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ABSTRACT 
 
Anna Panszczyk 
Dollhood: The Doll as a Space of Duality in 20th-Century Literature and Art 
(Under the direction of Eric Downing and Laurie Langbauer) 
 
This project explores the figure of the doll as something that textually and 
imagistically inhabits its own liminality and produces a particular uncanny experience. Dolls 
possess a liminality felt in the tension between contradictory opposing states that negate and 
collapse into one another. They are both living and dead, permanent and fleeting, feeling and 
unfeeling, loved and feared. I call this suspended state “dollhood” and argue that it points to 
both our desire for a permanent escape into “our things” and our inability ever to do so; we 
can never fully occupy the space of our dolls. 
The works investigated present images of the doll that speak to how a material culture 
constructs and names the identity of an object. The primary sources are North American and 
European twentieth-century works, including children’s books by Dare Wright and Sylvia 
Cassedy, poems by Charles Simic and Bolesław Leśmian, and artworks by Joseph Cornell 
and Hans Bellmer. The study engages theoretical concepts such as Victor Turner’s use of the 
“liminal,” Freud’s articulation of “the uncanny,” and Bill Brown’s writings on “thing 
theory.”  It also engages various essays by Baudelaire, Rilke, and Walter Benjamin. 
Each of the three main chapters is anchored in a particular metaphor: the shadow, the 
box, and the shadow box. The first uses the image of the shadow to examine the relationship 
between the human and the doll as one based on the visual experience of recognizing the 
iv 
 
possible existence of a doll soul as being both like and unlike that of the human. In the 
second, the tactile qualities of the box help articulate how the doll body is often explored and 
investigated to better understand the depth and breadth of its unique subjectivity. The third 
engages the image of a shadow box to examine how the doll can fluctuate and move between 
being read as an object or a subject. The conclusion examines how the doll can actually 
eclipse the human as a subject in a manner that gives fullest expression of the doll’s power 
over its audience. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“The overriding desire for most children is to get at and see the soul of their toys.… 
But where is the soul? This is the beginning of melancholy and gloom” 
from Charles Baudelaire’s essay, “A Philosophy of Toys,” 203-04 
 
“‘Only dolls,’” repeated the aunt, with icy significance. “Well, my child, you shall 
soon see what ‘only’ dolls can do.’”   
from William Sleator’s Among the Dolls (1975), 51 
 
 
 
Fig 1: “Plate 481 Movements, Female, Child, lifting a doll, turning, and walking off” 
Title: [Muybridge Animal Locomotion, plate 481]. ca. 1887 
Photographed by Eadweard Muybridge 
Archived at the University of Pennsylvania’s “University Archives Digital Image 
Collection:” <http://hdl.library.upenn.edu/1017/d/archives/20041222002.> 
Courtesy of the University of Pennsylvania Archives. 
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Background: 
The doll is nothing if not well known. As an image and an icon found in all aspects of 
culture, its uses and likeness have been studied across the academic disciplines: archeologists 
study dolls’ presence in excavated sites of ancient civilizations; religious scholars study the 
voodoo doll; sociologists relate dolls to gender roles; psychologists explore the doll through 
Freud’s idea of the uncanny; folklorists examine the gendering of lawn ornaments and 
funeral statues; economic historians research the American doll industry; and robotics 
scientists invent and obsess over mechanical doll innovations. Visual or literary 
representations of dolls as well as material doll toys have been the point of departure in 
discussions about cultural images of the female body (the improbable Barbie), its place in the 
construction of gender and identity (the act of playing with dolls), class (the marketing of 
Bratz Dolls vs. the American Girl Dolls), fetishization (the popularity of collectable dolls), 
and fashion (dolls’ historical association with femininity and fashionability).1 Dolls are also 
                                                          
1
 For the importance of dolls in ancient civilizations, see:  
Cerny, Jaroslav. “Organization of Ushabi-Figures.” Journal of Egyptian Archaeology. 34. 1949. 121. 
Marcus, Joyce. Women’s Ritual in Formative Oaxaca. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2008.   
Neils, Jennifer, John Howard Oakley, Katherine Hart, Lesley A. Beaumont. Coming of Age in Ancient Greece. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. 
For their importance in voodoo, see:  
Fanthorpe, Lionel and Patricia. Mysteries and Secrets of Voodoo, Santeria, and Obeah. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 
2008. 
For their relationship to gender roles in children, see: 
Crawford, Susan Hoy. Beyond Dolls & Guns: 101 Ways to Help Children Avoid Gender Bias. Portsmouth, NH: 
Heinemann, 1996.  
For their relationship to the uncanny experience, see: 
Freud, Sigmund. The Uncanny. Trans. David McLintock. New York: Penguin Books, 2003. 
For their visible representations of gender in folklore, see: 
Thomas, Jeannie B. Naked Barbies, Warrior Joes and Other Forms of Visible Gender. Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2003. 
For their relationship to American economic history, see: 
Formanek-Brunell, Miram. Made to Play House: Dolls and the Commercialization of American Girlhood, 1830-
1930. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. 
For their importance to animation and robotics, see: 
Wood, Gaby. Living Dolls: A Magical History of the Quest for Mechanical Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2002. 
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key figures or symbols in national literatures and works of art ranging from ancient Japanese 
texts to contemporary French graphic novels.2 The image of the doll is well documented 
across the spectrum of visual culture in examples as diverse as the earliest children’s book 
illustrations, classic horror films, gold framed daguerreotypes, home snapshots, nineteenth-
century portraiture by world renowned artists, eighteenth-century folk portraits by unknown 
American painters, and ads in the earliest days of commercial advertisement.3 Overall, 
scholarship has paid much attention to the doll and has tended to treat it as an object which 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
For Barbie’s influence, see: 
Lord, M.G. Forever Barbie: The Unauthorized Biography of a Real Doll. New York: Walker & Company, 
2004. 
McDonough, Yona Zeldis, Ed. The Barbie Chronicles: A Living Doll Turns Forty. New York: Touchstone, 
1999. 
Rogers, Mary F. Barbie Culture. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1999. 
Weissman, Kristin Noelle. Barbie: The Icon, the Image, the Ideal. An Analytical Interpretation of the Barbie 
Doll in Popular Culture. Boca Raton, FL: Universal Publishers, 1999.  
For dolls’ importance to play and gender identity, see: 
Chudacoff, Howard P. Children at Play: An American History. New York: NYU Press, 2007. 
Forman-Brunell, Miriam. Girlhood in America: An Encyclopedia. Oxford, UK: ABC-CLIO, 2001. 
For their relationship of class, see: 
Talbot, Margaret. “Little Hotties: Barbie’s New Rivals.” The New Yorker. Dec. 5. 2006. 
For their role as a fetishized object, see: 
Robertson, A. F. Life Like Dolls: The Collector Doll Phenomenon and the Lives of the Women Who Love 
Them. New York: Routledge, 2004. 
For their importance in fashion, see: 
Peers, Juliette. The Fashion Doll: From Bébé Jumeau to Barbie. Oxford, UK: Berg Publishers, 2004. 
 
2
 To name only a few: Murasaki Shikibu’s Tale of Genji (Japan), Canepa’s and Barbucci’s Sky Doll, 
Vol. 1 (France), Prus’s The Doll (Poland), Ibsen’s A Doll’s House (Norway), Ray Lawler’s Summer of the 
Seventeenth Doll (Australia), Tchaikovsky’s The Nutcracker (Russia), short stories by Carlos Fuentes’ 
including “The Doll Queen,” “Chac-Mool,” and “La Desdichada” (Mexico). 
 
3
 As a type of visual addendum to this dissertation, I have created a catalog of images that is meant to 
be illustrative of the many different types of representations of dolls found in visual cultures: 
www.dollhood.tumblr.com. Such representations included at this address include the categories of images listed 
here as well as many others which I feel reflect an idea of “dollhood” in general. Please note also that this 
virtual collection is an ongoing and publicly open blog and therefore interactive as it is located on Tumblr, a 
mini-blog service that allows users to upload as well comment on each others’ posted images. Finally, though I 
do attempt to identify the sources of every image on “dollhood,” this is not always a possibility. However, as 
the front page of the blog states, I am not the original creator or source of any of the images and do, at the very 
least, post a link to every internet page on which I located a particular image. I have not scanned, uploaded, or 
put any images on this website that did not already exist virtually and, if notified that any image breached 
copyright law, it was immediately removed. Nevertheless, any image directly referred to on the pages of this 
project is not only fully cited to credible sources, but, if visually represented, appears by permission of the 
copyright holders.   
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historicizes culture, acts as another of its artifacts, or as a symbol which embodies the larger 
issues and concerns of a culture. The doll in the twentieth century in particular has been well 
scrutinized as a gateway to the past, a symbol, or a representation, but it has been neglected 
as an invention. The doll has been viewed as the conductive tissue to something else, an echo 
to some other time, as another example of some other definition. In a sense, the doll has been 
read as an empty thing and so the depth of its power has been abbreviated.  
 
Thesis: 
Mourning the consequences of a culture that values rush and oversimplification, 
Walter Benjamin quotes the French poet Paul Valéry in his essay “The Storyteller: 
Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov” (first published in 1936) in order to explore the 
balance between nature and artifice in craftsmanship. He argues that the performance of a 
craft no longer resembles the forces of nature as it once did, and Benjamin recognizes this 
loss of slow process and production as the storyteller’s loss as well: 
“This patient process of Nature,” Valéry continues, “was once imitated by men. 
Miniatures, ivory carvings, elaborated to the point of greatest perfection, stones that 
are perfect in polish and engraving, lacquer work or paintings in which a series of 
thin, transparent layers are placed one on top of the other—all these products of 
sustained, sacrificing effort are vanishing, and the time is past in which time did not 
matter. Modern man no longer works at what cannot be abbreviated.” (“Storyteller” 
92-3) 
Just as the art of layering, whether in “lacquer work” or in storytelling seems to have been 
lost and replaced by its modern condensed version, the concept of the doll has also been 
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metaphorically cut short by modern man in a way that has nothing to do with its material 
production. The doll has been abbreviated and stripped of its unique power, its “thingness”4 
or “aura,”5 by how quickly and definitively that power is read in only certain narrow 
examinations. Specifically, the most narrowing examination offered the doll is the concept of 
the “uncanny” which, quite conversely, is also a concept that claims to have knowledge of 
the profundity of the doll’s real power.6 Nevertheless, my project aspires to reach very 
different goals. First, this dissertation provides an exploration of the doll as a force outside of 
the milieu of material culture scholarship. Secondly, my project will set apart traditional 
readings about how the doll offers itself as a site of uncanny experience. Instead, I will argue 
that the doll defines a liminality of the narrative experience whereas it is able to be, both 
                                                          
4
 “Thingness” in terms of Bill Brown’s definition of “thing theory” as investigated in a number of his 
works including the following essays: “How to Do Things with Things (A Toy Story)” published in Critical 
Inquiry (summer 1998), “Thing Theory” published in Critical Inquiry (autumn 2001), “The Secret Life of 
Things: Virginia Woolf and the Matter of Modernism” published in Modernism/Modernity (1999), “Reification, 
Reanimation, and the American Uncanny” published in Critical Inquiry (winter 2006), and the following two 
texts: The Material Unconscious: American Amusement, Stephen Crane, and the Economics of Play (1996) and 
A Sense of Things: The Object Matter of American Literature (2003). This term will be addressed later in this 
introduction. 
 
5
 “Aura” in terms of Benjamin’s articulation of it in his essay “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction” (originally published in 1936) will also discussed later in this chapter, but note that 
the version of the Benjamin essay referenced throughout this project is the Harry Zohn translation found in the 
Hannah Arendt edited collection, Illuminations (1969). 
 
6
 Though there is critical scholarship about the literary and aesthetic doll that has examined it in terms 
of such rich concepts as thing theory, the cyborg, childhood, animation, and possession, the child’s toy is still 
too often first and foremost discussed in popular culture in terms of sexuality (see footnote 11) or its given 
uncanniness. However, for works that discuss the doll in some of these other topics see, first, the following 
influential essays:  Bill Brown’s “How to Do Things with Things (A Toy Story)” (1998) for a discussion of the 
doll through “thing theory” and Donna Haraway’s “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and 
Socialist Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century” (1991) to read the doll through the cyborg lens. 
In addition, major texts specifically on dolls include: Lois Kuznet’s When Toys Come Alive: Narratives of 
Animation, Metamorphosis, and Development (1994), A. F. Robertson’s Life Like Dolls: The Collector Doll 
Phenomenon and the Lives of the Women Who Love Them (2004), Kitti Carriker’s Created in Our Image: The 
Miniature Body of the Doll as Subject and Object (1998), and Miriam Formanek-Brunell’s Made to Play 
House: Dolls and the Commercialization of American Girlhood (1830-1930) (1993).  
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independently as well as simultaneously, the subject and object and therefore can express an 
entirely unique space of power as a material object in a literary or visual text.  
This state of tension and amalgamation between subject and object, since it is so well 
articulated by the image of the doll, I will define and recapitulate with the term, “dollhood.” 
However, as I argue in the conclusion of this work, other characters, including human beings, 
can also occupy this liminal state of being, this “dollhood,” in literature and other works of 
art. The term “dollhood,” however, works beautifully in conveying this state because 
“[b]eing a living suffix, -hood can be affixed at will to almost any word denoting a person or 
concrete thing, and to many adjectives, to express condition or state, so that the number of 
these derivatives is indefinite” (online OED), and the specific word and concept of this 
“state,” as this chapter will express, is imperative to my argument. This term has been used 
once before in Miriam Formanek-Brunell’s “The Politics of Dollhood in Nineteenth-Century 
America,” which I first came across as reprinted in The Children’s Culture Reader (1998).7 
Formanek-Brunell focuses on a historical study of how dolls were presented, used, played 
with, and manipulated by both children and adults throughout America in the nineteenth 
century. Aside from the title, the word “dollhood” only appears one other time in the essay 
and refers to a historical/sociological context: “Busy parents with fewer children provided 
their daughters with the companionship of dolls, thereby lengthening childhood and 
prolonging their ‘dollhood’” (“Politics” 368). In my own work, I am redefining this term and, 
for all intents and purposes, introducing it into a critical literary, rather than a social science, 
discourse. In my argument, dollhood is a liminal state of being which neither the exclusively 
living nor the exclusively nonliving can occupy. Instead, dollhood is a space of reconciliation 
                                                          
7
 It is also a chapter in Formanek-Brunell’s Made to Play House: Dolls and the Commercialization of 
American Girlhood (1830-1930) (1993). 
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in which contradictory states, like the object and the subject, surrender into one another while 
also still firmly holding on with their own respective footing. I would argue that while dolls 
alone do not occupy this space, western culture has illustrated this liminal state through the 
ways in which twentieth-century works of literature, art, and film engage with, present, and 
imagine the doll. The doll is then the emblem of this interstructural state and, I would also 
argue, the doll is also its inventor as it fully defines, illustrates, and captures that very state of 
being. Though present in various genres, collectively these works not only feature the doll, 
but also play with the same boundaries of identity, imagination, and the threshold experience 
in terms of the doll.  
 
Brief Overview: 
The works I investigate in this dissertation present challenging and thought-provoking 
images of the doll that speak to how a material culture can construct and name the identity in 
an object. Drawing from poetry and children’s literature as well as from film and visual art, 
my thesis engages dolls as an assemblage of experiences that negotiate difference across 
psychological states: dolls repeatedly demand to look and be looked at, they insist on the 
wholeness of their body and yet desire its fragmentation. The primary sources I discuss in 
this project offer a varied collection of American and European twentieth-century works 
including children’s picture books such as Dare Wright’s Lonely Doll, middle-grade novels 
like Sylvia Cassedy’s Lucie Babbidge’s House, poetry by Charles Simic, artworks by both 
Joseph Cornell and Hans Bellmer, and even a photo story from Life magazine. I also include 
lesser known though remarkable texts such as a poem by Polish poet Bolesław Leśmian and 
a children’s short story by Ian McEwan. All of these works have a two-fold function: they 
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are capable of illustrating well-known ideas of the doll (as a thing of horror, a childhood 
reminiscence, a mirror, a cyborg), but they also demonstrate the space of dollhood to be, to 
borrow from Bill Brown’s A Sense of Things: The Object Matter of American Literature 
(2003), “the story of a kind of possession that is irreducible to ownership” (13). As to the 
theoretical make-up of my project, I have drawn from a number of critical texts in order to 
illustrate the particular liminality of the doll state, but the tent poles of dollhood are two 
specific concepts: Victor Turner’s use of the “liminal” and Sigmund Freud’s articulation of 
“the uncanny.”  
Moreover, in order to express the various layers of this particular liminal space, each 
of the three following chapters is anchored in its use of a specific image as metaphor: the 
shadow, the box, and the shadow box. Individually, each image/metaphor offers its own 
singular complexity of understanding and nuance of meaning to the doll. The shadow offers 
its relationship to the body as being one which is wholly personal, but also a relationship 
which is based on the visual experience. The box provides the doll a means through which to 
discuss how the doll, like the box, is experienced through the active investigation 
accomplished by the sense of touch. The shadow box articulates for the doll the complexity 
of being its own singular art object as well as a combination of “shadow” and “box.” 
Collectively, these images/metaphors provide a fuller and richer understanding of dollhood 
and so the concluding chapter explores how they are all at work in the liminal state of 
dollhood. 
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Primary texts: 
The twentieth-century texts discussed in this project cover a range of media including 
poetry, photography, newspaper print, and works of art. However, in a sense, these texts are 
liminal themselves in that they belong to less authoritative genres of literature or are 
reflective of a minor area within a larger, more established genre of critical study.8 The genre 
which overshadows all the others and is at the very heart of this project is a doubly liminal 
genre due to its subject matter and intended audience: children’s literature. Children’s 
literature is central to this paper’s argument because of its connection to the liminal space of 
imaginative narratives associated with childhood and childhood play and, of course, the doll 
and doll play. As Walter Benjamin observed in his “The Cultural History of Toys” (first 
published in 1928), it is an error to assume:  
…that the imaginative content of a child’s toys is what determines his playthings; 
whereas in reality the opposite is true. A child wants to pull something, and so he 
becomes a horse; he wants to play with sand, and so he turns into a baker; he wants to 
hide, and so he turns into a robber or a policeman. (“Cultural” 115) 
Imitation, Benjamin writes, “is at home in the playing, not the plaything” (“Cultural” 116).9 
Since the state of dollhood is articulated not in the doll alone, away from any subject, but in 
                                                          
8
 There are no novels, short fiction intended for adult audiences, or canonical works of live-action film 
represented in this project and though poetry is discussed, they are works by poets who are considered more 
avant garde and so less mainstream like the Yugoslavian-born American imagist Charles Simic and the 
metaphysical Polish poet Bolesław Leśmian.  
 
9
 E.H. Gombrich’s famous essay, “Meditations on a Hobby Horse or the Roots of Artistic Form” 
(1951), also speaks to the (what he called) “image-making” aspect of play. Gombrich also claimed that there is 
a biological need to perform this kind of “making:” He wrote: “The ‘first’ hobby horse…was probably no 
image at all. Just a stick which qualified as a horse because one could ride on it. The tritium comparationis, the 
common factor, was function rather than form. Or, more precisely, that formal aspect which fulfilled the 
minimum requirement for the performance of the function – for any “ridable” object could serve as a horse…in 
this sense, ‘substitutes’ reach deep into biological functions that are common to man and animal” (45).   
10 
 
an individual’s engagement with the toy as an object, one is more likely to find examples of 
this type of “object engagement” as well as descriptions of such narratives of imitation in 
texts for children or about childhood. In addition, as Benjamin intimates, narratives of 
childhood often express what occurs when the toy object not only stops acting as a reflection, 
but when it expresses difference from what is expected of it − a difference only recognized 
and experienced by the human child whether that experience with the toy as an “other” 
occurs within the realm of a child’s dream state, his or her imagination, or in the “real” world 
context of a children’s story.  
Finally, aside from the experience of differentiation from the doll that may be 
captured in the pages of a children’s book, a child’s reading of that narrative may also 
convey an experience of great beauty and power. Turning to Benjamin once again, consider 
the following passage from his “A Glimpse into the World of Children’s Books” (1926): 
Things do not come out to meet the picturing child from the pages of the book; 
instead, in looking, the child enters into them as a cloud that becomes suffused with 
the riotous colors and the world of pictures. Sitting before his painted book, he makes 
the Taoist vision of perfection come true: he overcomes the illusory barrier of the 
book’s surface and passes through colored textures and brightly painted partitions to 
enter a stage on which the fairy tale lives. … In such an open, color-bedecked world 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
There is also a range of interesting texts (from purely psychological studies to works on the visual arts) which 
engage with the idea that child’s play is a type of narrative mimesis. For example, grounded in the nature of 
child play, Kendall L. Walton’s fascinating book Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the 
Representational Arts (1990) develops a theory of make-believe in order to address the nature of representation 
in fiction as well as art because, as he writes, “What all representations have in common is a role in make-
believe” (4). Other engaging (though somewhat more anthropological or psychological) works include: 
Laurence Goldman’s Child’s Play: Myth, Mimesis and Make-Believe (1998), Carol Fleisher Feldman’s  2005 
article for Cognitive Development titled “Mimesis: Where Play and Narrative Meet,” and the anthropological 
work of renowned kindergarten and nursery school teacher Vivian Gussin Paley, especially her Bad Guys Don’t 
Have Birthdays: Fantasy Play at Four (1988), Boys and Girls: Superheroes in the Doll Corner (1984), and The 
Boy Who Would be a Helicopter (1991). 
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where everything shifts at every step, the child is allowed to join in the game. 
(“Glimpse” 226) 
Certainly, not all children have such an overwhelming experience with reading, nor can it be 
claimed that such a sensation occurs for the most impressionable child with every book she 
encounters. Nevertheless one can argue it is the child, as Benjamin suggests, who is more 
impressionable and imaginatively available and is thus more likely to have such an 
overwhelming reading experience compared to most adults.  
There are, of course, other genres of literature aside from children’s literature, such as 
science fiction, that also eagerly play with dimensions of identity and suspension of reality 
through the presence of the doll figure. Nonetheless, as adult texts, such doll narratives often 
also engage with sexual elements tied to the presence of that particular female form, and 
sexualizing dolls would inform this project in an entirely different way.10 Although there 
undoubtedly remains a great deal more that may be said about the relationship between 
inanimate female bodies and the men who create, desire, use or brutalize them especially 
through cyborg theory, it is also essential to examine doll narratives through the lens of 
aesthetics as well as the lens of gender, sexuality, or other identity politics. I argue that it is 
through the child and the literature of children that one can clearly establish how the doll may 
be critically approached in a new way. To a child, the doll is no cyborg; its technologies are 
different. In many science fiction works, the actual animation of the cyborg may presume a 
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 Female-identified dolls are, of course, not the only kind of dolls. There are also male dolls such as 
those marketed to boys like action figures and army men, boy-gendered baby dolls like Cabbage Patch Dolls, 
the Ken doll, Woody and Buzz from Toy Story, and the infamous Chucky from the horror film series, Child’s 
Play. However, though I do refer to some of these boy dolls, the specificity of being a male doll or playing with 
a male doll, is not the focus of this study. Instead, my focus is on the doll in general and the doll, in general, is 
seen as female. 
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“pygmalionism”11 that gestures to its man-made sexualized status, but the enlivened doll can 
also be registered as being more akin to an ensoulment, possessing an essence that may be 
represented in numerous ways aside from its materiality. For example, to discuss a story 
about a boy breaking a doll (as in the acts of ten-year-old Peter Fortune in Ian McEwan’s The 
Daydreamer (1994)12) by relying solely on generalizations about how males objectify the 
female form through the manipulation of female dolls would be careless scholarship. Indeed, 
in many such narratives, the human male claims the power in the exchange between a 
female-identified object and the human man as “maker” of said object, but there are also 
other avenues of studying such a relationship. For example, in my second chapter, I will 
argue, in the context of “The Dolls,” a story from The Daydreamer, that the literal 
fragmentation and splintering taking place with the boy is actually more of an exploration of 
a particular power the doll has over the human than the articulation of female or child 
objectification since this act actually occupies a liminal space that no human can easily and 
permanently ascertain. Therefore, though works like Salman Rushdie’s Fury (2001) and the 
infamous Alma doll belonging to Austrian artist Oskar Kokoschka (1886-1980) may be 
intriguing to pair with McEwan’s children’s story in order to discuss the power dynamics 
played out in the relationship of male creator to female doll, I am more interested in 
removing all previously discussed cultural relationships between the human and the doll in 
order to explore a new power dynamic. In this way, I ask: if we remove issues of gender 
                                                          
11
 Some thought-provoking works which address this type of gendered and usually sexualized 
relationship include: Victor I. Stoichita’s The Pygmalion Effect: From Ovid to Hitchcock (translated by Alison 
Anderson), (2008); Lynda Nead’s The Haunted Galley: Painting, Photography, Film around 1900 (2007); 
Giorgio Agamben’s Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture (translated by Ronald L. Martinez), 
(1993); George L. Hersey’s Falling in Love with Statues: Artificial Humans from Pygmalion to the Present 
(2009); and Alan Bacher Williamson’s Almost a Girl: Male Writers and Identification (2001). 
 
12
 Ian McEwan. The Daydreamer. Ill. Anthony Browne. New York: Joanna Cotler Books, 
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(human male to female doll) as well as dichotomies in femininity (male child to female doll), 
race (African-American child to Caucasian doll), and class (poor child to expensive doll) 
then where is the power of the doll located once all those are stripped away? Or to borrow 
from Book One of Ovid’s “Metamorphosis,” a quote which, coincidentally, also acts as an 
epigraph to McEwan’s The Daydreamer: “My purpose is to tell of bodies which have been 
transformed into shapes of a different kind.” 
In Plato’s Symposium, Alcibiades tells Socrates that what he loves about him is his 
agalma, the mysterious treasure, hidden inside. In a similar sense, the true power of the doll, 
its agalma, is only seen once we look past the body of scholarship and the way that culture 
currently reads its objects. Without negating other ways of reading, in this project I discuss 
these texts through more of a phenomenological philosophy, paying greater attention to the 
subjective experience of the doll than the shared public experience in my attempt to articulate 
that essential power that the doll (no matter its making) has over the human (no matter his or 
her cultural identity). My interest is to study the doll that is animated through the mechanics 
of the imagination rather than the mechanics of physical articulation or technology. To 
illustrate the distinction, consider a doll story as simple as Liesel Moak Skorpen’s Elizabeth 
(1970).13  
This thirty-two page children’s book begins with Christmas, the holiday most 
commonly linked to doll transformation in literature and art,14 when nothing necessarily 
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 Liesel Moak Skorpen. Elizabeth. Ill. Martha Alexander. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 
1970. 
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 Christmastime recurs as the setting for tales of dolls animation because like birthdays and Easter, 
this holiday provides a type of toy origins story due to the fact that these are occasions when a toy can be 
considered “born” as it enters the child’s world first as unknown and unopened present that is then brought to 
being by the tearing of paper and the opening of packages. For example, at the conclusion of Elizabeth, as Kate, 
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overtly “magical” happens but when two dolls are, in a way, born. The protagonist, Kate, 
receives an unnamed “soft cloth doll with warm brown eyes and thick brown braids” that 
looks remarkably like her and yet does not seem to “do” anything; when the child asks her 
mother: “What does it do?,” her mother replies that it does “[e]verything a doll’s supposed to 
do” (6). Thinking it to be “an ugly doll,” Kate instead expresses jealousy over the seemingly 
livelier doll, in both programmed abilities and girlish appearance, which her cousin Agnes 
receives for Christmas: 
Agnes had a new doll whose name was Charlotte Louise. Charlotte Louise could walk 
and talk. “Where is your Christmas doll?” asked Agnes. 
Kate showed her the cloth doll lying in the box. 
 “What does it do?” asked Agnes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the child protagonist, tugs her doll into bed on Christmas night she wishes it not only a “Merry Christmas,” but, 
as the doll was received a year ago that day, Kate also wishes it a “Happy Birthday too!” (Skorpen, 32). 
However, aside from the fact that dolls are given as presents during Christmas, another reason for the 
plethora of Christmas doll stories is the magical quality associated with the holiday. The most well-known 
animation of dolls and toys during Christmastime is E. T. A. Hoffmann’s story, “The Nutcracker and the Mouse 
King” (1816), a story which is actually better known as the Tchaikovsky penned ballet, the perennial favorite, 
“The Nutcracker.” Many writers have written doll animation stories which are, not so coincidentally, also 
Christmas stories such as Louisa May Alcott’s short story, “A Christmas Dream, And How it Came True” 
(1890) (thanks to Dr. Anne Bruder for this reference) and the very brief and very peculiar “The Crooked Mirror 
(A Christmas Story)” by Anton Chekhov. Children’s doll stories include Big Susan (1947) written and 
illustrated by Elizabeth Orton Jones, The Story of Holly and Ivy (1959) by Rumer Godden, and The Dolls’ 
Christmas (1950) by Tasha Tudor. One also cannot forget the presence of the rag doll on the “Island of Misfit 
Toys” which made its indelible mark on Christmas in popular American culture when it appeared in the stop-
motion classic, “Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer” (1964). A passage from the short story, “The Brandenburg 
Gate” by Sarah West Lander (published in the “Berlin” volume of the series Spectacles for Young Eyes (1865)) 
hints to the magical as well as visual pleasure of this holiday that seems to make everything, including dolls, 
come alive:   
"They do not look empty to-night," exclaimed Walter; "for, if Berlin was never gay before, it is so now." 
"It is glorious," said Peter. "It is Christmas eve: every one is moving about, and the whole city is 
alive." 
It was true. Shops were open; boxes of toys had been unloading all day, and for a week before; dolls 
were winking from the windows; dogs were barking; cats were mewing; jumping-jacks and jugglers were 
performing wonderful feats; Christmas-trees were glittering with golden apples, and lighted with wax-tapers. 
"Well! what kind of a city do you call this?” inquired old nurse, suddenly roused by the confusion and 
the lights." Is it a spectacle and a show, or a playhouse for children?" 
"It is a spectacle for young eyes, nurse; and we cannot but enjoy it too." (23-24) 
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 “It doesn’t do anything,” Kate replied. 
 “What is its name?” asked Agnes. 
 “It doesn’t have a name,” said Kate. 
 “It certainly is an ugly doll,” said Agnes. She set Charlotte Louise down on 
the floor, and Charlotte Louise turned a somersault. 
 “I hate you, Agnes,” Kate said, “and I hate your ugly doll!” 
 Kate was sent upstairs to bed without any pumpkin pie. (10) 
Kate angrily discards the doll by giving it to the dog, but, eventually, retrieves it from where 
her pet has buried it in the snow (an act suggesting its rebirth). Kate realizes that her simple 
cloth doll, now named “Elizabeth,” “could do everything:”  
  When Kate was happy, Elizabeth was happy. 
  When Kate was sad, Elizabeth understood. 
 When Kate was mad and said something mean and had to go upstairs, 
Elizabeth went with her. (16)  
For Kate, Elizabeth turned out to be more alive than the pre-named and pre-programmed 
Charlotte Louise who, despite her somersaulting and blonde-haired and pink-dressed 
glamour, seems completely lifeless. In fact, in the story’s conclusion, the plot goes full circle 
and returns to the following year’s Christmas holiday. While Kate receives other gifts, 
including new dresses for her doll Elizabeth, her bratty cousin, Agnes, receives yet another 
new doll because last year’s Charlotte Louise, who could “do” mechanical tricks, was 
already broken and thrown “in the trash” by the summertime (22). This year, the difference 
between the two cousins is that now when Kate expresses her hatred toward Agnes and her 
new doll, it is not blurted out in jealousy, but whispered to her cousin with relish, suggesting 
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quite the opposite feeling from the one she once had toward Agnes and her then new doll 
exactly a year ago: 
 Agnes had a new doll whose name was Tina Marie. 
“Tina Marie can sing songs,” said Agnes. “She can blow bubbles too, and 
crawl along the floor.” 
Kate held Elizabeth tightly in her arms. 
“Well,” said Kate in a whisper, “Tina Marie is the ugliest doll I ever saw. She 
is almost as ugly as you.” 
Agnes kicked Kate sharply on the leg and said the most dreadful things to 
Elizabeth, who was looking particularly well in her velvet dress. 
Agnes’s mother was very cross with Agnes. 
Agnes spent the rest of the day in disgrace and wasn’t permitted any pumpkin 
pie. (30) 
In a reversal from the Christmas before, Agnes is punished and goes to bed without pumpkin 
pie even though, as it was last year, it was Kate who escalated the name-calling between the 
two cousins. For the reader, this turnaround not only suggests that Kate, and through her the 
doll Elizabeth, are the ones meant to be cheered as heroes, but also that they are heroic 
because they illustrate a larger swath of what a doll “can do” when it is engaged with that 
force of active imaginative play that exists entirely outside of cyborg elements: the 
mechanics of a voice box or the workings of motored limbs. It is that ensoulment of the doll 
that exists in the intimate space of play between such a scrappy heroine and her simple rag 
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doll that I propose as more powerful, more valued, and a more lasting enlivening than the 
produced results of motorized clockworks.15  
For the primary texts in this project, I also sought such depictions of doll animation in 
children’s literature of the twentieth century because that genre and period share a connection 
to modern psychology. As the tail end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the 
twentieth was a time period in which the social, emotional, and imaginative world of 
children’s minds began to receive serious attention from the fields of social science, 
psychology also began to play a role in shaping children’s literature. These new interests in 
the child then turned and informed the constructs of the worlds given back to children in 
picture and story form. As Kenneth Kidd wrote in his 2004 article, “Psychoanalysis and 
Children’s Literature: The Case for Complementarity”: 
From the start, psychoanalysis was part and parcel of a new interest in childhood that 
drew from evolutionary metaphor and the emergent social sciences. That interest in 
turn transformed the scene of children’s literature. “When the late nineteenth century 
found that its researches into origin and development focused attention on the child,” 
writes Juliet Dusinberre, “it simultaneously produced for those children a literature 
which revealed as clearly as possible adult hopes for the new generation” ….While 
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 Worth noting that aside from this opposition between mechanical and immaterial animation, this 
story points to a number of other more archetypal patterns of tension. In the dolls alone, there are the opposing 
sides of handicraft (Elizabeth) vs. mass produced commodity (Charlotte Louise and then her doppelganger Tina 
Marie), working class (handmade rag doll) vs. upper class (store-bought dolls), and constructs of personal 
identity (Elizabeth looks like Kate and is named by Kate) vs. public persona (Agnes’ dolls don’t really belong 
to her as they are pre-named and pre-packaged to look only like each other). And then, in terms of the girls 
themselves, they are also, in both word and text, polar opposites of one another. Where Kate, with her brown 
braided pigtails and simple yet classic first name is as familiar and trusting to us as is the form of her rag doll, 
Agnes, with her upturned nose and bowed hair is as spoiled and prissy as is suggested by the pretentious names 
given to her dolls. And though both use the same “ugly” language, with Kate its use is meant to register as 
scrappy and is intended to elicit cheers from readers while from Agnes, such language is read as coming from a 
spoiled and cruel child. These differences between the girls (in looks, demeanor, as well as suggested class) are 
also reminiscent of another, much more familiar rivalry in children’s literature: the one between the out-spoken 
Laura Ingalls and the spoiled Nellie Oleson as found in the works of Laura Ingalls Wilder. 
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there may be no direct or simple correspondence between psychoanalysis and 
children’s literature, it’s safe to say that the whole project of writing for children was 
profoundly altered by the insights of psychoanalysis, and child analysis especially. 
(Kidd 115) 
As Kidd as well as other contemporary theorists have suggested, the relationship formed at 
the beginning of the twentieth century between the social sciences and children’s literature is 
worthy of drawing from and addressing in a project such as this which is attempting to 
discuss the doll in a new way.16 Along with the general richness of readings that 
psychoanalysis has provided to children’s literature written in the twentieth century, it was 
also during this time period that a major study on how children understand and play with 
dolls, in particular, was produced and widely remarked upon.  
G. Stanley Hall, known as “the father of adolescence”17 and one of the first major 
child psychologists, conducted the study, titled “A Study of Dolls,” along with A. Caswell 
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 In addition to Kidd’s essay, an excellent overview is Hamida Bosmajian’s chapter, 
“Psychoanalytical Criticism,” found in the International Companion Encyclopedia of Children’s Literature 
(1996) in which she begins by stating that: “the child and childhood hold a privileged position in most 
psychoanalytical theories, the elective affinity between children’s literature and psychological criticism seems 
more natural than the affinity between psychology and literature” (86). 
Also see Jacqueline Rose’s canonical The Case of Peter Pan or The Impossibility of Children’s Fiction 
(1984), Karín Lesnik-Oberstein’s Children’s Literature: Criticism and the Fictional Child (1994) and Juliet 
Dusinberre’s Alice to the Lighthouse: Children’s Books and Radical Experiments in Art (1987). 
17
 Hall’s most famous work is the 1904 two volume edition of Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its 
Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion, and Education. A pioneer in child 
psychology and credited with defining adolescence, the gist of Hall’s theory, as defined in Adolescence, was 
that the “storm and stress” seen during these years was “an inevitable outcome of evolutionary processes” 
(Epstein 117). However, as Robert Epstein notes in his 2007 work, The Case Against Adolescence: 
Rediscovering the Adult in Every Teen, Hall’s theory was discredited by the 1930s because it was based on a 
“faulty theory from biology” (Ibid). Indeed, although no longer recognized as accurate, Hall’s famous work is 
still known and addressed in the psychological community in order to discuss current practices as well as 
historical understandings of adolescence. Furthermore, the psychological accuracy of “A Study of Dolls,” which 
is the primary work by Hall that I consider does not appear ever to have been discredited. While undeniably 
dated, perhaps this particular work has been left unchallenged because its form is more of an empirical record of 
data rather than an interpretive analysis of it. Nevertheless, this project is not in a position to speak to the 
validity of such psychological research, but only to point to how such works may have not only reflected, but 
also contributed to twentieth-century ideas of the child and the doll as illustrated in literature and art. And 
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Ellis, in the late nineteenth century in order to observe, gather, and catalogue the responses 
American and British schoolchildren gave to their own relationships to this particular toy. 
Published in 1896, the study offers an abundance of information on how children play with 
and think about dolls, illustrating that very particular power the doll has over its child.18 As 
Hall and Ellis observed: “Nothing illustrates the strength of the doll instinct and the vigor of 
the animistic fancy” as do children who will find anything from pillows to flowers to “stuffed 
elephants (seemed like a real baby)” to act as doll substitutes for them (“Dolls” 159). Another 
psychologist, James Sully,19 also addressed the power the doll has over children as he wrote 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
although there is discussion of this work within the social sciences especially in the area of “doll play,” I am 
more invested in how contemporary literary scholars have engaged with this work especially Robertson’s  Life 
Like Dolls, Carriker’s Created in Our Image, Bill Brown’s The Material Unconscious, and Formanek-Brunell’s 
Made to Play House. 
 
18
 According to A. F. Robertson’ s Life Like Dolls: The Collector Doll Phenomenon and the Lives of 
the Women Who Love Them (2004), this empirically structured study by American psychologists Granville 
Stanley Hall (1844-1924) and Alexander Caswell Ellis (1871-1948),  has no parallel in terms of its scope and 
depth - even after more than a century since its publication. Hall and Ellis provided detailed surveys to 
interested American and British school teachers who volunteered to administer this “test stimuli” to their 
students and so “hundreds, sometimes thousands of ‘cases’” informed the final work (Robertson 261).  
“A Study of Dolls” was published in December 1896 in volume four of Pedagogical Seminary. This 
journal, later renamed the Journal of Genetic Psychology, was the first of its kind in the field of child 
psychology (it was also founded by Hall in 1893). Though not even 50 pages long, the study itself is incredibly 
detailed and well organized in the cataloging of the many aspects of doll play. It is divided into several sections 
that address topics as diverse as the materials of which dolls were made as well as their apparent “psychic 
qualities” (Hall, “Dolls” 159). It also inventories how children fed, dressed, put to sleep, disciplined, named, 
groomed, accessorized, and played with their dolls; and  how children perceived illness and death in their dolls 
and how these toys were treated and considered when thought “dead.” In addition, this study incorporates 
historical and international examples of doll play and makes room to reference Victor Hugo, Goethe, and Queen 
Victoria. And along with the aforementioned wealth of information already crammed into the pages of this 
study, Hall and Ellis also included generous amounts of quotes taken directly from children themselves. 
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 James Sully (1842-1923) was an English psychologist most renowned for introducing and studying 
children’s art into and through the science of psychology. His most famous work, Studies of Childhood (1896), 
is quite an engaging work of study on the complexity and inaccessibility of children’s imaginations and worlds 
of play. In addition to the direct study of the child, Sully also drew much from literature incorporating writers 
such as George Sand, John Ruskin, and Robert Louis Stevenson into his concepts. Though the interdisciplinary 
facet of his work is fascinating, Sully also relied heavily on the problematic analogy between children and 
“primitive” peoples especially in his discussion of child art. This type of equating is, however, reflective of how 
influential Darwin’s evolutionary theory was during this time period according to Carolyn Steedman’s Strange 
Dislocations: Childhood and the Idea of Human Interiority, 1780-1930 (1995). Quoting Frank Sulloway’s work 
on Freud, Steedman notes:  “‘Darwin’s pervasive influence on child psychology’, and the way in which in the 
second half of the nineteenth century it became increasing common for psychologists [Sully, among others] to 
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in his essay responding to Hall’s and Ellis’s study titled “Dollatry” (1899): “dolls seem to 
reach a higher degree of reality than other playthings. As objects of passionate attachment, 
they appear to grow a part of the child’s very self, and so become the least questionable of 
realities” (68).20  
Although my study is not a work of psychological analysis, the popularity and 
influence that such studies had by the turn of one century (no matter whether they were later 
challenged, overturned or dismissed) clearly casts a large shadow over the century that was 
to follow and thus cannot be ignored. In fact, those studies still appear to inform how the 
child and/or the doll are considered even in texts of the latter half of the twentieth century, 
including those addressed in this dissertation. In addition to the 1896 “Study of Dolls” and 
Sully’s 1899 “Dollatry,” other intriguing studies which influence how scholars talk about the 
power of twentieth-century dolls include another study by Hall (with Theodate L. Smith) 
titled “Curiosity and Interest” (1903), a doll study conducted in Poland by Madam Anna 
Grudzinska, titled “A Study of Dolls Among Polish Children” (1907), James Frazer’s classic 
anthropological study, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion (first 2 volumes 
published in 1890); a study on children and shadows, found in The Child’s Conception of 
Physical Causality (1927) by renowned French child psychologist Jean Piaget; and the 
encyclopedic work by Max von Boehn, titled Dolls and Puppets (1932, in English) which 
attempted to catalog all of the doll’s vast uses and understandings including dissimilar 
categories such as “prehistoric idols,” “utensils in doll form,” and “the shadow theatre of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
compare the emergence of instincts in childhood with those in the lower animals” (84). Also see Donna Darling 
Kelly’s Uncovering the History of Children’s Drawing and Art (2004) and Jonathan Fineberg’s Discovering 
Child Art: Essays on Childhood, Primitivism, and Modernism (1998). 
 
20
 Sully’s essay goes on to acknowledge that children can also have intense attachments to animal toys, 
but it is not quite the same unique attachment that they have to dolls. 
21 
 
orient.”21 Finally, it is worth noting that one of the critical concepts that I use to illustrate the 
state of dollhood was also first published in the early part of the twentieth century: Freud’s 
“The Uncanny” was originally published in 1919. 
 
Theoretical Framework: 
The Liminal: 
My concept of dollhood, first and foremost, necessarily incorporates definitions of the 
liminal. Victor Turner, the cultural anthropologist, writes in “Betwixt and Between: The 
Liminal Period in Rites de Passage,” in his The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu 
Ritual (1967), that “our basic model of society is that of a ‘structure of positions’” or “states” 
(93): 
By “state” I mean here “a relatively fixed or stable condition” and would include in 
its meaning such social constancies as legal status, profession, office or calling, rank 
or degree. I hold it to designate also the condition of a person as determined by his 
culturally recognized degree of maturation as when one speaks of “the married or 
single state” or the “state of infancy.” The term “state” may also be applied to 
ecological conditions, or to the physical, mental or emotional condition in which a 
person or group may be found at a particular time. A man may thus be in a state of 
                                                          
21
 As further evidence as to the importance of these studies, there are key literary texts which were also 
published during this same time period that, in their own right, seem to express many of the interests that the 
anthropological and psychological studies discuss, specifically the relationship between man (or child), nature, 
and the inanimate object. These works may be considered as having also influenced later generations of 
literature. I have in mind such works as: Shaw’s Pygmalion (1913) (it may also be worth noting that Shaw 
wrote the “note on puppets” which acts as an introduction to Boehn’s work of over 500 pages on dolls and 
puppets); Charles Kingsley’s The Water-Babies (serialized in 1862-1863, published as book in 1863, and 
remained popular through the 1920s); Robert Louis Stevenson’s A Child’s Garden of Verses (1885); and Hans 
Christian Andersen’s fairy tale, “The Shadow” (1847). 
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good or bad health; a society in a state of war or peace or a state of famine or of 
plenty. State, in short, is a more inclusive concept than status or office and refers to 
any type of stable or recurrent condition that is culturally recognized. (93-4) 
Yet, between those states, those culturally recognized structures, there is also “a period of 
margin or ‘liminality’” which is “an interstructural situation” (93). Turner observes that in 
the rituals of some societies (as the title of the work indicates, he focused on the Ndembu 
tribe in central Africa) one can locate or name this “liminal period” during particular times in 
individuals’ lives (in this case during initiation rites). My concept of dollhood is similar to 
and informed by Turner’s articulation of cultural spaces of liminality because the space that a 
doll may occupy (as being both singly and collectively the object and subject) is also a state 
of “betwixt and between” identity that corresponds to Turner’s ideas of liminality and 
interstructurality (Turner 97).  
Dolls are also neophytes. When describing the Ndembu tribe of Zambia, Turner uses 
the term “neophyte” to refer to “the subject of passage ritual” as “not-boy-not-man, which is 
what a novice in a male puberty rite is ...” and he writes that the basic feature of the 
neophytes is that: 
…neophytes are neither living nor dead from one aspect, but both living and dead 
from another. Their condition is one of ambiguity and paradox, a confusion of all 
customary categories. (95-7)  
This confusion is the result of the neophyte not being in a fixed and fully defined state or a 
“stable or recurrent condition that is culturally recognized” (94). Like Turner’s neophyte, the 
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doll also occupies a neither/either/both space where it can encapsulate opposing states: that 
of being object and subject and source of both subjective and intersubjective knowledge.22 
Another, and arguably more famous, example of the “betwixt and between” liminal 
space is in the character of Peter Pan who is also in a neither/either/both position. He 
occupies this position though his aging and non-aging, of having just had a birth day (“his 
age is one week”), but also of having no future birthdays though the children who once knew 
him collect so many birthdays that they soon forget about him (Barrie 12).23 However, 
though Peter Pan exemplifies Turner’s neophyte writ permanent, he does not illustrate the 
concept of dollhood in its entirety. As defined by Turner as a liminal period, the character of 
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 My idea of dollhood begins to veer away from Turner’s idea of the neophyte when it comes to the 
concept of permanence. In one way or another, Turner’s neophytes are eventually meant to move on to a fixed 
state. They do not permanently occupy the liminal period of being the novice while a literary doll or the 
representation of a doll can be or become permanently liminal. 
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 As described in J.M. Barrie’s Peter Pan in Kensington Gardens (originally published in 1906): 
Of course, it also shows that Peter is ever so old, but he is really always the same age, so that does not 
matter in the least. His age is one week, and though he was born so long ago he has never had a 
birthday, nor is there the slightest chance of his ever having one. (12) 
Nevertheless, it is not only through a collapsing of time in which Peter occupies this liminal space. He also 
occupies it in the form of his identity (or, perhaps, lack thereof) as being multiple combinations of a boy/a 
bird/not a boy/not a bird. He finds out from Solomon, an old caw, that even though he was born a bird (after all, 
all children have “been birds before they were human”) he is no longer one now though he is also not a boy 
(13): 
‘Poor little half-and-half!’ said Solomon, who was not really hard-hearted, ‘you will never be able 
to fly again, not even on windy days. You must live here on the island always.’ 
      ‘And never even go to the Kensington Gardens?’ Peter asked tragically. 
‘How could you get across?’ said Solomon. He promised very kindly, however, to teach Peter as 
many of the bird ways as could be learned by one of such an awkward shape. 
     ‘Then I shan’t be exactly a human?” Peter asked. 
      “No.’ 
      ‘Nor exactly a bird?’ 
      ‘No.’ 
      ‘What shall I be?’ 
      ‘You will be a Betwixt-and-Between,’ Solomon said, and certainly he was a wise 
fellow, for that is exactly how it turned out. (16-17) 
Solomon also tells Peter that he “will be a Betwixt-and-Between” (emphasis is mine) and not that he is in a 
betwixt-and-between space. That choice to make “Betwixt-and-Between” a thing, a noun, something that 
someone becomes, instead of a space of temporary occupancy, makes it a permanent state, a place from which 
Peter cannot move – not toward boy, not toward bird. Turner’s liminal period of being “betwixt and between” 
then, in the form of Peter Pan, becomes a fixed state like any other state.  
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Peter Pan is indeed in a space of neither/nor/both, but, as Solomon’s wise words announce, 
that space can be and is an everlasting state for one like Peter Pan: a perfect and permanent 
“Betwixt-and-Between.” What then further unites Barrie’s Peter with Turner’s neophyte is 
also what distances both of them from the doll: the fact that they are living. Despite being 
examples of identities which are neither/nor/both – for Turner, the neophyte is always a 
living person, Peter is always a living boy-bird. 
Representations of dolls, as I will argue throughout this work, are not only presented 
in a liminal space as defined by Victor Turner or located in this liminal state as embodied by 
the character of Peter Pan. They also encompass a much more complicated neither/nor/both 
identity because they are not securely covered by the umbrella of being alive. They defy 
categorization. Nonetheless, Turner also addresses this issue of deadness in his work. He 
writes that “the structural ‘invisibility’ of liminal personae has a twofold character. They are 
at once no longer classified and not yet classified” (96). He goes on to note that if they are no 
longer classified then the symbols used to represent them are familiar because they are 
treated: 
… as a corpse is customarily treated in his or her society. … The neophyte may be 
buried, forced to lie motionless in the posture and direction of customary burial, 
maybe be stained black, or may be forced to live for a while in the company of 
masked and monstrous mummers representing, inter alia, the dead, or worse still, the 
un-dead. (Ibid) 
Turner writes that the neophyte is seen as “structurally ‘dead’” and is treated so as a corpse 
may be treated by being buried, colored black, or forced to live among the dead or “un-dead” 
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(Ibid) even though this “structural” death is still, in fact, dictated by life in many ways 
including the reality that it inevitably leads to a rebirth.24  
As I will argue in the following chapters, though not alive, dolls can also move with 
greater fluidity between the states of living and lifelessness than even neophytes because they 
are neither. Since dolls are neither living nor dead, they are able to perform as if in one state 
or the other as well as in both simultaneously and so can perform as both indifferent text (as 
pure commodity) and subjective teller (as partner in imaginative play). The non-classified 
neophyte, in his liminal period, needs symbols of death to identify him as dead; whereas the 
doll, in its liminal state, is often used or read as a symbol of death which can then also, to 
borrow from Freud’s “The Uncanny,” “take on the full function and significance of what it 
symbolizes” (151). The doll as a symbol can then represent and dwell in the states of living 
(as storyteller, as subject) or dead (as text, as object) though continuing to be neither as well 
as both. 
The space that the doll occupies is not, however, only a type of permanent liminal 
state which can reflect these human states, but it is also a space which lacks an organizing or 
classifying principal because its very “thingness” resists such customary classification. In 
other words, the doll can also occupy nonhuman spaces. Because of this, the doll is truly 
                                                          
24
 There are three significant ways in which “life” is still present in this structural “death.” First, 
technically (and perhaps obviously), despite all symbolic gestures, the neophyte is still a living person. 
Performing as if dead or being considered dead is still not actually being dead. Secondly, the space in which the 
neophyte is unclassified and seen as dead is a culturally ordered and articulated space because his “deadness” is 
defined by the symbols by which his society recognizes and indicates death. To have such firm and fixed 
symbols or symbolic acts (being buried, forced to lie in the position and style of a traditional burial, painted to 
look deceased, forced to live with those dressed to appear dead or, actually, to live with the dead) highlights the 
relationship between this state of deadness and the state of living since it is the living who are dictating what 
death looks like and how it needs to be reflected back to the living in order to be recognized as such (Turner 
96). Finally, with any presentation of human death there is also a presentation of human life. The “structural 
‘invisibility’ of liminal personae,” which Turner discusses, is actually made visible not only through the means 
of naming (the importance and use of symbols), but also because to discuss anything dead is to also 
acknowledge that it was once alive, once visible (Ibid).  
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reflecting what Turner’s idea of “not yet” or what “a not at all” classified thing should look 
like. Unlike Turner’s neophyte, who was organized even within his liminality or his non-
classification in terms of transitional states of living, the doll, being a material object, resists 
this predictable movement and cannot be classified using those same symbols or images of 
liminality. In other words, despite the neophyte’s classification as “dead,” he is still bound by 
societal assumptions and expectations about how he should perform “death.” For dolls, 
however, there cannot be any customary way of treating it in death (because it can never die) 
or in life (because it can never be living). Nevertheless, the problem is that the doll and its 
power are discussed in terms of human states of being (those of being living or dead). Such 
readings then classify the doll as being liminal in the same sense as Turner’s neophyte. 
Therefore, in order to avoid this customary way of reading the doll through the dichotomy of 
human living and death, I address the state of the doll, in the following chapters, through 
symbols which are also specifically not human though they are not entirely dead: the shadow, 
the box, and the shadow box. Nevertheless, the foundation to this general misreading of the 
doll’s liminality is in a narrow understanding of the concept of the uncanny.  
 
The Uncanny: 
In his essay, “The Uncanny” (originally published in 1919), Sigmund Freud’s starting 
point in defining the concept was with a paper written by Ernst Jentsch in which Jentsch 
defines the uncanny as when there is “doubt as to whether an apparently animate object 
really is alive and, conversely, whether a lifeless object might not perhaps be animate’” 
(135). Freud quotes Jentsch as stating that: 
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‘One of the surest devices for producing slightly uncanny effects through story-telling 
… is to leave the reader wondering whether a particular figure is a real person or an 
automaton, and to do so in such a way that his attention is not focused directly on the 
uncertainty, lest he should be prompted to examine and settle the matter at once, for 
in this way, as we have said, the special emotional effect can easily be dissipated….’ 
(Ibid) 
To a greater extent, the power of the doll has been measured against this definition despite 
the fact that, in this same essay, Freud infamously discarded the doll, Olimpia, from his 
discussion of the concept through Hoffmann’s figure of the “Sand-Man,” choosing instead to 
focus on the uncanny experience of being robbed of one’s eyes.25 However, works such as 
Hélène Cixous’ 1976 essay, “Fiction and Its Phantoms: A Reading of Freud’s Das 
Unheimliche (“The Uncanny”),” have taken issue with Freud’s dismissal of Olimpia as being 
“nothing else than a personification of Nathaniel’s feminine attitude toward his father in his 
infancy” and have reclaimed uncanniness as belonging to the doll (538). Nevertheless, these 
readings have also, to a degree, contributed to a now familiar cultural understanding of the 
uncanny doll. That understanding is that the doll’s power is, primarily, articulated through 
the fears of it having a real independence, existence, and difference away from the human 
body.26  
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 “Uncertainty as to whether an object is animate or inanimate, which we were bound to acknowledge 
in the case of the doll Olimpia, is quite irrelevant in the case of this more potent example of the uncanny” 
(“Uncanny” 138-39). 
“…I hope that most readers of the story will agree with me – that the motif of the seemingly animate doll 
Olimpia is by no means the only one responsible for the incomparably uncanny effect of the story,  or even the 
one which it is principally due” (136). 
 
26
 Also see Eva-Maria Simms’ essay, “Uncanny Dolls: Images of Death in Rilke and Freud,” in a 1996 
volume of the journal, New Literary History; Françoise Meltzer’s “The Uncanny Rendered Canny: Freud’s 
Blind Spot in Reading Hoffmann’s ‘Sandman,’” in Introducing Psychoanalytic Theory, edited by Sander L. 
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In many ways, however, it may seem as if these two sides of the doll (familiar 
material object versus uncanny entity) parallel Bill Brown’s articulation of “object” (that 
which continues to “work” as expected) versus “thing” (that which “asserts itself” and claims 
a new kind power over us when it “stops working” as expected) (“Thing Theory” 4). 
Nevertheless, such paralleling is actually misleading as to just how similar those two sides of 
the doll coin actually are in terms of cultural expectations and understandings of this child’s 
toy. In his 2001 essay “Thing Theory,” Brown wrote that there: 
… are occasions of contingency – the chance interruption – that disclose a physicality 
of things. In Byatt’s novel,27 the interruption of the habit of looking through windows 
as transparencies enables the protagonist to look at a window itself in its opacity. As 
they circulate through our lives, we look through objects (to see what they disclose 
about history, society, nature, or culture – above all, what they disclose about us), but 
we only catch a glimpse of things. … We look through objects because there are 
codes by which our interpretive attention makes them meaningful, because there is a 
discourse of objectivity that allows us to use them as facts. A thing, in contrast, can 
hardly function as a window. We begin to confront the thingness of objects when they 
stop working for us: when the drill breaks, when the car stalls, when the windows get 
filthy, when their flow within the circuits of production and distribution, consumption 
and exhibition, has been arrested, however momentarily. The story of objects 
asserting themselves as things, then, is the story of the changing relation to the human 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Gilman (1982); and Carriker’s discussion of both Cixous’s and Meltzer’s essays as found in her work on dolls, 
Created in Our Image: The Miniature Body of the Doll as Subject and Object (1998).  
 
27
 Brown is referring to A.S. Byatt’s The Biographer’s Tale (New York, 2001). 
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subject and thus the story of how the thing really names less an object than a 
particular subject-object relation. (“Thing Theory” 4) 
One may argue that, when understood in terms of Brown’s articulation of the difference 
between “object” and “thing,” the doll has, in fact, “asserted” its power when it stopped 
working as a material object and instead began working (by not “working”) as a means 
through which one may access the uncanny experience. After all, as in the uncanny, in 
Brown’s concept there is a correlation between the relationship of working and not working 
to being alive and dead, and the examples Brown uses of things “not working” are things in 
which there is an interruption to their purpose or intent, or even a breaking down. In other 
words, there are objects, such as the drill or the car, which fail or “die” because they are no 
longer functioning as they were intended to as products of consumption. The doll can also 
stop working in that same sense when a voice box breaks or hair becomes unglued, but, more 
provocatively, one can also claim that the doll also stops working when it stops acting as we 
expect the doll to act: its moves on its own free of its mechanical abilities or human 
manipulation, or it seems to have a will of its own by speaking though it has no voice box, or 
by independently participating with the world around it though it has no soul. Furthermore, 
these instances of the doll “not working” (whether depicted in literature, art, or film) are also 
instances in which the experience of the doll is then labeled as being uncanny. However, the 
difference between how Brown’s “thing” does not work and the experience of the uncanny 
doll is that the notion of an independently animated doll has actually become part of the 
cultural idea of how a doll “works.” The resulting effect is that those narratives that engage 
with the same question (whether an apparently inanimate doll is animate or not) have become 
so commonplace and predictable in our culture as to have helped push the doll out of the 
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uncanny experience entirely. Or, to quote Cixous: “The abbreviating effect which affirms life 
asserts death” (545). In other words: We have become so familiar with associating the 
uncanny with the doll that by naming the doll as uncanny we have destroyed its actual 
uncanniness. Therefore although the experience of seeing a doll “coming to life” in a film or 
a story may seem to frighten an audience, it surely no longer surprises them. 
Consequently, whether read through Freud or Cixous, the uncanny has become an 
empirical tool with which the doll is now universally dissected and so, to borrow now from 
Freud: “There is no longer any question of ‘intellectual uncertainty,’” and, with that, it seems 
that the doll can no longer be experienced as uncanny (“Uncanny” 139). This lost experience 
is then similar to the “aura” that Walter Benjamin saw as lost in the age of reproduction. In 
his essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (first published in 
1936), Benjamin defines “aura” of natural products…: 
…as the unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be. If, while resting 
on a summer afternoon, you follow with your eyes a mountain range on the horizon 
or a branch which casts its shadow over you, you experience the aura of those 
mountains, of that branch. (“Work” 222-23) 
Benjamin then pins the loss of “aura” on two circumstances: culture’s desire to “bring things 
‘closer’” and their equally passionate concern for overcoming each thing’s uniqueness by 
assimilating it as a reproduction” (“Work” 223). In twentieth-century culture it then also 
appears as if that power or “aura” which once seemed to have belonged to the doll may now 
also be lost because of that collective desire to name and identify its power as “uncanny” and 
to then cycle such pre-determined likenesses of the uncanny experience back out into culture 
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in the form of mass entertainment like popular horror films,28 television shows,29 and lasting 
works of literature.30 In fact, the uncanny and the doll have become so inextricably bound up 
with one another that this concept is now part of the intersubjective knowledge in which the 
doll is discussed rather than as a subjective experience that was once contingent on one’s 
own singular engagement with a doll’s actual nature. This loss of meaning is just what is 
suggested by Goethe’s remark as quoted in Benjamin’s “Little History of Photography:” 
“There is a delicate empiricism which so intimately involves itself with the object that it 
becomes true theory” (“Little” 287). However, as outlined earlier in this introduction, the 
experience of the uncanny is still a key component of the experience of the doll in terms of 
the state of dollhood, but in order to reclaim for the doll its actual uncanniness − the 
relationship of one to the other needs to be reassembled from that failing construct of the 
doll’s uncanniness being equated with the expectation of its aliveness in animation. 
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 The most familiar is likely the “Child’s Play” series where the infamous Chucky straddles that line 
of animate and inanimate depending on his own murderous agenda. 
Child’s Play. Dir. Tom Holland. Perfs. Catherine Hicks, Chris Sarandon. United Artists, 1988.  
Child’s Play 2: Chucky’s Back. Dir. John Lafia. Perfs. Alex Vincent, Jenny Agutter. Universal Pictures, 1990. 
Child’s Play 3: Look Who’s Stalking. Dir. Jack Bender. Perfs. Justin Whalin, Perrey Reeves. Universal 
Pictures, 1991. 
Bride of Chucky. Dir. Ronny Yu. Perfs. Jennifer Tilly, Katherine Heigl. Midwinter Productions, Inc., 1998. 
 
29
 Such haunted and haunting dolls have appeared on many television shows from the well-known 
episode of a classic program, The Twilight Zone (“Living Doll.” The Twilight Zone. writ. Jerry Sohl, dir. 
Richard C. Sarafian. Season 5, episode 6. November 1, 1965) to an episode of a current program, The Ghost 
Whisperer (“Cursed.” Ghost Whisperer. writ. Laurie McCarthy, dir. Kim Moses. CBS. Season 4, episode 21. 
May 2009). 
 
30
 Writers such as Edgar Allan Poe (in “William Wilson”), Joyce Carol Oates (in “The Doll”), Henry 
James (in “The Jolly Corner”) and Susan Sontag (in “The Dummy”) have engaged with ideas of the 
uncanniness of the doll as these works are even found published in a collection of short stories titled: Doubles, 
Dummies and Dolls: 21 Terror Tales of Replication (edited by Leonard Wolf. New York: Newmarket Press, 
1995). Another “haunting” collection of doll stories is The Haunted Dolls (an anthology selected by Seon 
Manley and Gogo Lewis. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980) which includes stories by Agatha Christie (“The 
Dressmaker’s Doll”), Nathaniel Hawthorne (“Feathertop”) and Hans Christian Andersen (“The Steadfast Tin 
Soldier”). 
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Specifically, the uncanny experience of the doll is recaptured by addressing one particular 
distinction: form versus symbol.  
 First and foremost, in the liminal state of dollhood, the experience of the uncanny is 
not linked to the doll as a physical form, but as a functioning symbol. This dissertation will 
carefully focus instead on the latter: the animation of the doll in terms of descriptions of its 
consciousness or “soul,” rather than the mechanics of its temporal body. The failure of the 
doll’s uncanny experience was that such an experience was anchored in the toy’s body 
whereas this project looks to discuss the experience of the uncanny with respect to abstract 
representations of being such as the soul, the spirit, or the “aura.” Such intangible qualities of 
otherness are not those suggested by the Jentsch description of the concept of the uncanny 
that opens Freud’s essay, where he states that the experience of the uncanny is felt when 
there is “doubt as to whether an apparently animate object really is alive and, conversely, 
whether a lifeless object might not perhaps be animate’” (135). Although this description 
seems to address the doll almost directly, that fact also restricts readings of the doll only in 
terms of its physicality, an interpretation which has been reproduced so many times that 
associating dolls with the uncanny has become a critical commonplace. Like the two 
movements which erase “aura” for Benjamin, being both identifiable and reproducible 
examples of the uncanny voids the actual experience of the uncanny through the doll. In 
order to maintain and use its power, I will locate dollhood’s manifestation of the uncanny in 
Freud’s summary of it as a purely symbolic function and not in its material self: 
An uncanny effect often arises when the boundary between fantasy and reality is 
blurred, when we are faced with the reality of something that we have until now 
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considered imaginary, when a symbol takes on the full function and significance of 
what it symbolizes, and so forth. (“Uncanny” 150-51) 
The doll is the manifestation of this moment because it is the symbol which articulates itself 
while at the same time it represents something else. To only discuss the doll in terms of 
human states is problematic because, again, representations of the doll living and the doll 
dead do not look like the human living or the human dead, even when compared to those who 
occupy liminal human spaces (the neophyte in culture or Peter Pan in literature). The doll, 
after all, is a thing. And it is the doll’s very thingness which allows it to carve out and define 
a new concept of the liminal space. However, in this articulation of Freud’s concept of the 
uncanny, the effect of the uncanny is found in that blurred boundary or state between fantasy 
and reality where the uncanny doll also exists. By describing the uncanny in such terms, 
Freud not only proposes that in such liminality a relationship to human life does not have to 
exist but also points to a more complicated uncanniness present in the doll. The doll, as a 
conduit, can then be that symbol that takes on the full function and significance of what it 
symbolizes in a liminal state without mention of human states or qualities. Reading the doll 
as a symbol then also reinforces the idea that it does not need to have a relationship to human 
states of liminality in order to be considered as existing in a liminal state. As the rest of this 
work will convey, the doll is in fact the thing which captures a much more complex and 
multifaceted idea of liminal identity and, in that identity, a truer sense of the uncanny. 
This distinction between the physical and the symbolic uncanny as recognized by 
Jentsch and Freud, respectively, is crucial to my own critical method for this project. As 
noted, physical dollhood invites psychological and sociological interpretations, but treating 
the imaginary and spiritual dimension of dollhood demands literary criticism. As the 
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difference between Jentsch’s idea of the uncanny and the symbolic one invited by Freud is 
much like a distinction between the uncanny experience as grounded in the physical versus 
the immaterial, this project also grounds itself as a critical work by engaging with the doll as 
it exists in the realm of the imagination rather than in the realm of the real.  
Consider the image which opens this introduction as a work existing in these two 
realms (see figure 1). Described as “Plate 481 Movements, Female, Child, lifting a doll, 
turning, and walking off” and titled “Muybridge Animal Locomotion, plate 481,” this 1887 
plate of images taken by Eadweard Muybridge can be interpreted as a work grounded in the 
real or as a work grounded in the imaginative. As a work reflective of the real, one can 
interpret these images as if there is a definitive answer that this series of still photographs 
offers about a child’s relationship to the doll. Such an analysis would be akin to answering 
that $25,000 question that Muybridge so famously answered in 1878 with the photo sequence 
of a certain animal in motion: while galloping, is there any point when all four of a horse’s 
legs come off the ground?31 With that series of images of a horse in motion, an answer to a 
long sought after question could be provided:  yes, a running horse, for an instant, was air 
bound. Does the series of photographs of a girl picking up her doll and walking away, taken 
almost ten years later, also ask an implicit question demanding the kind of certainty that only 
the real could provide? Over his lifetime, Muybridge captured many such photographic 
sequences of animals and humans in motion and, though most did not test a hypothesis as 
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 In Mitchell Leslie’s Stanford Magazine article, “The Man Who Stopped Time: Photographer 
Eadweard Muybridge stunned the world when he caught a horse in the act of flying” (2001), Leslie writes that 
“legend has it” that Leland Stanford, a former governor, railroad owner, and horseracing enthusiast, had a 
“$25,000 wager on the outcome” of this famous question though, as Leslie also shares, “[v]irtually every 
serious historian to look into this … has concluded there was no bet” 
(http://www.stanfordalumni.org/news/magazine/2001/mayjun/features/muybridge.html).  
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directly as the galloping sequence, his images clearly demonstrate the difference between 
approaching a work as being reflective of the real or of the imaginative.  
For instance, each of the twelve images of the girl in motion contributes to the 
collection as a whole in the same way in which individual chapters work together to produce 
a single narrative, a narrative of a certain child’s sole pursuit in having and holding a 
particular doll. A reading of these images as such a narrative is to consider the work as 
functioning in the realm of the real as if the individual images are facts that can be dissected 
in order to provide a firm answer as to how the child views the doll. In the first five images 
the little girl seems to be driven to the doll itself as the child seemingly walks with purpose 
from the viewer’s left toward where the doll lies on the floor amongst some other 
unrecognizable things (fabric? a bed?), picks it up, and holds it in her hands. In the first two 
(or three) images she appears to only look forward and down toward her destination, the doll, 
and not at the camera which is recording her every move. These motions imply intent and 
desire. In the sixth image, she pivots and seems to momentarily face the camera, smile with 
an open mouth, before returning again from where she came, the off-screen space to the 
viewer’s left. Here we see her pleasure in reaching the doll. Even though she holds the doll in 
virtually the same position in her hands (not against her body, not close to her face) when she 
is walking away with it, she appears to express joy in her possession. In all six of the last 
images, her smile appears natural and genuine, but specifically in the first two of the last six, 
the ones which follow her pivoting return, she appears particularly pleased with herself as 
she shares a wide open smile with the camera that also captures a motion in her step which 
suggests the exuberance of skipping away. After piecing together the fragments (the singular 
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images) of this whole picture, one can surmise that the child single-mindedly attained and 
returned with the doll that she so desired. 
This reading of the narrative of these photographs is not wrong, but it is, in many 
ways, evidentiary. Such a reading of a text is invested in a cool and calculating dissection as 
if such a performance will and must result in some final cohesive answer. This type of 
analysis, though thoroughly successful in discussing the motions and movement of a visual 
narrative, removes the actual experience of the imaginative and thus the uncanny from the 
story. In other words, through such a reading of this visual essay any talk of the uncanny 
experience would be one only grounded in the physical: what is found, what can be touched, 
and what is cataloged through the investigative process. For example, as Jentsch suggested 
that: 
‘One of the surest devices for producing slightly uncanny effects through story-
telling … is to leave the reader wondering whether a particular figure is a real person 
or an automaton…’ (“Uncanny” 135) 
Then one can surmise that Muybridge, as a storyteller, provided the reader with the 
experience of the uncanny by causing him or her to wonder as to the authenticity of this 
engagement between the child and the doll in its entirety. The question of the “realness” of 
this situation comes through with the evidence of the staging of the action (the lines and 
numbers of the tracking chart behind the girl) and her almost constant awareness of the 
camera’s eye, as seen in almost all of the stills, once she finally reaches and returns with the 
doll in her hands. This type of uncanny experience, because it is identifiable and universally 
recognizable is not actually a representation of the uncanny as a personal experience. There 
is no intellectual uncertainty present because an evidentiary critic does not value it. By 
37 
 
dissecting the image-story in such a way the reader first grounds the uncanny moment in 
what is physically present rather than what is immaterial and also grounds the moment in the 
realm of the real (the evidence found in the text) instead of in the realm of the imaginative 
(the experience of reading the text). 
When discussing the work as belonging to the realm of the imaginative, an important 
element is the value of maintaining distance. Distance which, as Benjamin discussed in his 
definition of “aura,” is vital if one wishes to actually gain knowledge through the experience 
of a moment rather than to merely comprehend a moment through a close and critical 
examination of it. Now looking at Muybridge’s visual narrative of a girl and a doll, it may 
seem as if there is no room for a reading of distance, never mind as a means to offer access to 
the experience of the uncanny. However, despite the qualities of the images which lend 
themselves to such a “close” reading, these images are also suffused with “aura” or distance 
and the true symbolic uncanny moment because of their content: the child and the doll.  
For all the ways in which evidence is able to provide intellectual certainty about what 
is occurring within this narrative, what such a reading is unable to provide is the child’s 
actual experience. The aforementioned moments of the uncanny in this series link the 
experience of the uncanny to the doll as a physical form and not as a functioning symbol. 
Those moments of uncertainty as to the “realness” or genuineness of the story are laid out for 
us by the storyteller in the form of the simple empirical plot of his story, a construct which 
the evidentiary critic is then able to articulate. However, to identify the experience of the 
uncanny as a functioning symbol is rather the work of the critic who reveals and revels in the 
narrative’s qualities of distance.  
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To access this actual experience of the uncanny, such a critic produces the moments 
of liminality without taking them apart and thus making them no longer liminal. For instance, 
consider the third image of the series. In it, the girl does not look directly at the doll though, 
one would think, assuming that her assignment was to “Go pick up that doll,” her eyes would 
be entirely focused on either the doll or the camera which was recording her fetching of it. So 
where is she looking? What has caught her attention aside from the task at hand? In that same 
image, the girl appears to be mouthing something as if, possibly, unsure of what she is doing 
or is supposed to do. Or is she saying something else entirely? This is the moment she is 
reaching for the doll − could she be saying something to it? For it? Through a close reading 
of a photo spread in Life magazine, the following chapter of this dissertation will argue that 
for all the ways in which a child’s doll play may be constructed by culture at large or 
controlled by more immediate influences like parents or those seemingly ever-present 
photographers, there is no measuring the real intimacy that takes place between a child and 
her plaything. That engagement between an object and its subject is oftentimes reversed in 
play as to be unknowable and ungraspable by any observer. For a series of photographs 
which seem to follow in the tradition of serving the investigative reporter and providing an 
answer (while galloping, is there any point when all four of a horse’s legs come off the 
ground?), it is the presence of that well-known yet private and immaterial intimacy that exists 
between the child and the doll which resists reader knowledge − no matter how well 
constructed, plotted, or controlled the rest of the elements of the narrative may be. That 
relationship between the child and her doll maintains not only a sense of aura for her, in not 
knowing the possible internal life of her own plaything, but also for the outside observer in 
not knowing the child’s thoughts, feelings, or privately held experiences. For the reader, it is 
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in just this realm of the imaginative where the experience of the uncanny actually occurs in 
this narrative and where this dissertation focuses its attention. 
 
The Shadow: 
Although Turner’s concept of liminality and Freud’s idea of the uncanny are the 
major theoretical tent poles of this dissertation, the images of the shadow, the box, and the 
shadow box also play significant roles in establishing a critical, as well as metaphorical, lens 
through which to read the experience of the doll in the state of dollhood. 
The shadow, for example, is an apt tool in the study of dollhood because at the same 
time that children are beginning to negotiate the difference between themselves and their 
shadows, they are also inquiring about the possible dissimilarities between themselves and 
their dolls.  
In terms of a child’s development in recognizing the “other” as having an essence, 
spirit, or consciousness of its own, Lacan’s “mirror stage” is an immediate touchstone 
reference. However, an emphasis on Lacan’s pre-mirror and mirror stages does not fully 
facilitate access to the dollhood quality of being both self and other. The mirror, though it 
does point to an existence outside of the self, is nevertheless functioning as a reflection and 
thus illustrating the “other” as an extension that is still tied to the self. On the other hand, 
while the shadow too can function as a type of reflection of the self, it can also be 
experienced as expressing independence away from the self. This idea that the shadow can 
act independently of the self also produces a profound feeling of the uncanny as illustrated in 
such different works as James Frazer’s anthropological study, The Golden Bough: A Study in 
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Magic and Religion32 and Hans Christian Andersen’s fairy tale, “The Shadow” (1847).33 
Freud also acknowledged the link of the shadow to the image of the double in his nod to Otto 
Ranks’ work as “exploring the connections that link the double with mirror-images, shadows, 
guardian spirits, the doctrine of the soul and the fear of death” (“Uncanny” 142). Finally, one 
could argue that the rise of the literary device of the double or the motif of the doppelganger 
during this time period, specifically in Gothic literature, is a manifestation of where the 
shadow and the doll meet in form. 
In addition to how the shadow articulates the “other,” the age range in which children 
begin to engage with the possibility of an “other” present in their dolls corresponds to the age 
range of the “shadow stage” and not that of the “mirror stage.” For Lacan, the “mirror stage” 
                                                          
32
 “The Soul as a Shadow and a Reflection.─But the spiritual dangers I have enumerated are not the 
only ones which beset the savage. Often he regards his shadow or reflection as his soul, or at all events as a vital 
part of himself, and as such it is necessarily a source of danger to him. For if it is trampled upon, struck, or 
stabbed, he will feel the injury as if it were done to his person; and if it is detached from him entirely (as he 
believes that it may be) he will die” (Frazer 189). 
 
33
 In this dark fairy tale, a “learned” man, a writer, loses his shadow in Africa only to have it reappear, 
in human form, when the man returns home. The shadow in its human disguise visits the man and makes him 
promise not to reveal its real identity. The shadow then relates his successes and experiences beginning with 
what he has learned from “Poesy” who occupied the house opposite the man’s in Africa. Years later, the 
shadow returns again. It has grown fat and successful while the man has grown ill and though he writes “about 
the true, and the good, and the beautiful, but no one cares to hear such things!” (Andersen 324) The shadow 
then offers to take the man with it on its journeys, but only if the man becomes his shadow. Upon its 
engagement to a princess, the shadow wishes to make the man into a shadow permanently. The man, refusing to 
deceive anyone as to the shadow’s real identity, proclaims he will reveal all to the princess. The shadow then 
locks up the man and tells the princess of “his shadow’s” madness: 
   “‘I have lived to see the most cruel thing that any one can live to see!’ said the Shadow. ‘Only imagine─yes, it 
is true, such a poor shadow-skull cannot bear much─only think, my shadow has become mad: he thinks that he 
is a man, and that I─now only think─that I am his shadow!’” (Andersen 328). 
The shadow and the deceived princess do, indeed, wed and he, the Learned Man, according to the last line of 
story, “heard nothing of all this─for they had deprived him of life” (Andersen 329).  
Also, in terms of the uncanny elements in this fairy tale, see When Dreams Came True: Classical Fairy 
Tales and Their Tradition (2007) by Jack Zipes who notes that: 
Andersen “turned known literary motifs into provocative and uncanny stories that challenged conventional 
expectations and explored modes of magic realism that he learned from the German romantics, especially E. T. 
A. Hoffmann. … ‘The Shadow,’ which is clearly based on the German writer Adelbert von Chamisso’s novella 
Peter Schlemihl (1813), in which a man sells his shadow to the devil, can also be traced to E. T. A. Hoffmann’s 
tale “The New Year’s Adventure” (1819), in which a man gives up his reflection for love. For Andersen, this 
loss of a shadow or reflection is transformed into a problematic psychological conflict in which unconscious 
forces debilitate and eventually destroy a strong ego” (122). 
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originates with the infant while the playing with dolls is actually not typically the play of the 
very young.34 Rather, doll play is traditionally seen as (and thus marketed toward) the play of 
school-aged children, older children who are no longer in the “mirror stage” but are in what 
the French child psychologist Jean Piaget implied to be a “shadow stage.”  
According to Hall and Ellis’s “A Study of Dolls,” the stage of “doll play” is typically 
between seven and ten: “Very rare are those who begin doll play in the cradle and keep it up 
through life. The doll passion seems to be strongest between seven and ten, and to reach its 
climax between eight and nine” (Hall, “Dolls” 184). Madam Anna Grudzinska in her 1907 
study, “A Study of Dolls Among Polish Children” which acted as a response to Hall and 
Ellis’s work noted that “Polish children cease playing with dolls earlier than American, 
usually by nine or ten years, but there is a recrudescence of interest in dolls at about twelve, 
which is, perhaps, a cropping out of the maternal instinct “(389).35 In terms of the stage of 
                                                          
34
 Without a doubt much younger children can also enjoy playing with dolls, but the complexity of the 
relationship of the self to the doll seems to occur for children who are older than infant or toddler age. As will 
be discussed, doll play is the play of children who are at the age in which they not only begin to notice that 
“others” may exist, but also seem to be constantly negotiating with their own knowledge (or lack thereof) of the 
essential qualities of the “other,” whether it be shadow or doll.  
35
 In April of 2009, The Sydney Morning Herald published an article, “Goodbye dolly, hello 
Nintendo,” which reported on a social research study that revealed that today’s girls stop playing with their 
dolls at an average age of six or seven while their mothers had stopped playing with dolls between the ages of 
ten and eleven (Burke). Nevertheless, despite the fact that this study reveals that contemporary children are not 
playing with dolls as long as their counterparts once did over 100 years ago, Hall’s and Grudzinska’s 
observations are not necessarily entirely out of date. This study indicates that the earlier end of doll play is a 
phenomenon of this youngest generation, “generation Z.” More interesting, however, is the fact that the study 
notes that the mothers of this generation played with their dolls until around ages ten or eleven. Therefore, one 
may surmise that this drop in age is more of a twenty-first century phenomenon since the mothers of these 
children (mothers who were children of the late twentieth century) played with their dolls for approximately as 
long as the children at the turn of the previous century.  
Also worth mentioning is that this recent study implies that this youngest generation’s early discarding of dolls 
is reflective of the growing influence of technology. Although one may argue that every new generation is 
perceived as corrupted by “technology,” one child psychologist calls this current incarnation: “the up-ageing 
syndrome.” This syndrome is thought to be “fuelled by the premature sexualisation of children” and “has 
resulted in a generation of young girls deeply dissatisfied with their age, no matter how old they are” (Burke). 
In addition, though research such as the Australian study does indicate the erosion of childhood, others 
are pointing to an extension. Jennie Lindon in her 2001book, Understanding Children’s Play, acknowledges that 
many school aged children now stop having imaginary companions at younger ages because they are often 
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“shadow play,” a 1927 study about children’s responses to shadows, conducted by renowned 
French child psychologist Jean Piaget and published in his The Child’s Conception of 
Physical Causality, revealed an age range in which children are negotiating their relationship 
to the shadow that is virtually identical to the age range in which children are playing with 
dolls. Victor I. Stoichita, in his A Short History of the Shadow (1997), summarizes Piaget’s 
concept of a child’s four stages in understanding the phenomenon of shadows in the 
following way:  
[in terms of a child around the age of five] …in this first stage, the shadow is said to 
be the result of the collaboration or participation of two roots, one internal (the 
shadow emanates from the object, it is a part of the object), the other external (the 
shadow comes from the night, from a dark corner of the bedroom etc.). It is only 
around the age of six or seven that the shadow is seen to be the product of one single 
object. From that point it is regarded as a substance, emanating haphazardly from the 
object. However, from the third stage (around the age of eight), the child can even 
predict where a shadow will fall, going as far as to state that the shadow is produced 
where light is absent. But behind this outwardly correct reasoning we discover the 
‘substantialism’ of the final stages: to the child, the shadow is still nothing but an 
emanation from the object, but it is an emanation that drives out the light and is 
therefore obliged to position itself on the side opposite the source of light. It is only 
around the age of nine that the child, at last, realizes that the shadow is not a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
shamed by fellow students out of such play, but she also questions whether such play ever really ends as she 
quotes from George Bernard Shaw (the famed playwright of Pygmalion): “‘We do not stop playing because we 
grow old, we grow old because we stop playing.’ It is an open question whether some grown-up children ever 
stop playing. Perhaps it depends on your definition of play” (90).  
Finally, A.F. Robertson’s book, Life Like Dolls: The Collector Doll Phenomenon and the Lives of the 
Women Who Love Them also articulates and argues for the presence of a type of extended doll play into 
adulthood especially in terms of how avid doll collectors consider and engage with their own dolls. 
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substance behind the object, driven away by light. To the child the shadow simply 
becomes synonymous with the absence of light (Stoichita, “Shadow” 29).36  
In essence, the age range in which Piaget indicated children are negotiating their relationship 
to the shadow (five to nine) is profoundly similar to the age range in which G. Stanley Hall 
and others observed children to most often play with dolls (seven to ten).  
 This convergence of age in doll play and shadow work is as remarkable as it is 
useful. As a critical tool in describing the liminal space of the doll, the shadow proves not 
only to be a stronger metaphorical “reflection” than the mirror, but also more of an 
appropriate one in a discussion that engages with the implications and influences of child 
psychology in literature and art for and about the child’s relationship with the doll as an 
“other.”  
 
The Box:  
Rich in a wide range of both obsolete and current definitions,37 many of the 
meanings, uses, and images associated with the box do, indeed, position it as another space 
                                                          
36
 Note that there are works which challenge and delve much deeper into the psychological 
implications of Piaget’s ideas as well as its relevance and accuracy. I found some interesting observations about 
this study in the following works: Michael Siegal’s Knowing Children: Experiments in Conversation and 
Cognition (1997), Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence’s Concepts: Core Readings (1999), and Felipe 
Fernández-Armesto’s Truth: A History and a Guide for the Perplexed (1997). 
 
37
 As a brief overview, the online OED notes “box” to be a small evergreen tree, a case  or receptacle 
with a lid that is “(unless otherwise specified) understood to be four-sided and of wood;” a mixing up of 
different flocks of sheep which also informs its definition as a “stage of confusion;” slang for a safe, TV, coffin, 
jail, confessional, vulgar euphemism for female genitalia, short for telephone (box), jury or witness (box), 
seated compartment in a theatre (as well as the occupants of such a box), a small shelter, free range area for a 
horse; a part of a watch, gun, pump; a space that acts as a container (ballot box, letter box), a space that is 
contained (an enclosed military area, defended in all directions), and a space that does the containing (the cavity 
inside a tree’s truck where it collects its sap) ; to “box” is also to beat with the hand, with fists, but also to 
confine, to cup,  and “to box clever” which is slang for: behaving cleverly or to “use one’s wits” (online OED). 
In addition, from New Dictionary of American Slang, ed. Robert L. Chapman, Ph.D. (Harper & Row, 
1986, 42) box or boxes may refer to male genitals, especially as displayed by tight pants; any stringed 
instrument, esp. a guitar; an accordion; a small camera; an icebox or refrigerator; police telephone operator;  a 
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of liminal unfolding as do the many profound ways in which theorists from Gaston Bachelard 
to Laura Mulvey have engaged with the image of this familiar form.38 Nevertheless, the box 
is a particularly valuable metaphor for the doll in dollhood because of how it articulates the 
idea of the doll as having an architecture that is both a thing of construction (or science) and 
an act of deconstruction (or art). 
The concept of “construction” reflects the systematic and practical side of 
architecture (its science) which correlates to the general physical form and intended 
functional construction of the box (as container, as TV, as coffin) as a thing used by humans 
“to house” other things. The doll embodies this understanding of the box when the doll 
“looks” like a doll (child-like, miniature, unbreakable) and when it is being played with as a 
doll is “supposed to” be played with (as a baby, as a mother, as a children’s television show 
character). In this sense, the box represents what the doll collector values − the doll that is 
kept in its original packaging, in its original box:  
With an eye to investment, the ‘serious’ collector keeps everything intact from bows 
and shoelaces to wrappings, labels, and receipts, and must resist the temptation to 
make little changes to clothes and hair. (Robertson 54). 
The act of “deconstruction,” on the other hand, illustrates the creative and aesthetic 
side of architecture (its art) located in how a box is employed beyond its intended use and so 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
tight spot, a bind. Also, “boxed” meaning drunk, “boxed in” meaning trapped; “boxed out” meaning totally 
uninhibited because on drugs; “box man” meaning a safe-cracker, or a cashier or blackjack dealer at a gambling 
casino. 
Finally, also worth noting is that fact that boxes are also closely linked to dolls in measuring the value 
of a doll when the question is asked: Is it in its original box? There are many visual representations that engage 
and play with the image of “doll in box,” some of which can be found  here: 
http://dollhood.tumblr.com/tagged/box 
38
 See Bachelard’s The Poetics of Space: A Classic Look at How We Experience Intimate Places (first 
published in French in 1958, translated into English in 1958) for a poetic reading of the box as home and 
Mulvey’s “Pandora’s Box: Topographies of Curiosity,” as found in her work Fetishism and Curiosity (1996) for 
a thoroughly engaging feminist reading of the Greek myth. 
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becomes “home” to something else (the shoebox becomes a diorama, a bed for a stuffed toy, 
a bird’s coffin). The architecture of deconstruction is recognized in how the original box is 
manipulated and not merely touched, but also changed and challenging beyond its given 
form. The doll exemplifies this quality of the box when that which is called “doll” does not 
“look” like one (it resembles instead a corn husk, a pillow, a clothes pin) or when it is played 
with in an unintended manner (instead of being held like a baby −  it is hung from a tree, 
instead of being dressed − it is dissected). The box here then signifies what the doll owner 
values − the doll that is played with, taken out of its box, and tactically experienced: 
Nearly all the doll owners we met were critical of collectors who put material values 
above emotional values. Keeping a doll boxed, with her label and price tag still fixed 
to her wrist, is considered inhumane. (Robertson 54) 
With these two sides of architecture in mind, what the box then offers a reading of the 
doll in dollhood is how the doll, like the box, is able to embrace the two opposing sides of 
what it means to have a tangible existence. Through the exploration of depths, the negotiation 
of spatial materiality, and the journey in the reading and recognizing of boundaries through 
the sense of touch, the doll, like the box, can be viewed as moving in and out of being both 
an object of steady and fixed construction as well as an experience of unstable and unknown 
deconstruction. 
 
Shadow Box:  
The significance of the shadow box in understanding the doll’s power is that it not 
only brings together both the qualities of the shadow and the box. The shadow box also 
expresses how there exists a Möbius strip-like movement between the relationship between 
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the shadow and box images, a fluidity that more fully grasps the liminal and uncanny nature 
of the doll in dollhood. 
In her Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (1994), Elizabeth Grosz 
articulates the Möbius strip to the relationship present in the construct of “shadow box”: 
The Möbius strip has the advantage of showing the inflection of mind into body and 
body into mind, the ways in which, through a kind of twisting or inversion, one side 
becomes another. This model also provides a way of problematizing and rethinking 
the relations between the inside and the outside of the subject, its psychical interior 
and its corporeal exterior, by showing not their fundamental identity or reducibility 
but the torsion of the one into the other, the passage, vector, or uncontrollable drift of 
the inside into the outside and the outside into the inside. (xii) 
Although the use of the “shadow box” as a metaphor could represent the sorting out of what 
elements of the doll are “shadow” and which are “box,” that ability does not convey the real 
impact of reading the doll as a “shadow box.” Instead, as Grosz suggests, what the image of 
the shadow box offers this reading of the doll identity is the suggestion of what it feels like to 
a subject to experience the distinct qualities of the box and the shadow as they move into and 
from one another like forms constantly intertwining and collapsing on a Möbius strip.  
 
Outline of Chapters: 
As I anchor the complexity and nuance of the liminal space of dollhood in an 
understanding of the three images of the shadow, the box and the shadow box, I devote a 
chapter to each metaphor. 
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In Chapter One, “The Doll is a Shadow,” the shadow’s pertinence to a discussion of 
dollhood is twofold. First, the doll, like the shadow, is experienced as a stable visual 
construct of something else. Each is considered to be a physical reflection, possession, as 
well as creation for and of a human form. On the other hand, both the shadow and the doll 
can also elicit a troubling or uncanny visual experience for their respective viewers when 
they perform differently, independently, or at a distance from the recognizable human body. 
After all, both the shadow and the doll have been depicted in literature as well as in visual 
arts as forms which are capable of animation independent from human control. 
Tracing a number of ways in which the doll functions like a shadow as expressed 
through the ancient Roman myth of the origins of art, this chapter then moves on to discuss 
how “likeness” is measured in the idea of portrait dolls (“Shirley Temple” dolls versus the 
“Strawberry Shortcake” doll) and how the doll, like the shadow, values and understands 
intimacy as expressed in the creation of dolls in folk art by twentieth-century American 
artists (Nellie Mae Rowe, Morton Bartlett, and Calvin and Ruby Black). Finally, the 
culmination of this chapter is a close reading of how all of these elements of the shadow 
come together in the doll as expressed in a 1961 photo essay for Life magazine, titled “A Girl 
Named Sandra is a Doll Named Peter.” 
In the second chapter, “The Doll is a Box,” the tactile qualities of the box as well as 
its ability to express depth are offered to a reading of the doll and to a fuller understanding of 
the liminal state of dollhood. Aside from being experienced through the field of vision, the 
doll, like the box, is also experienced through the sense of touch. Unlike the shadow, the doll 
can be encountered via the physical senses similar to the ways in that the box is concretely 
experienced and investigated. Therefore, as the first chapter argues that the shadow offers 
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dollhood an understanding of how the child begins to negotiate his or her relationship to the 
“other” through the doll, my second chapter explores how the box represents dollhood for the 
child beginning to experience the actual depth of that “other” by playing with the interiority 
and exteriority of the doll. 
In order to discuss the nature of the toy’s power in box/doll “mis-play” in terms of 
their respective literal as well as semantic deconstruction, this chapter begins with 
deconstructive nature of curiosity (as examined through a passage from Toni Morrison’s The 
Bluest Eye (1970)) and then turns to the deconstruction associated with the corpse (as 
articulated in the artwork of German artist Hans Bellmer and the children’s book The 
Meanest Doll in the World (2003) written by Ann M. Martin and Laura Godwin, and 
illustrated by Brian Selznick). In the section that follows, I then discuss how even the 
deconstructed parts of the doll reveal their individual and unique powers to be human-like (as 
seen through a reading of a song found in Charles Kingsley’s children’s book, The Water 
Babies (1863), which begins with the line: “I once had a sweet little doll, dears” (193) as well 
as not human-like at all (as found in the characterization of Tottie from Rumer Godden’s 
children’s book, The Doll’s House(1962)). In order to combine the effects of these types of 
“mis-play” together along with the notions of a doll soul as a thing of action, this chapter 
concludes with a close reading of a contemporary children’s story (“The Dolls” by Ian 
McEwan as found in his The Daydreamer (1994)).  
In Chapter Three, “The Doll is a Shadow Box,” the interests of the shadow intersect 
with the interests of the box to complicate the liminal space of dollhood and reveal it to 
function much like the constantly changing and returning path on a Möbius strip. Exploring 
how the incorporeal shadow merges with the physical box in two works named “Untitled 
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(Bébé Marie)” (a 1940s shadow box by Joseph Cornell and a 1990s poem by Charles Simic) 
leads to a larger discussion of how this newly amalgamated “shadow box” begins to present 
how the doll can be viewed as even having more than a human-like subjective experience. I 
will argue that for the state of dollhood, the “shadow box” illustrates how the doll can still be 
the object of the experience, but can now also be the subject that experiences. And primarily 
through a close reading of two very different texts (the early twentieth-century poem, 
“Lalka” (“The/A Doll” in English), by Polish poet Bolesław Leśmian, and the 1957 picture 
book, “The Lonely Doll,” by Dare Wright), this chapter examines how the doll can be 
experienced as the spectacle and the spectator, as that thing which is able to do more than 
mimic the human experience, it can also create its own space of experience because it can 
exist on the unique border between life and art. 
Finally, in the concluding chapter, “The Doll in Dollhood,” I consider how the full 
existence and capacity of the doll in dollhood is able to trouble, challenge, and usurp human 
identity. In other words, the goal of this chapter is to address the consequences of the fullest 
expression of the doll’s power in the liminal state of dollhood for human existence. Drawing 
on Susan Stewart’s On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the 
Collection (1984) and Jane Bennett’s “The Force of Things: Steps toward an Ecology of 
Matter” (2004), this dissertation ends with a reading of Sylvia Cassedy’s children’s book 
Lucie Babbidge’s House (1989) in order to address how the power of the liminal doll 
overwhelms that space of the human when both are placed on the same stage as equals. For 
in that space, the doll is able to maintain its objecthood at the same time in which it is able to 
eclipse the human as a subject. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
THE DOLL IS A SHADOW 
Ancient Greek and Latin vocabulary also makes it clear that dolls were regarded as 
young girls, not babies. … in Latin the doll is called pupa, a word that can also mean 
“little girl”; the same is true of the Greek word for doll, korē, which is also the 
standard word for “girl.” … Another Greek word for the doll — plangōn — is found 
as a proper name in Greek New Comedy (something like the English “Dolly”). Thus, 
as defined in Greek and Latin, the doll is like a tiny mirror that reflects the world at 
large. This mirror is not simply a metaphor: the words pupa and korē were also both 
used to mean the “pupil” of the eye, and more specifically the miniaturized image 
captured in the mirror of someone else’s pupil when we look into the eye of the 
person who is looking at us. 
 
(on defining the image of “the girl in the eye”) 
from Maurizio Bettini’s The Portrait of the Lover (1999), 217 
 
 
Introduction: 
 For the doll in dollhood, the shadow articulates three essential qualities. First, like the 
shadow, the doll can reflect the form of the human subject as a universally recognizable 
figure. This is the idea of “likeness” which the doll is most easily and unhesitatingly 
associated with. However, the doll, like the shadow, can also reflect the soul of the human 
subject as a privately experienced and intangible force. Although not as readily recognizable, 
this resemblance is what makes a doll a truly captivating force as it suggests some of the 
doll’s real power. Finally, as between the being and its shadow, it is interaction that plays a 
significant role in the negotiation between the human subject and its doll as an active 
performance that reveals the profound ability of the toy to reflect a likeness to human 
consciousness. This means that the doll, as a shadow, functions under the idea of a doubled 
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“likeness” that only one’s real engagement with the doll can articulate, explore, and 
experience.  
The twofold idea of resemblance is captured in how the doll looks like a subject in 
terms of physical similarity, but also in how the doll looks for recognition in how well it 
registers the real consciousness of an absent subject that cannot be tangibly measured. 
Although two seemingly indistinguishable ideas of “likeness,” an understanding of 
resemblance as physical similarity and resemblance as reminder of a soul can be made 
discernable in the intimacy of interaction or, more directly, in how an individual engages or 
plays with a doll. 
 This chapter will address the distinctions between these two sides of “likeness.” First 
through a reading of Pliny’s version of the myth of the origins of art (about the making of the 
first sculpture), this two-fold idea of “likeness” will be discussed in terms of the creation of 
modern “portrait dolls” like Shirley Temple dolls or Strawberry Shortcake dolls and in terms 
of the desire of the doll itself as expressed in Sylvia Waugh’s children’s book series about a 
doll family, The Mennyms (1993). The chapter then focuses on a later version of the origins 
myth, retold by Athenagoras, that employs a discussion of four twentieth-century American 
folk artists (Nellie Mae Rowe, Morton Bartlett, Calvin and Ruby Black) to illustrate how the 
act of interaction reveals the art object to be a greater expression of the doll as soul than the 
doll as body. Finally, the 1961 Life magazine photographic essay, titled “A Girl Named 
Sandra is a Doll Named Peter,”1 is introduced to express the manifestation of these three 
                                                          
1
 Titled “A Girl Named Sandra is a Doll Named Peter,” this photo essay was published in the May 19, 
1961 issue of Life magazine titled (9-10). Photographer: George Silk. Date taken: April 1961. One can view this 
photo essay on Google Books by searching the title of the essay or by going to the following link: 
http://books.google.com/books?id=rE8EAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA2&dq=titled%20%E2%80%9CA%20Girl%20N
amed%20Sandra%20is%20a%20Doll%20Named%20Peter%E2%80%9D&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false 
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shadow qualities in the doll and how they contribute to a fuller understanding of the uncanny 
and liminal power of the doll in dollhood. 
 
Pliny’s Origins of Art and the Doll’s Two Sides of “Likeness”: 
Although dolls are now mass produced, bought, and sold as objects and so seemingly 
separated that much further from the living body upon which they are modeled, the doll’s 
first role was like that of the shadow’s: as a form considered to be an actual extension of a 
human subject. In other words, the doll, like the shadow, was first and foremost considered to 
be a manifestation of the living soul. According to Max von Boehn, in his encyclopedic 
work, Dolls and Puppets (1932), it is the doll as vessel for the human spirit or the doll as 
“ancestor image” that “is rightly to be regarded as the oldest doll form” (76). Boehn 
describes this first doll as such: 
The ancestor images represent the dead and form a substitute for the dead, since all 
the spiritual qualities of the deceased have passed into them. It is the dead man 
himself who, in sculptured form, continues to participate in the life of the community. 
(Boehn 37) 
Further, and more famously, Rainer Maria Rilke, in his essay “Some Reflections on Dolls: 
Occasioned by the Wax Dolls of Lotte Pritzel,” addresses the consciousness he sees 
belonging so intrinsically to dolls. Kitti Carriker notes in her study, Created in Our Image 
(1998), that “Rilke’s essay and the fictional narratives treated here illustrate, the body of the 
doll is often invested with a ‘truth-bearing function,’ perhaps even with a soul” and further 
adds that Rilke:  
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…places the doll at a border that conscribes existence … He describes dolls who “lay 
there on the border of the children’s sleep, filled, at most, with the rudimentary idea 
of falling down, allowing themselves to be dreamed; as it was their habit, during the 
day to be lived unwearyingly with energies not their own.” This vision is the uncanny 
and “inhuman spectacle of a dream no longer in need of its dreamer,” a doll no longer 
in need of a dollmaker, an object no longer in need of a subject. Like the three-
dimensional dolls of childhood, the doll-soul too eventually appears then vanishes at 
its own uncanny border, “the quiveringmost borders of our vision…. Reflecting thus 
and looking up, one is confronted and almost overwhelmed by their waxen nature.” 
(Carriker 172) 
This vision is also of a doll with consciousness, with a soul, that is separate from the 
consciousness which may or may not be reflected onto it from the child or its viewer, a 
dynamic further suggested by the choice to frequently name dolls “Alma” (“soul” in 
Spanish).2 Even the myth of the very origins of art, as recounted by Pliny the Elder (23-79 
AD) in his Naturalis Historia (Natural History), insists that the doll is like the shadow in that 
it not only mirrors the physical shape of a subject but also captures the very essence of that 
subject’s consciousness.  
Although the origins of art is a story rich with interpretations and retellings, the 
structure of the myth depends on the same cast (pun intended) of characters (a potter, his 
                                                          
2
 Aside from the “Alma” doll belonging to Austrian artist Oskar Kokoschka (1886-1980), there is also 
the 2009 “Alma” animated short film directed by Spanish filmmaker Rodrigo Blaas (http://almashortfilm.com). 
In this wordless Pixar-like short, a child named “Alma” stumbles upon a toy shop which features, in its window, 
a doll which looks exactly like her. After entering the doll-filled but human-empty shop, the girl, in touching the 
doll she admired as her mirror image becomes trapped within it. In essence, like all the other children hidden 
within the dolls of the toy shop, Alma’s “alma” is stolen and locked behind the glassy eyes of her miniature toy 
double. 
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heartbroken daughter, and her lover’s shadow) and the same basic plot. On the eve of her 
beloved’s departure, a potter’s daughter captured her love’s “likeness” by drawing “in outline 
on the wall the shadow of his face thrown by the lamp” (Stoichita, “Shadow” 11).3 Her 
father, the potter, then “pressed clay on this” in order to make a physical and tangible model 
of the young man’s likeness (Ibid). This model, “hardened by exposure to fire with the rest of 
his pottery,” thus became the first sculpture and was “preserved in the Shrine of the Nymphs” 
(Ibid). An interpretation of Pliny’s version of this myth may, at first, seem to be as 
straightforward as the plotting of the story’s events. The daughter created the first portrait by 
tracing her beloved’s shadow and the potter created the first sculpture (or doll) by following 
that portrait. In such a reading of the story, all signs (articulated as the motives and actions 
made by individuals) seem to only point back to the beloved or, more precisely, the 
beloved’s body. It is as if the very careful plotting of this myth articulates that the desire for 
art-making (or shadow-making) is found in the culmination of creating earnest referents that 
are only made, accumulated, and valued in how successfully they refer back to (however far) 
an undeniable and stable original form. In desiring her beloved, a potter’s daughter catches 
his body’s likeness by tracing his shadow. In wishing to please his daughter, a potter casts 
this silhouette into hardened clay. Wanting evidence of this act, the Shrine of the Nymphs 
preserved this model. Needing an origin to art, we have this story. This myth, in both 
structure and narration, suggests that even the supposedly elusive shadow functions to make 
lost physical things once again present. It appears as if the engine that drives this narrative, 
                                                          
3
 As I am citing Pliny via Stoichita’s text, please note that Stoichita indicates that all quotations from 
Pliny’s Natural History are taken from the Loeb Classical Library version translated by H. Rackman 
(Cambridge, MA and London, 1952) (endnote 1, 243). In addition, see cited pages of Stoichita’s text 
(particularly his endnotes) for exact page references to Pliny’s work. Finally, in order to avoid errors in citation, 
please note that the format of this citation is Stoichita’s as well. 
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and its eventual art-making, is that of creating a family tree, a type of map which, by its very 
nature, brings the past into the present as it always carries with itself a physical and tangible 
reminder of that which once seemed past, or lost along the way, into the ongoing present. 
However, the emotional motivation that initially triggers this stable of referents also reflects a 
“likeness” that is found outside of physical resemblance. In fact, what actually drives this 
story is an insistence on creating a communion with the psyche and not the body.  
It is the spirit of the beloved rather than his body that each referent is attempting to 
reflect as this story’s entire art process was triggered by the private feelings of a heart-
stricken girl who desired for the final form, for all intents and purposes, to return her to the 
intimacy of her lost love and not necessarily its bodily representation. That is to say that 
while both the story as a whole as well as each exchange of action in its plot illustrates a 
generational progressing away from the original (first to the shadow, then the silhouette, the 
clay relief, the fired sculpture), what is held wholly intact within each of those descending 
stages is an implication that although each generation of creators makes a new “likeness,” 
each has that same firm desire to return to the intimacy and emotion associated with that first 
soul and not necessarily to the body which contained it. In this myth, the “likeness” which is 
then valued is the resemblance that brings the viewer closer to the beloved’s spirit and not the 
beloved’s body. 
Of course, the genre of portraiture, whether in works of art, photography, or literature 
also acknowledges that the desire to harken back to a “first” body, like the body of the 
beloved, is really about returning to that subject’s essence and not necessarily its physical 
and tangible form. In Portraiture (2004), Shearer West succinctly notes the genre’s 
complexity:  
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While a portrait can be concerned with likeness as contained in a person’s physical 
features, it can also represent the subject’s social position or ‘inner life’, such as their 
character or virtues. A portrait can be subject to social or artistic conventions that 
construct the sitter as a type of their time; it can also probe the uniqueness of an 
individual in a way that sets the sitter apart from his or her context. (21)  
In listing just a few of the possibilities of what a portrait “can be,” what West is actually 
illustrating is how portraiture is a complicated form of testament. In fact, aside from the 
ways in which desire is measured in the material doll as it offers itself as a means of 
accumulating knowledge about the social, religious, or economic practices or whims of a 
collective body (see the first footnote in my introduction), the doll as image can also be 
viewed as longing to satisfy a need to convey the existence of a single consciousness.  
In a sense, in this understanding of their respective relationships to the body, the 
shadow and the doll both seem to function under the guise of a doubled idea of “likeness” as 
articulated in the most superficial notion of the “portrait” or of “portraiture” − as that which 
looks like something else in the details of its physicality and that which looks for recognition 
in how well it feels like the essence of that something else. Consider, for a moment, the 
shadow and the doll in terms of W. J. T. Mitchell’s discussion of what images desire in his 
What do pictures want? The Lives and Loves of Images (2005): 
…most pictures want something. Consider the average portrait, standing in a portrait 
gallery with hundreds of others, waiting for someone to pay attention to it. Average 
portraits−that is, the conventional, official images of forgotten personages by 
forgotten painters−are the most forlorn figures of longing for recognition. No one 
cares about them except historians and specialists. Yet captured there on the canvas is 
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the shadowy likeness of a once-living individual, one who probably regarded himself 
with considerable self-esteem, an attitude validated by his ability to command a 
portrait to be made. This picture is caught in the labyrinth of desire, its demands to be 
noticed, admired, and taken at its “face value” (pun intended) continually outstripped 
its bare need to exist (which is also somewhat doubtful, since no one would miss it if 
it disappeared). (73) 
Although he does not directly address either the shadow or the doll, they do fall within the 
scope of Mitchell’s discussion of “pictures” as they too can be perceived as having the same 
two-fold desire as that of the portrait. Essentially, that doubled desire is not only to be held as 
a likeness to some first form but also for the quality of that likeness to be recognized, to be 
held as a universally valued truth.4  
Again, despite not being directly addressed by Mitchell, there is a direct correlation as 
to how the shadow and doll act like the critic’s description of “average” portraits. First, in 
terms of that initial desire, a longing to be held up as a likeness, the shadow, as mentioned 
already, points to the exact shape of a figure. The doll, as a three-dimensional portrait, looks 
to produce a likeness of an individual who may have also “regarded himself with 
considerable self-esteem” though, more often than not, this form of portraiture is a means 
through which the likeness of a publicly cherished individual is captured (Mitchell 73). For 
instance, there are a great number of “individuals” such as twentieth-century American stars 
                                                          
4
 Coincidentally, Mitchell, in an earlier section of this work, in chapter three’s “Drawing Desire,” does, 
in fact, engage directly with Stoichita and the Pliny myth as an example of a doubled desire, one which is 
“based respectively in lack and plenitude, in the longing for an object and the possession that surpasses any 
object” (66). However, as this quote suggests, it is a two pronged desire which belongs to the human participant 
and not any inanimate object or cast image. For Mitchell, the moment in which the girl traces the outlines of her 
beloved’s shadow “expresses both pictures of desire in a single scene; it has its cake and eats it too,” but it is a 
desire that seems to be all human (Ibid). Therefore, though Mitchell’s discussion in this earlier chapter is 
engaging, it is his following chapter, “Drawing Desire,” which relates more directly with this paper’s argument 
as it illustrates a multi-faceted desire which begins with and belongs to the image itself. 
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Raggedy Ann, Strawberry Shortcake, and Mrs. Beasley, who entered “dollhood” and the 
marketplace when they became so popular in their original roles as characters in the literary, 
television, or film stage that three-dimensional portraits were made in order to provide 
anyone (who could afford it) a chance to have such a “likeness” for their very own.5 In 
another example closer to the heart of portraiture, many dolls have also been designed and 
manufactured to capture the likeness of cherished warm-blooded individuals, especially 
culturally popular children no matter whether those children were also known as 
“characters,” like Shirley Temple, or were merely known for being born, like the Dionne 
Quintuplets.6 Therefore, as in Mitchell’s “most pictures” or “average portraits,” one can 
                                                          
5
 Of course none of these famous characters have the same tale to tell as to how they came to be known 
in their three-dimensional forms. For example, though the popularity of Raggedy Ann dolls in the early 
twentieth century does have a direct correlation to the popularity of the Raggedy Ann stories as written and 
illustrated by Johnny Gruelle (1880–1938), the doll was not merely born because of the books but rather the rag 
doll as “doll” begot the rag doll as “image” who returned the favor. According to the “Dolls” entry of The 
Guide to United States Popular Culture (2001), written by Kathy Merlock Jackson, Gruelle took an old rag doll, 
drew on her expression, named her as we know her, and gave her to his daughter, Marcella. From that doll 
sprung the stories of Raggedy Ann which Gruelle made up for his daughter who contracted, and eventually died 
from, tuberculosis. Those stories were only published after her death, as a tribute and, according to Jackson, it 
was booksellers who “in order to generate interest in the books” placed them “alongside Raggedy Ann dolls” in 
their store windows (243). For images of Raggedy Ann, see: 
http://dollhood.tumblr.com/tagged/raggedy%20ann%20and%20andy. 
The first incarnation of Mrs. Beasley was also as a doll as she was featured in the late 1960s, early 
1970s television show Family Affair as being the confidante of a six-year-old girl named Buffy. However, 
though Mrs. Beasley, the doll, existed in the realm of a family sitcom where only its child could hear her speak, 
the “Mrs. Beasley doll” was created and mass-produced because of the character’s popularity on the show. But 
then with that first doll of Mrs. Beasley, she was also no longer silent to a public audience. Through a voice 
box, the “Mrs. Beasley doll” was given a voice typical of a grandmother and a bank of less than a dozen pre-
programmed phrases to share with any listener who pulled her string. According to Juliette Peers’ overview of 
“Mattel” in Girl Culture: Studying Girl Culture (2008), the doll was made into her own doll when the toy 
company moved into “the portrait doll arena in the mid- to late 1960s” and began to create dolls that 
represented such well-known living personalities as the model Twiggy and the actress Dianne Carroll as well as 
the well-loved though not quite as “living” personality that was Mrs. Beasley (426). For images of “Mrs. 
Beasley” dolls, see: http://dollhood.tumblr.com/tagged/mrs%20beasley. 
Strawberry Shortcake rose to dollhood in the 1980s when she “became America’s top-selling doll after 
she appeared on video, triggering sales of over $1 billion in Strawberry Shortcake dolls and related products,” 
according to Kathy Merlock Jackson’s “Dolls” (244). However, the popularity of the sweet smelling character 
that led to the production of its doll-form was actually a foregone conclusion. Jackson reveals that such 
animated programs in the early 1980s like Strawberry Shortcake were part of “the birth of toy-based television 
shows” that were “designed expressly to promote doll lines” (244). For images of “Strawberry Shortcake” dolls, 
see: http://dollhood.tumblr.com/tagged/television%20-%20strawberry%20shortcake. 
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argue that the majority of Shirley Temple dolls, for example, also express that same initial 
desire for likeness, that which looks like something, to be met. A desire which can then be 
satisfied when it, the collective that is the Shirley Temple doll, expresses any universally or 
culturally understood signs of resemblance (presence of dimples, curly blond hair) to that 
larger constructed form of the Shirley Temple child.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6
 Shirley Temple and the Dionne Quintuplets, as well as their likenesses, were hugely popular in the 
1930s with 1934 being a shared year of significance. Shirley Temple was, in many ways, the world’s biggest 
movie star during her reign in the 1930s. According to Tino Balio’s Grand Design: Hollywood as a Modern 
Enterprise: 1930-1939 (1995), after appearing in nine films in 1934, Temple received a special “miniature 
Oscar for bringing ‘more happiness to millions of children and millions of grown-ups than any other child of 
her years in the history of the world’” (147). And, in that same year, on May 28th, the Dionne Quintuplets were 
catapulted into fame, and doll form, the moment they were born in Canada. As the first set of quintuplets to 
survive their infancy, the five identical girls, according to Katherine Arnups’ “Mothering the Dionne 
Quintuplets: Women’s Stories” (2001):  “provided hope and inspiration to millions of people across North 
America and, indeed, around the world” (134).  
This history as well as the ongoing commoditization of all six of these girls as “dolls” whether in 
actual form or in cultural representation is a complicated and intertwining relationship which, regrettably, this 
project does not have the scope necessary for its discussion though I do suggest that any interested readers begin 
first with their autobiographies (the ones which were written by the adult women and not the many 
autobiographies “written by” them as children): Shirley Temple Black’s Child Star was published in 1988 and 
Jean-Yves Soucy’s and the Dionnes’ Family Secrets: The Dionne Quintuplets’ Autobiography in 1997. Also, I 
should like to draw the reader’s attention to three tantalizing images of the girls and the girls as dolls to 
illustrate just how convoluted their relationship may have been with each other, with themselves, as well as with 
representations of both the former and the latter. The first image, as reproduced in a 2009 edition of an auction 
book by Heritage Auction Galleries titled Heritage Vintage Movie Photography & Stills, is a publicity shot of 
Shirley Temple taken in 1934 in which she is posed to be “playing” with own her set of “Quints” dolls (60). The 
second image is a 1935 publicity shot, reproduced in the letters section of the autumn 1975 edition of Liberty 
magazine (Dubas 5), in which Temple is depicted celebrating the birth of the famous quintuplets by preparing to 
present them with another set of quintuplets, five Shirley Temple dolls. In this image, Temple appears to be 
organizing her dolls for duty as, with eyes cast toward the camera, her finger is pointed up and towards the 
ready row of dolls whose faces are all turned in the direction of that original “doll.” The Dionne girls 
themselves then add to this visual labyrinth of ownership and doll identification by contributing not only an 
innumerable number of images of themselves playing “naturally” in front of an eager camera with dolls of their 
own likeness but also a particularly fascinating un-credited photograph, published in the “Illustration Section,” 
following page 64, of their 1963 work, We Were Five: The Dionne Quintuplets’ Story from Birth Through 
Girlhood to Womanhood written by James Brough and the five sisters. In this third telling image, from 1944, 
sitting in a semi-circle on the floor of a neatly arranged room full of multiples, the identically dressed girls are 
now the ones posed with what appears to be those same Shirley Temple dolls. Under a portrait of the girls as 
infants, an image which anchors the center of the room as it hangs over a fireplace bookended by matched sets 
of chairs, curtains, lamps, and girls (one girl is, coincidently, positioned right under the picture itself), the five 
sit politely, smile awkwardly, and hold for the camera those very same (but ten years older) Shirley Temple 
dolls. An image of all these children and dolls “playing” together would be the culmination of this surreal visual 
experience, but, sadly, I have not had the luck nor the time to locate such an image if one, in fact, exists. 
For examples of “Shirley Temple” dolls or Shirley Temple with dolls, see: 
http://dollhood.tumblr.com/tagged/shirley%20temple. 
 For dolls of the “Dionne Quintuplets” or for images of the girls with dolls, see: 
http://dollhood.tumblr.com/tagged/dionne%20quintuplets. 
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Even the doll in works of fiction can function as if it also longs to make present that 
“home” body that may otherwise appear entirely absent. Consider, for example, Sylvia 
Waugh’s 1990s series of children’s books about a family of dolls called the Mennyms.7 
Though they are “man-sized, talking, rational rag dolls” that “do not exist anywhere else in 
the world,” neither age nor feel any sort of physical pain since they have no physical flesh, 
their basic behaviors and deep desires are all driven by a need to reflect a real human form 
(Waugh, “Mennyms” 15) Their longing to always be pointing back to this home of origin, 
the human, is emphasized by the fact that a key part of their daily existence is to routinely 
play “pretends” where they perform the everyday human acts that they are incapable of 
actually participating in as material dolls such as drinking tea, getting sick, or sleeping. And 
although these “pretends” do seem to share much with how children play at house, the 
mimicry that the Mennyms have been engaging in for the multiple decades of their existence 
more pointedly illustrates what Mitchell saw as the desire of “average portraits.” This doll 
family does, indeed, shadow human behavior for the obvious fact of their survival. They 
must/do/act/perform like the typical family in order to go unnoticed by the human world 
which surrounds their snug little home at Number 5 Brocklehurst Grove.  
However, their mimicry of human behavior at home, in the privacy and security of 
that space as an “average” family also points to what Mitchell saw as the “labyrinth of 
desire” that is also present in an “average” portrait (73). While the portrait may appear to 
strive to be recognized as offering a resemblance to a particular individual and the Mennyms 
may claim to want to look like a typical human family, what both the portrait and the 
                                                          
7
 The following are the five titles that make up Waugh’s series: The Mennyms (1993), Mennyms in the 
Wilderness (1994), Mennyms Under Siege (1995), Mennyms Alone (1996), and Mennyms Alive (1996). 
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Mennyms also desire is to be appreciated for how they model, mimic, and remind their 
respective audiences of the spirit that inhabits a human body and not necessarily just its form. 
In terms of both her reader and her dolls, Waugh makes much of this desire for 
recognition as being like a human rather than simply looking like one. As the reader may look 
to understand the secret life of dolls, the dolls are illustrating how precisely they are (despite 
their button eyes) just like the reader in how much they desire to be measured as such in their 
daily acts of performance. Even in moments where it may appear as if the distance between 
“us” and “them” should be marked with difference, those moments are pointing to an actual 
difference present in us. Consider, for example, the description of Appleby’s yearly 
reoccurring fifteenth birthday celebration: 
Appleby was proud of her birthday. Every fourth of July she reached the age of 
fifteen yet again. It was never clear at what stage of the year she reverted to being 
fourteen. Certainly at Christmas she was always fourteen. At other times she would 
be fifteen if being a little bit older gave her more prestige. Occasionally, in an 
argument, she might claim to be nearly sixteen. But the birthday always had to be her 
fifteenth. (Waugh, “Mennyms” 113) 
There is no denying the fact that this teenager is celebrating the same fifteenth birthday she 
has been celebrating every year for the past 40 years. The text does not even attempt to avoid 
this truth as it states, quite definitely, that: “Every fourth of July she reached the age of 
fifteen yet again” (Ibid). And yet despite what this passage is claiming, it is anything but a 
foreign concept to its reader. In fact, in the ways in which Waugh describes how this forever 
turning fifteen-year-old does or does not act her “age” is actually quite similar to how any 
human fifteen-year-old may act and seem to be one age in one instant and yet a younger (or 
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older) age in the next. By noting that Appleby is certain ages at certain times of the year (on 
the fourth of July she is fifteen, at Christmas she is fourteen), the author also suggests that 
these ages are actually tied more to the “betwixt and between” behavior of a teenager than 
the chronological age of one. Therefore, echoing the age of any human teenage girl, Appleby 
is fifteen when it suits her, almost sixteen for the sake of argument, and always fourteen at 
Christmastime when being younger is always better.  
 In reading Appleby, the doll, as behaving as a typical teenage girl, Mitchell’s 
secondary form of likeness, as that which looks for recognition in how well it feels like 
something else, is expressed because it is a type of resemblance that cannot be measured in 
how closely the elements of the “portrait” or “doll” meet and match the original form. 
Rather, this likeness is recognized in how well the cast likeness (the portrait, the doll) closes 
a more intangible gap between itself (the image) and the original body. In other words, the 
desire for likeness, rather than in likeness, is measured in how closely the copy brings us, in a 
more intimate and visceral sense, to the spirit of the original.  
In Portraiture, West also uses C. S. Pierce’s idea of index (from his semiotic theory of 
the icon, index, and the symbol) to address how a portrait may include the artist as well as the 
encounter between himself and the subject as being part of the larger idea of what a portrait 
artist may “portray” in this genre. Notwithstanding her own particular use of the term, what 
is useful about West’s observation is that it also exemplifies how forms of “likeness,” in 
general, are able to carry with or in their semblances (the silhouette, the doll) that which was 
also thought to have only existed off-stage or off-screen (the departed lover, the elusive 
shadow). 
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Most portraiture represents a particular occasion or moment, whether directly or by 
implication. Unlike a landscape painting or a history painting, which may seem to 
transcend a single moment in time, the presence of a specific individual in a portrait 
reminds us of the encounter between the artist and the sitter. This special aspect of 
portraiture has been explained using C.S. Peirce’s semiotic theory of the icon, the 
index, and the symbol. According to Peirce, an icon looks like the thing it represents; 
an index draws attention to something outside the representation; and a symbol is a 
seemingly arbitrary sign that is, by cultural convention, connected to a particular 
object. A portrait has qualities of all three: it resembles that object of representation 
(icon), it refers to the act of sitting (index), and it contains gestures, expressions, and 
props that can be read with knowledge of social and cultural conventions (symbol). In 
this tripartite view, the indexical qualities of portraiture are particularly notable. 
These signs relate to the process of producing the portrait, and the traces of that 
process that remain in the final product. When we look at portraits, we see individuals 
who are either dead or are now older and different than the way they were 
represented, but portraits seem to transport us into an actual moment that existed in 
the past when the artist and sitter encountered each other in a real time and place. 
Whether or not a portrait was actually based on a sitting, the transaction between 
artist and sitter is evoked in the imagination of the viewer (West 41). 
This difference between desire for likeness as an index and the desire for recognition in its 
indexicality can be seen in how, for example, the value of Shirley Temple dolls is measured. 
First, the dolls which look the most “like” the child are not necessarily the most valued in 
terms of monetary worth or collector demand. Those types of dolls simply satisfy that desire 
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for likeness as similarity, for the physical ways in which their material features may harken 
back to the original. But the dolls considered to be the most valuable and are the most sought 
after are, in a way, the generation of dolls closest to the actual child: the licensed Ideal 
Company dolls “born” in the same years as Temple’s greatest success and the one of her as a 
baby that was inspired by family photographs.8 Both of these dolls are “originals” in that 
both kinds of dolls are perceived as being only one generation removed from the original 
form. This lack of distance illustrates the fact that the kind of likeness measured and valued 
is located in how these dolls are able to mimic that intimacy between the actual shadow and 
the body of origin in a much more nuanced and complicated way than those dolls which 
superficially “look like” the actual human form. 
Essentially, what West is suggesting and what is implied in the very etymology of the 
word “portrait” (specifically in how the noun “portrait” may be interpreted as the archaic past 
participle form of “portray”9) is that the portrait is, in a sense, a means to access more than 
the lost body, but also the lost spirit. The portrait and the portrait doll is readily and 
                                                          
8
 Though there are countless websites devoted to the discussion of the buying and selling of Shirley 
Temple dolls and number of published pricing guides (including two volumes of the Shirley Temple: 
Identification and Price Guide to Shirley Temple Collectibles (2002, 2003) by Suzanne Kraus-Mancuso), these 
two sets of dolls seem to be, in general, the most sought after by collectors as well as the dolls with the highest 
price tag. Of course, it is important to note that Shirley Temple doll collectors, like all collectors, also measure 
the value of their collectibles in increments of intactness (original box, original bow) and nuance of markings 
(the number of teeth showing, how the company licensed to make the dolls marked their approved “Shirley 
Temples”) in addition to the “generation” of the doll. 
 
9
 The following is excerpted from the OED’s definition of the verb form of “portrait”: 
 “Apparently < the past participle of PORTRAY v. (see forms portrait, purtrait, purtraite at that entry). Attested 
earliest in the past participle portraited, which could alternatively be interpreted as simply a variant of the past 
participle of PORTRAY v. with secondary suffixation, from which a present stem portrait subsequently arose 
by analogy. Alternatively, perhaps a back-formation < either PORTRAITOUR n. or PORTRAITURE n. 
Probably also in later use partly < PORTRAIT n. Compare PORTURE v” (online OED). 
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constantly echoing back to an original or, to borrow a phrase from critic Eloise Knowlton, it 
is also a form of narrative which is “bent toward its object” (44).10 
 
Athenagoras’ Origins of Art and Doll Interaction:  
Returning to the story of the origins of art, although Pliny’s account is possibly the 
best-known Western version of the myth of the origins of sculpture (in particular) or of art (in 
general), it is a later version of this story, told by Athenagoras, which draws a more profound 
connection between the soul and the doll itself: the role of interaction.11 
In Pliny’s telling, this myth emphasizes an intimate relationship between the soul and 
the doll only if one were to carelessly collapse the distinctions between the arts of sculpture 
and doll-making. Certainly, there are elements of this story which do resist the notion of 
calling the potter’s finished creation a “doll,” such as the fact that its shape (adult male rather 
than female child), form (hardened clay not pliable material), suggested dimension (life-size 
not lap ready), and eventual landing place (museum rather than nursery or trash heap) are the 
qualities more broadly linked to that of sculpture than of the doll. In addition, one cannot 
ignore the fact that this myth is more famously known, due to Pliny’s version, as the origins 
of sculpture than the making of dolls. 
However, there is also room to interpret the potter’s finished object as being more a 
doll than a sculpture because of the role that interaction plays in not only defining such an 
                                                          
10
 In her Joyce, Joyceans, and the Rhetoric of Citation (1998), Knowlton uses this phrase in her 
discussion of James Joyce’s use of quotes (specifically the epigraph by Ovid) in his A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man. 
 
11
 For additional references on this myth in general as well as fuller discussions of Pliny’s version, see: 
Victor I. Stoichita’s A Short History of the Shadow (1997) and Maurizio Bettini’s The Portrait of the Lover 
(1999). 
66 
 
object as a “doll,” but also in how that intimacy of interaction grants access to the experience 
of the being.  
 Although Pliny’s version of this myth is the most familiar, it is not the only one. A 
century after Pliny, another author, Athenagoras, recounted the same story, but with one 
notable difference − he directly stated this to be the origins of the doll: 
The manufacture of dolls was inspired by a young woman: very much enamoured of a 
man, she drew his shadow on the wall as he slept; then her father, charmed by the 
extraordinary likeness − he worked with clay − sculpted the image by filling the 
contours with earth. (Stoichita, “Shadow” 15)12 
Athenagoras’ word choice of “doll” in his retelling may appear insignificant as even Victor I. 
Stoichita does not dwell on its implications. The scholar seems to move past it by writing in 
his A Short History of the Shadow (1997) that, despite differences, what both accounts of the 
story seem to indicate is that “the primary purpose of basing a representation on the shadow 
was possibly that of turning it into a mnemonic aid; of making the absent present” (Ibid). 
And yet, though this observation glides past the word “doll,” it does not reject a reading of 
the potter’s work as a doll. In fact, by indicating that what these two versions of the tale share 
is how the shadow functions as an “aid,” Stoichita’s word choice suggests a doll reading of 
the potter’s creation as it implies the element and importance of interaction, a key defining 
characteristic of recognizing that which is doll spirit rather than sculpture body.  
According to an interview with Geri Olson, chair of Sonoma State University’s 
psychology department, interaction is also that key distinction between doll and sculpture:  
                                                          
12
 Stoichita is quoting from the translator’s version of Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis, in 
Patrologia Cursus completus, 6, coll. 923-4. (As stated in the second footnote in this chapter, please note that 
the format of this citation is also Stoichita’s.) 
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…the main difference between a doll and a sculpture—stone sculpture especially—is 
that we play or interact or somehow use dolls in some way, whether we put them on 
an altar or dress or undress holy dolls in a church. (Giles) 
Though the clay figure eventually does find itself to be something which is looked upon and 
admired when it is “preserved in the Shrine of the Nymphs,” the desire which drove the 
potter’s daughter to capture a sense of her beloved as well as, perhaps, the desire for the 
potter to please his daughter bears the implication that the intention of this creation was for 
the closeness and intimacy of private interaction  (between lover and beloved and, although 
differently, also between father and daughter) and not the distance found in shared or public 
contemplation of it as a physical art object.  
Supporting this idea that one may recognize a life-like art form to be a doll rather than 
a sculpture based on the level of intimate if not physical engagement taking place between it 
and its audience, is the work of four twentieth-century American artists: Nellie Mae Rowe 
(1900-1982), Morton Bartlett (1903-1992), and Calvin and Ruby Black (1903-1972, 1915-
1982). Aside from being near in age and sharing the troubled and troubling label of artists of 
“folk art,”13 all four also produced the same form − the three-dimensional doll.  
Georgia’s Nellie Mae Rowe worked in various mediums producing works both 
playful and spiritual. In addition to the handmade dolls she began making out of bedclothes 
                                                          
13
 It is important to acknowledge that “folk art,” even within the narrower parameter of “American folk 
art,” is a somewhat unstable umbrella term as it is used to refer to such differing categories of art as “primitive,” 
“outsider,” and even children’s artwork. Although it is defined with inconsistent and changing understandings 
of concepts such as “naïve,” “non-academic,” and “visionary,” I chose to use this term as it is exemplified 
through a particular reading of these four specific artists. Aside being canonized as “folk artists” by their 
inclusion in the American Folk Art Museum and the Gerard C. Wertkin edited Encyclopedia of American Folk 
Art (2004) all are self-taught as well as self-propelled to create not for public recognition, but for the complex 
idea of personal pleasure (however each defined that pleasure). Special thanks to Lee Kogan, curator emerita, of 
The American Folk Art Museum for a personal discussion of the term “folk art” as well as introducing these 
artists to me. 
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in childhood, Rowe formed chewing gum sculptures, created works made brilliant in color 
through her use of only colored pencil and crayon, and embellished both the interior and 
exterior of her house (turning it into a living and lived in artwork) to the point of drawing the 
curiosity of strangers. On the other hand, Morton Bartlett, in Boston, privately worked to 
make only about 15 intricately and startlingly life-like dolls in order to photograph them in 
various settings “realistic” to childhood like reading, fishing, or playing with a dog. While 
husband and wife Calvin and Ruby Black first began to create what would become a family 
of about 80 wooden “Possum Trot” dolls as an attraction to their rock store in California’s 
Mojave Desert, they also identified each doll as having her own particular personality as well 
as carefully selected name. Although their dolls, like their styles, are quite different,14 what 
these artists share is the fact that their three-dimensional figures are seemingly uniformly 
categorized as “dolls” due to their physical likeness to such objects. Indeed, as in the 
typically prescribed gender of the toy, the form of the female child does dominate throughout 
the oeuvre of these artists. However, while Rowe’s dolls are fabric-based neither the Blacks’ 
rough and wooden dolls nor Bartlett’s plaster ones “look” like typical dolls nor is either 
collection particularly cuddle-friendly.15 
                                                          
14
 For more on Rowe, see The Art of Nellie Mae Rowe: Ninety-Nine and a Half Won’t Do (1998) by 
Lee Kogan and Judith Alexander’s Nellie Mae Rowe: Visionary Artist, 1900–1982. (1983). For images of her 
dolls, see: http://dollhood.tumblr.com/tagged/artist%20-%20nellie%20mae%20rowe. 
For more on Bartlett, see Marion Harris and Graham Ovenden’s Family Found: The Lifetime 
Obsession of Morton Bartlett (1994) and Roberta Smith New York Times art review of Bartlett’s work, titled: 
“Doll, You Oughta Be in Pictures” (August 8, 2007). For images of his dolls, see: 
http://dollhood.tumblr.com/tagged/artist%20-%20morton%20bartlett. 
For more on Calvin and Ruby Black, in addition to Wertkin’s Encyclopedia of American Folk Art 
(2004), see Folk Art in American Life (1995) by Robert Bishop and Jacqueline M. Atkins, and the documentary 
Possum Trot: The Life and Work of Calvin Black, 1903-1972 produced by Light-Saraf Film. For images of 
their dolls, see: http://dollhood.tumblr.com/tagged/artist%20-%20calvin%20and%20ruby%20black. 
 
15
 Indeed, neither the Blacks nor Bartlett created easily embraceable dolls, their dolls were sturdy 
enough to be played with by anyone as many of the Blacks’ “Possum Trot” dolls were outside dolls, braving the 
elements of a desert sun while, despite the delicacy of Bartlett’s dolls, the main reason he made them, according 
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As the dolls of Rowe, Bartlett, and the Blacks also sit in different seats on the scale of 
“life-like” in much the same measure that “life-like” sculptures might, what then identifies 
them as dolls and not as sculpture? Is it the desire for a certain kind of personal physical 
engagement which Geri Olson gestured toward in her observation about the main difference 
between a doll and a sculpture that is also present in Stoichita’s observation that shadow 
functions as an “aid”? In a word: yes.   
As the desires that drove both the potter’s daughter and the potter to create suggests 
that the intention of the ultimate creation was meant to be experienced through the closeness 
and intimacy of interaction rather than one of cool observation, this same desire appears to be 
echoed threefold in the readings of these four American “folk art” artists. Though their dolls 
are wildly different in style, what these artworks share, and what seems to then reveal why 
they are so clearly identified as “dolls,” is that all of these artists are emphasizing the same 
type of desire for interaction present in the art-origin story. In other words, each is said to 
have made dolls with a desire to reproduce the intimacy found in personal interaction, to 
make the presence of an unknown soul known to them and only them. With that said, this 
interaction was also of the upmost importance because it acted as an “aid” to fill a space of 
absence in their lives. 
In that way, the main difference between the doll as a material object and the doll as 
an image is that as an image it often acts as a testament to an absence. For example, in 
nineteenth-century American folk portraits of children, the presence of a doll in the hands of 
a painting’s subject often acts as the marker for gender in what would otherwise remain a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to Roberta Smith’s “Doll, You Oughta Be in Pictures” (2007), was to photograph them, implying one’s 
experience of them was to be found in the sturdiness of reproducible images rather than the fragility of the 
actual models. 
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genderless child.16 Or, on the other side of the spectrum, the appearance of a doll as it sits in 
its owner’s lap in a work of eighteenth-century English portraiture points to nuances of class 
or education that might otherwise go unrecognized.17  
In terms of our four artists, they each created and interacted with their dolls in order 
to find a means through which to negotiate and then fill a space with the experience of 
consciousness that they felt as being absent from their existence. In other words, the artists’ 
personal interactions with their dolls allowed them to access an intimacy that was lacking in 
their own lives, specifically the emotional rather than physical closeness of having their own 
children.  
After her second husband, Henry Rowe, died Nellie Mae Rowe devoted all of her free 
time to making art including dolls which, according to Lee Kogan’s “Nellie Mae Rowe: 
Multiple Contexts, Multiple Meanings:”  
…fulfilled several functions for the childless woman. She said, “I wanted to be a 
mother....Every one of my sisters had children but me….God did not give me 
children, but He gave me artistic talent…and I have to use it.” (114).  
For Bartlett, orphaned at the age of eight, his dolls also seemed to serve as a surrogate family 
and not just as a subject for his camera’s lens: 
Bartlett made intimate, photographic portraits of “his children,” reading, sleeping, 
laughing, and weeping, and they were private components of the alternate world he 
created for himself. (Kogan, “Bartlett” 42) 
                                                          
16
 For dolls as gender indicators, see the Heritage Plantation of Sandwich’s Is She or Isn’t He? 
Identifying Gender in Folk Portraits of Children (1995), a work which corresponds to a loan exhibition held at 
the museum from May 14 through October 29, 1995. 
 
17
 For dolls as indicators of class and education, see Leslie Reinhard’s 2006 article “Serious Daughters: 
Dolls, Dress, and Female Virtue in the Eighteenth Century.” 
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Finally, readings of Calvin and Ruby Black also suggest that their desire to produce this 
particular form of art was driven by the possibility of an intimacy that can be achieved in the 
interactions of naming, discussing, personifying, and entertaining a family of dolls as if they 
were real children: “The childless couple lavished attention on their dolls, buying them 
perfume and jewelry from tips that visitors were encouraged to leave for their favorites” 
(folkartmuseum.org). 
At the same time that Rowe, Bartlett, and the Blacks may have all similarly 
restructured the myth of the origins of art through the art-making map made out between the 
daughter as lover and her (absent) beloved in order to satisfy the longing for the closeness 
and intimacy of interaction between parent and child, they have also given the doll her due in 
the origins of art. 
 
Me and My Shadow Doll: 
Published in the May 19, 1961 issue of Life magazine, the photographic essay “A 
Girl Named Sandra is a Doll Named Peter,”18 is a text that illustrates the same three qualities 
that the shadow offers as an understanding to the doll in dollhood as well as complicates 
those qualities to the point where the photographic essay on a doll becomes, for the viewer, 
both a threshold and uncanny experience. 
First consider the essay as a composite of a number of different photographs. One 
image featuring the child and doll in identical poses and hiding half of their respective bodies 
and faces behind a shared floor-length curtain is now sliced down the middle and used to 
                                                          
18
 To view this photo essay search the title, “A Girl Named Sandra is a Doll Named Peter,” on Google 
Books or go to the following link: 
http://books.google.com/books?id=rE8EAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA2&dq=titled%20%E2%80%9CA%20Girl%20N
amed%20Sandra%20is%20a%20Doll%20Named%20Peter%E2%80%9D&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false 
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bookend the essay itself. The first half of this picture, with the image of the doll, “Peter,” is 
now acting as the left hand margin of the left page and it leads into the first half of the title’s 
text: “A Girl Named Sandra.” While the other half of the picture, the image of the girl, 
Sandra, acts as the opposite margin of the opposite page and it follows the text: “Is a Doll 
Named Peter.” Without addressing the serendipitous naming of either the magazine (Life) 
nor the particular department in which this story is published (“Speaking of Pictures”), this 
photo essay, in both word and text, outlines many of the ways in which the doll is tied to an 
understanding of the shadow as a visual representation of the twofold idea of “likeness" as 
being both the material illustration of the body as well as the intangible manifestation of the 
soul. Furthermore, the construction of this photo essay demonstrates how the private 
exchange of play taking place between child and doll is precisely that form of intimate 
interaction that not only emphasizes the doll as a representation of consciousness but also 
illustrates the larger scope of the doll’s liminal and fantastical power in dollhood upon its 
larger audience.  
But first, does taking an inventory of the contents of these two pages truly reveal the 
doll’s full power or even delve into how a child’s personal interactions with her doll reveal 
the likeness of a consciousness? Constructed and controlled by a desire to illustrate an 
unsettling experience and explain away how a child plays with her toy, this photo essay 
seems to have erased the very possibility of seeing the doll soul and also as experiencing it as 
fantastic. As addressed in the introductory chapter of this work, one can argue that this photo 
essay is evidence of how Jentsch’s idea of the uncanny − as “doubt as to whether an 
apparently animate object really is alive and, conversely, whether a lifeless object might not 
perhaps be animate” − has become so culturally understood, or told to us, with respect to how 
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the doll “works” that the uncanny effect is, in effect, no longer felt by us (“Uncanny” 135). 
At stake in this photo spread is then the experience of the strange. In order to offer an 
unsettling experience, a text must keep something hidden, something unknown, that can only 
be accessed through the individual’s intimate and private engagement with that text. 
However, this photo essay with its abundance of staged images and explanatory content 
appears to resist offering the reader space for an intimate interaction that would lead to a 
private and visceral gain or a surprising experience. The question that then needs to be 
answered is what that first divided image suggests: Is this photo essay, like that sliced image, 
to be read as a stage curtain being drawn open for a spectacular performance that offers one 
access to the experience of the doll soul? Or is it a rather clumsy exposé that reveals every 
mystery taking place behind the scenes and tells the reader about the doll spirit without the 
soulful experience?19  
As presented in the introduction of this dissertation, the recurring image of this 
particular toy as animated in popular culture, as product of consumerism, and as critical text 
to be read in any number of fields may imply that nothing can be left silent in the doll 
because nothing has been left silent on the topic. It may already be too near to us, too much 
has been told. Furthermore, one may also find fault with the form of this magazine 
article/narrative for not providing or permitting anything to be left unknown. Its design as 
well as its intent seems too noisy with informing the reader of any and all information 
pertinent to how this child plays with her doll. Published in a famously popular magazine, the 
                                                          
19
 There are indeed other questions to be asked about this rich assemblage of word and image that I 
will address such as: Could this photo essay be a type of uncovering of a strange family and its peculiar 
encouragement of a child’s fantasy life? Or is this magazine article simply capturing the representation of a real 
child in actual play? 
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nature of its format as a mass produced, mainstream, and lowbrow report of popular culture 
back to consumers of popular culture may also suggest it has little interest, or holds no value, 
in producing an unsettling moment for its readers. In addition, the fact that this photo essay is 
so inundated with photographic images also suggests that it refuses to be a true representation 
of an in-between or uncanny experience. After all, many have argued that photography 
functions as a medium that either creates false knowledge20 or distances one entirely from 
gaining access to the experience of original knowledge.21 Yet even with all those images, the 
article is just a two-page spread, an apparent centerfold, an overt display that defiantly denies 
the reader the discovery that comes with the investigative work or pace setting found in 
turning pages at one’s own will or of then flipping back through them. Nevertheless, with all 
of this in mind, this tale of Sandra and Peter still warrants a closer examination of how 
exactly it may or may not work as an unsettling expression of the doll psyche. 
To begin with a close reading of this work, in addition to the picture split in two that 
bookends the essay, there are three large black and white photographs and a small strip of 
text vertically centered (though horizontally lowered) across the two-page spread. Even 
though these images are clearly emphasized due to their content, size, and positioning in the 
layout, the text is also quite thought-provoking and so is quoted here in its entirety: 
Most little girls like to pretend their dolls are real live people, but 3-year-old Sandra 
Kunhardt is different. She would much rather pretend that she is a doll. Deserted each 
morning by her brothers and sister who go off to school, Sandra hauls out the 
                                                          
20
 See Susan Sontag’s On Photography (1973): “Humankind lingers unregenerately in Plato’s cave, 
still reveling, its age-old habit, in mere images of truth” (3). 
 
21
 See Benjamin’s The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (1935-36): “that which 
withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art” (221). 
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household collection of life-size dolls. She dresses up in their clothes, she walks stiff-
legged as if her legs were hinged, she talks in a squeaky mechanical voice. Whether 
it’s hide and seek behind a curtain or sleeping head to head on the rug, Sandra never 
changes her expression. She even refuses to answer to her own name, for when she is 
doll, her name is Peter. Here LIFE Photographer George Silk, a good friend of 
Sandra’s, has captured Peter and her pals during a morning’s play. In the afternoon 
when the older children come home, Peter becomes Sandra again. But sometimes the 
transformation back is a reluctant one. “Being a doll is fun,” explains Sandra, 
“because I get to be the boss.” (Life) 
First and foremost, one must acknowledge that a number of the suggestive elements 
in this text may be unintentional and therefore may not be ripe for a discussion that looks to 
measure the choices an unnamed Life author made in these two pages. For instance, there is 
the naming of the doll “Peter” which would be a tantalizing element to explore, but only if 
there was evidence that it was chosen for the sake of adding an additional layer of meaning to 
this piece and not purely coincidental.22 If this were a fictional narrative or a psychological 
study, knowing that the child would one day become a writer would also be an interesting 
topic to address,23 but because this essay is neither ─ that fact, as well as the inviting details 
                                                          
22
 Briefly, the child’s choice to name a doll Peter might seem to reflect the influence of reading about 
Peter Pan and his shadow or, perhaps, the reading about any “Peter” ─ no matter whether it is Barrie’s literary 
boy, the anthropomorphic rabbit in Mr. McGregor’s garden found in Beatrix Potter’s The Tale of Peter Rabbit 
(first commercially published in 1902), the Catholic saint, or, perhaps, even a human “Peter” of Sandra’s 
acquaintance. 
 
23
 Sandra is a future writer if I am to assume Sandra Kunhardt, the child, and Sandra Kunhardt Basile, 
the co-author of A Mother’s Circle: An Intimate Dialogue on Becoming a Mother (1996), are one and the same. 
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of her parentage, will have to be, unhappily, ignored (for the moment).24 In addition, when 
discussing the aesthetics of this essay, although the choice of the uniform black and white 
palette offers itself up to a reading as well, one must acknowledge that the limited colors of 
this photo composition may be more reflective of publication styles of the time (not 
publishing entirely in color) than of an editorial decision to heighten the eerie effect that such 
an intentional act may produce on its reader.25 Worth noting, nonetheless, is the fact that this 
decision, whether artistic or executive, does undeniably (and, yes, perhaps unintentionally) 
support the other choices made in the shaping of this piece to be a “shadowy” display of the 
shadow qualities found in doll play. 
There are, of course, still elements of this essay that are rich, if not too rich, in 
meaning. For one, the symmetry of the layout acts as a type of doubling that suggests the first 
of many examples of the literal and tangible workings of “likeness.” Not only in the splitting 
of the aforementioned image, such symmetry is also found in the bifurcation of the top 
                                                          
24
 Although the text must ignore it, this footnote is quite willing to quickly mention a few brief details 
about Sandra’s family. Her father was Philip B. Kunhardt Jr., who was not only a managing editor at Life 
magazine, but, according to his 2006 New York Times obituary, later became a writer and producer of historical 
documentaries for television including a 1995 three hour biography of P.T. Barnum. In addition, he and his 
family have been known for generations for their “penchant for collaboration, documentation and 
accumulation,” a fact that is most notably proven in what is known as the “Meserve-Kunhardt Collection” 
which includes rare glass negatives by the photographer Mathew Brady of Abraham Lincoln as well as a vast 
collection of circus images (Fox).  
Finally, Sandra’s grandmother was children’s book writer Dorothy Kunhardt, who is none other than 
the author of the children’s book classic, Pat the Bunny (1940). According to the website for the “Meserve-
Kunhardt Foundation,” “Sandra K. Basile” is listed as the Director of “The Dorothy Kunhardt Collection” 
(http://www.mkfound.org/projects.htm). 
 
25
 Within this particular issue of Life magazine, in addition to the cover (which is of astronaut Alan 
Shepard as he “relaxes with his fan mail”), the images that were published in full color were almost all 
advertisements for everything from alcohol to paper towels. The eight-page piece on the work of a French 
painter, René Bouché, was, naturally, also printed in color as were the two images accompanying an article on 
the funeral of a king of Laos. On the other hand, the article on Shepard and his historic flight included just two 
small illustrations done in muted blues and only one full color photograph ─ a full page picture of the “cloud-
strewn Atlantic,” a color image of “What Shepard Saw, as recorded by the camera in capsule and timed by stop-
clock in corner of picture” taken minutes after launch (Shepard 28, 29). 
Aside from adding to the appeal of products in print ads, the magazine’s choice to print images in color 
seems to have been reflective of the importance of color in a particular subject (Bouché piece), its ability to 
emphasize the exotic (the Laos images), or wow its audience (the image from space). 
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middle image which places a paired boy and girl on each side of the margin (though all, but 
one, are dolls). This image also creates the same sense of mirroring as the initially addressed 
divided image, as it has Sandra appear on the left hand page and the doll on the right – as if 
to further reinforce the idea that they are two sides to the same coin. The bottom two images 
are also reflective of one another. At first glance, they do appear to have the same number of 
figures though, in actuality, the image on the left has five while the one on the right has four. 
In addition to the suggestion of mirroring in number, the composition of the images is similar 
whereas the child is lined up in a row of dolls as if she is one of them, but her behavior 
deviates from their actions. In the left image, their eyes are closed while her eyes are open 
and in the right image she is seated with them, but facing the opposite direction. The amount 
of space the title takes up on each page also appears symmetrical as does the shape of the text 
in the repeating neatness of four columns of five lines. Despite the cleverness in the 
composition of creating so many of these mirroring and repeating choices, when combined 
with the almost endless repetition within the images themselves (the matched outfits, 
identical positioning of bodies, pattern of raised hands in the top middle picture, mirroring 
cupped hands and rounded eyes in the divided image), the experience of the text becomes 
such a heavy-handed lesson on literally illustrating the fantastic through the work of the 
shadow as a double, that the actual force of the uncanny on the level of spiritual experience is 
negated. On the other hand, the text itself is much more nuanced. Rather than erasing the 
experience of the strange by the intentional and (over)construction of signposts pointing to it, 
it actually begins to produce the experience. 
What is essential to note in this inventory-taking of the written content, is that more 
than half of the narrative seems to be playing with ideas of liminality (and thus the hidden) 
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and so begins to produce the uncanny effect which is actually present at the heart of this 
story. In fact, the first half of the first sentence carefully sets the stage in order to later 
unsettle it in just such a surreal fashion. First off, these words (“Most little girls like to 
pretend their dolls are real live people…”) are reflective of an assurance found in fact. 
Written in third person, the first line in the magazine article functions to bring security to its 
reader as the reader is reminded of knowledge that he already possesses and thus can find 
comfort in. Such a first line offers the work a surefootedness, an entrance into the text as if it 
is already in control of the experience – even in the confidence of its first word: “Most.”  
Alone, the banality of the images seems to frustrate access to the more complex 
experience of the doll for both the girl and the reader, and, at first glance, the content of the 
text also appears to reinforce what the images have already told us. After all, the images 
seem to present the very interactions that “most little girls” have with their dolls as the text 
goes on to articulate what we have already seen: the child playing hide-and-seek, napping on 
the rug, not changing her expression, and entirely alone but for her dolls. Although play in 
general as well as these specific types of play suggest threshold states (hiding, sleeping, 
keeping thoughts to oneself), the overtly controlled perfection depicted in these photographs 
of Sandra playing hide-and-seek or playing dress-up does not offer a true expression of 
private or, for Victor Turner, “interstructural” experience. Even the idea of the child 
performing in a number of indeterminate spaces (deserted, alone, at home during the day) is 
diminished by the very presence (and naming) of the photographer. The privacy of her play is 
further dismissed by the primping and arranging done to costume and pose her by unnamed 
and unacknowledged hands. Looking at the reminder of the text, despite the photographer’s 
claim to be “a good friend of Sandra’s” and “her pals,” his role in the erasing of the uncanny 
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experience is accomplished not only in his taking of the pictures, but also in his disregard for 
the child’s relationship with the doll. For example, according to the text, right after Sandra 
refuses to answer to her own name and will only answer to “Peter,” the text reveals: “Here 
LIFE Photographer George Silk, a good friend of Sandra’s, has captured Peter and her pals 
during a morning’s play.” The “here” seems to announce the conclusion of participating in 
the child’s play and the reader’s access to the fantastical. In that one sentence, the child is not 
only immediately named despite her refusal to answer to “Sandra,” but when she is then 
humored and referred to as “Peter” that choice reads as dismissive of her intimate experience 
with the doll since the use of the doll’s male name is quickly accompanied with the use of the 
child’s female pronoun: “she.”  
Nevertheless, despite the ways in which this essay, in word and image, initially 
appears to focus on the physicality of “likeness” as it also over-articulates the experience of 
the strange to the point of not producing that effect, upon closer inspection this text also hints 
to an appreciation of the actual uncanny experience in the way it presents a moment of true 
anxiety. Although written in the confident style and certainty of tone that is often attributed 
to the third person narrative, this text also pauses to mark unease. As noted earlier, in size, 
content, and design, the images dominate this two-page article and, as already argued, this 
visual domination feeds into an authoritative and unsubtle display of the strange as an 
explainable and explicable concept. However, when paired with the text, these images and 
their almost collective brashness in “telling” rather than “showing” actually offers something 
else to the reader. In fact, it is that confidence and the unavoidability of going through the 
image-laden text rather than around it, which then becomes the gateway to the uncanny 
experience of the doll’s essence for the reader.  
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There is very little chance that a reader would read the text without at least taking a 
passing glance at the photographs that take up most of the two pages. To then go through the 
images and catch that aforementioned emphasis on mirroring and copying is to then reach the 
text with an assumption that the article will depict the physical mirroring present in the idea 
of “likeness” with the child as a self and the doll as her possession (as an object) or as a thing 
which possesses her reflection. (Though it may not perfectly reflect Sandra’s likeness, it does 
reflect the likeness of children in general). Even the title, despite its directness in stating the 
fact of the child’s perception, “A Girl Named Sandra is a Doll Named Peter,” is constructed, 
both in formatting and language, to suggest not merely a mirror-like equivalence of 
exchangeability, but even the mirror stage’s idea of equivalency where reflection begins with 
the human image: “A Girl Named Sandra….” and ends with the object: “is a Doll Named 
Peter.” Therefore, for the reader, the declaration of difference made in the second half of that 
first sentence (“…but 3-year-old Sandra Kunhardt is different.”) is disorienting, a reason to 
pause, that is only heightened as it arrives after the reader has already passed through a 
terrain littered with signposts that emphasizes not only the physicality of “likeness,” but a 
“likeness” that begins with the human subject (the object looks “like” the human rather than 
the human looks “like” the object). Nevertheless, although the reader may have been 
promised this one side of resemblance, upon arrival to the text the reader is thrown into the 
unsettling space of experiencing the side of resemblance that registers the soul of an object 
first, as primary. In other words, the text suggests that what is “different” about Sandra is 
that, for her, the doll is the original and the child is the reflection.  
Contributing to the reader’s loss of footing, may also be the announcement of 
Sandra’s age. As discussed in the introduction, at age three Sandra is technically only on the 
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cusp of falling into the age range for Piaget’s shadow phase or Hall’s doll play even though 
her play does seem to reflect a deep investment in the shared interests of both. One cannot 
claim, however, that the intended effect of including her age and announcing it so early in the 
text was for the reader to recognize this dovetailing of Sandra, her age, and her play with the 
meeting of the aforementioned stages. Nevertheless, these choices do nudge the reader in the 
direction of that convergence by emphasizing Sandra’s own liminality ─ beginning with its 
expression in her age. 
 Sandra is indeed “different” because, as the text states: “she would rather pretend that 
she is a doll.” However, she is also different in that she is three, which is a fact that subtly 
hints of her status as a threshold figure or, to borrow phrasing from a Peter Schwenger essay, 
it is a “difference” that “has taken on the characteristics of différance” (78). No longer an 
infant but not yet school age, “three” seems to evade being anchored to a single fixed 
understanding.26  
                                                          
26
 This fact is further reinforced not merely by any children’s book, but by the classic children’s book, 
Pat the Bunny (1940), written by Sandra’s own grandmother, Dorothy Kunhardt, and the circumstances in 
which she wrote it for her three-year-old daughter, Edith.  
One of the very first interactive books written for small children, according to its publisher’s website, 
Pat the Bunny was the result of the author “experimenting” to see if added “elements could increase a child’s 
love for reading and learning” (Random House). As evidenced in its perpetual success, these elements have 
surely added to the book’s pleasure, but it is also worth noting that the book, which was written with the needs 
and abilities of a three-year-old at that time, is also a text which expresses a liminal moment or transition 
between codes of understanding. As Ellen Handler Spitz observes in her essay, “Primary Art Objects: 
Psychoanalytic Reflections on Picture Books for Children,” even the books’ format was thought to be, in many 
respects, transitional (1999):  
Even prior to the primer, children still in the crawling stage may encounter picture books like Pat the 
Bunny, which conjoin the perceptual and verbal with kinesthetic, olfactory, and tactile experience, 
strongly prioritizing the latter. Such objects emphasize the physicality, the materiality of art ─ qualities 
which, as adults acculturated into a universe of abstract codes, we learn early to decathect. Yet, 
touching, holding, loving, all intimately related for the small child, are transferable, displaceable, by 
means of those transitional forms, to physically more remote encounters later on with sophisticated 
cultural objects. (248)  
Clearly, Spitz is discussing this text in terms of much younger children (those “still in the crawling stage” 
which, in terms of contemporary research on child development, are a much more appropriate target audience 
for this book then the older one which Kunhardt was aiming for - a fact that is supported by how the book is 
now marketed as “baby’s first gift”). However, in its origins as a transitional text that was actually created with 
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Further, and more simply, three is, after all, an age that is both claimed and 
relinquished in terms of the broad categorizing of child development for which a toddler is 
one to three years in age while a preschool child is three to six (Davies 230, 307). Therefore, 
this particular age, on a number of levels, reflects a “betwixt and between” of the reader’s 
expectations of Sandra’s actions which her characterization only further emphasizes. Is she a 
preschooler because she is bright and creative? Or is she a toddler because she does not 
attend school? In that same sense, it may then seem that “three” is also caught between states 
(mirror, shadow, and doll play) as none of them seem to lay direct claim to the actual age.27 
In addition, although the number “three” may, in some ways, seem quite fixed due to its 
constant reoccurrence as a pattern in our culture (three wishes, three strikes, the trilogy, three 
meals a day) and in how it is understood symbolically (most obviously in the image of the 
trinity), it is still very much a “betwixt and between” number.28  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
an older child, a three-year-old, in mind as well as the fact that that three-year-old turns out to be related to this 
three-year-old further points to the liminality of this age (Random House).  
 
27
 As addressed in this dissertation’s introduction, ages three and four seem to be in need of a stage as 
Lacan’s “mirror stage” emphasizes ages six to eighteen months old while Piaget’s “shadow stage” leaps ahead 
with a range of five to nine years (and which is, for good measure, buttressed by the Hall, Ellis, and Grudzinska 
“doll play” age range of seven to ten years). 
28
 For example, after taking an extensive inventory of the frequency of the number “three” as examples 
of trichotomy in American culture, folklorist Alan Dundes noted in his “The Number Three in American 
Culture” (1980) that, in a sense, three is an unnatural state: “Trichotomy exists but it is not part of the nature of 
nature. It is part of the nature of culture” (159). Although discussing Dundes’ claims through a study of 
narratives of recovery in his work, Sobering Tales: Narratives of Alcoholism and Recovery (1997), Edmund B. 
O’Reilly makes a salient point in support of the liminality of the number three: “To put it succinctly (and in 
only three words): trichotomy subverts symmetry” (114). O’Reilly goes on to write: 
In a list of generalizations about the uses of the number three as a native category, Dundes observes 
that “a third term may be the result of splitting a polarity,” or that a third term may be formed by the 
“merging or combining of two terms so that one has A, B, and AB.” It is then only a short step to the 
production of a third term that depends upon the two members of a polarity but is not contained by 
them, or even necessarily and specifically implied by them. The third term may be qualitatively 
distinct, a synthesis that is something other than a mean or a sum, but is perhaps a transcendence. 
Analogies from genetics or chemistry might be suggested, but they would fail, as always, to convey the 
intricacies of symbolic process, especially in its characteristic ability to elude or defy categorical 
rigidity. Transcendence, in the imagination, is not answerable to falsifiability strictures, or even to 
brute facts. (114-15) 
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Returning to the primary text again, despite both the overt and subtle nods of “in-
between-ness” in Sandra’s “three-ness” contribute to how the rest of that first sentence 
(“…but 3-year-old Sandra Kunhardt is different”) looks to produce anxiety in the reader, 
more than half of the remaining text also goes on to catalogue the other in-between spaces 
the child occupies because of the almost barebones manner in which it is written. By simply 
providing an account of Sandra’s day, the narrative suggests her liminality rather than 
drawing arrows directly to it. She is seen as occupying a threshold space in how she is both 
excluded (she is not yet school age) and “deserted” (she is abandoned daily by her older 
siblings when they head off to school). And yet, within that marginal space of being 
seemingly left at home, Sandra then turns to create more complicated “betwixt and between” 
spaces as she turns to the imaginative play of presence and absence in “hide and seek behind 
a curtain or sleeping head to head on a rug” and also hides her own presence by actually 
becoming her doll’s other, its shadow. Sandra performs this in-between-ness by not only 
dressing like the doll but also by mimicking its movements and mechanical speech. Through 
disguise and performance, she also masks her gender in bearing a likeness to not just any 
doll, but a boy doll. Her “self” seems to then be further suppressed by her refusal to answer 
to her own name or change her expression. The text, up to this moment, has only stated the 
observational facts of Sandra’s play and not qualified or explained the intimacy of that 
interaction. It is that very quality, however, which begins to offer the reader space to enter 
the text and therefore both imagine the shape of the child’s personal and private experience 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
These threshold qualities of the number three as an unnatural cultural construct that also encompasses ideas of 
transcendence and the asymmetrical places the idea of “three” squarely in cahoots with the liminal nature of the 
shadow. 
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with the doll’s soul and to also experience the actual nature of the uncanny as a reality 
because they cannot fully know the intimate relationship between Sandra and her doll.  
In terms of how the images are aligned with the text, the fact that these physical and 
tangible actions and interactions are also the ones depicted does not necessarily diminish the 
power found in this child’s private and intimate play with her doll. In other words, although 
the interaction between child and doll seems to be made public, the intimacy of how the child 
experiences the doll soul is not necessarily lost. Consider the point in the text when “Peter 
becomes Sandra again.” This transformation suggests the idea that the only hidden nature 
present is an internal or subconscious act of the child’s and not one for the reader to 
experience. There is clear evidence, however, in those first two and a half paragraphs, that 
Sandra is enacting Walter Benjamin’s idea of “living in images” as expressed by Beatrice 
Hanssen in her “Introduction: Physiognomy of a Flâneur: Walter Benjamin’s Peregrinations 
Through Paris in Search of a New Imaginary” as found in the text Walter Benjamin and the 
Arcades Project (2006): 
[in discussing Benjamin’s fondness for collecting children’s picture books]  
To Benjamin the collector, these images in children’s picture books offered up a 
mysterious topography in which the child-spectator could become absorbed to the 
point of self-extinction (in the 1929 essay about children’s literature), blissfully 
merging with the object or representation ─ a flash-like moment ─ blitzhaft ─ in 
which the border between representation and the represented object was obliterated. 
It was precisely this mimetic impulse, through which the imitator merged with the 
object imitated, that announced itself in the child’s obsession with the sock, just as it 
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surfaced in surrealist dream-work, in which the subject crossed the expanse of 
‘aesthetic distance’ to gain close proximity or nearness to the magical thing. (7) 
Quite literally, looking more closely at the photo essay as a whole, Sandra has passionately 
“become absorbed [in her doll and doll play] to the point of self-extinction” because she 
engages with both sides of “likeness.” Sandra not only bears the literal likeness of her doll 
but also reflects its consciousness as she experienced it as the intangible and powerful force 
she discovered in her play with its form. In more than half of the article, this mergence of 
child with object occurs in the reality of the child and also in the articulation of it in the text. 
Digging deeper into the photo essay, there are more strange and liminal moments that 
gesture to the real relationship of the child to the doll than were initially perceived. For one, 
the idea of a “household collection of life-size dolls” draws in an image of household gods, 
spirits or souls within objects. The final sentence in the text and the only time Sandra is 
directly quoted is also quite jarring: “‘Being a doll is fun,’ explains Sandra, ‘because I get to 
be the boss.’” Where is the evidence of this statement anywhere else in the text or in the 
composition as a whole to “show” the reader this fact? There is none. There is only, in every 
corner of this essay, a declaration of the child being anything other than in charge as she is 
set and dressed to mirror the doll, positioned and propped by stage hands, framed and shot by 
a photographer, and copied and claimed by its magazine’s readers. And yet she, herself, 
claims ownership of the doll in being aware of its soul; she points to an intimacy that we 
have not been informed of at all.  
This is when the uncanny experience for the reader begins to slip in. This is when the 
fantastical begins to be felt again. Further, it is interesting to find (through one’s right to 
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inspect) which photographs were not chosen as part of this photo essay.29 There is another 
image of the child and doll behind the curtain, but their expressions do not match because the 
child’s natural expression is too impish. There is also an image of the child in actual play, 
carrying the doll on her back, and, in the third image, the child and doll face one another to 
order to give each other a kiss (although this kiss may have been staged as well, the intimacy 
that is present in this picture is the fact these two are the only participants in this act). In these 
unpublished images, the child and doll are not perfect doubles of one another in expression 
and action. In the latter two, they appear to be in actual play, in movement, in the experience 
of their intimacy, and it is these images which cause a reader to reflect more profoundly and 
wonder what is hidden in this doll, this Peter, this shadow that only Sandra is able to reach 
and reflect. And yet these qualities of the uncanny do not “prove” this work, in the end, to be 
uncanny. An awareness of unsettling qualities does not immediately access that experience. It 
is not that easy. In order to feel the effect of the fantastical, a reader cannot be a mere 
observer, but an actual participant, an active reader, that is invested enough to inspect and 
sort through a web of images and text that are both tangible and ephemeral, publicly shared 
and privately held, to order to experience them at the end of that experience. Even Sandra’s 
statement, on which this case of the uncanny hung (“‘Being a doll is fun,’ explains Sandra, 
‘because I get to be the boss.’”) begins to become unsettled if one considers whether the 
child actually did say what she is purported to have said or if even her quote is just another 
example of all the artifice involved in the construction of the photographs and this 
photographic composition. 
                                                          
29
 On www.life.com, one can view additional images from this particular photo shoot which were not 
published in the magazine, including a photo of Sandra kissing Peter and of Sandra carrying him on her back 
(http://www.life.com/search/?type=images&q0=sandra+kunhardt). 
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These limits of representation are also challenged in this Life magazine photo essay 
without the participation of any sense other than vision. The reader has to read through a 
complicated movement of assemblage that creates and confuses, distances and nears, claims 
as public and makes private, mirrors and shadows in order to arrive at its own experience of 
this liminal expression of the doll as soul. According to Simon During’s Modern 
Enchantments: The Cultural Power of Secular Magic (2002): 
Visual magic is a fictional domain where what is seen is not what is there, and not 
just in the banal sense that images presented in peepshows, stereoscopes, or 
thaumatropes are not “really” there. Stage magic, in particular, offers a complex 
interplay between depths and surfaces, two and three dimensions, stasis and 
transformation, light and shade, transparency and opacity, and reflection and 
refraction. It does so in a highly mechanized visual setting, where there is always 
occasion for illusion and surprise: it is organized and constructed in such a way as to 
induce experiences or sensations of amazement, wonder, and bewilderment. It is also 
a dynamically visual field, in the sense that sight is rarely wholly independent of 
sound and touch. (286) 
Much does depend on the reading of the stage, on the seeing of the magic act, and the 
journeying done through the work of vision in order to then still arrive at a liminal space. As 
quoted in the beginning of this chapter, Maurizio Bettini’s puzzling out of the origins of the 
word “doll” into the idea of “girl in the eye”30 reveals how the doll itself is not only able to 
                                                          
 
30
 In the section titled, “The Girl in the Eye and Neurospaston,” found within his chapter, “The Doll,” 
Bettini also discusses how “doll” is linguistically tied to other meanings including “precious object” and 
“virgin” (216-18).  See his footnote 12 on page 297 for specific references discussing the image of the “girl in 
the eye.”  
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reflect back to the world its physical resemblance but also its intangible force that can only 
be truly revealed in one’s real engagement with the doll itself.
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
THE DOLL IS A BOX 
 
Figure 1: Broken Doll, Paris (1958) photograph by Frank Horvat.1 
Permission to reproduce this image in this dissertation was granted by the 
photographer. 
 
 Perhaps a definition of a box could be as a kind of “forgotten game,” a 
philosophical toy of the Victorian era, with poetic or magical “moving parts,” 
achieving even slight measure of this poetry or magic ... that golden age of the toy 
alone should justify the “box's” existence. 
 
Joseph Cornell, in a 1960 diary entry as quoted in Dawn Ades’s “The 
Transcendental Surrealism of Joseph Cornell,” Joseph Cornell (1980), 29 
 
 
                                                          
1
 This image is found on Horvat’s website: http://www.horvatland.com.  
The exact page for this image is: http://www.horvatland.com/pages/01doc/02paris/22_en.htm 
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She helped me unpack my trunk when it came, and was delighted when she found the 
doll the little girls sent her. I thought it a good opportunity to teach her her first word. 
I spelled “d-o-l-l” slowly in her hand and pointed to the doll and nodded my head, 
which seems to be her sign for possession. Whenever anybody gives her anything, 
she points to it, then to herself, and nods her head. She looked puzzled and felt my 
hand, and I repeated the letters. She imitated them very well and pointed to the doll. 
Then I took the doll, meaning to give it back to her when she made the letters; but she 
thought I meant to take it from her, and in an instant she was in a temper, and tried to 
seize the doll. 
 
(an excerpt from an 1887 letter by Anne Sullivan in which she describes the first 
time she spelled out a word (“doll”) for her new student) 
from Helen Keller’s 1903 autobiography, The Story of My Life (1921), 305 
 
Introduction: 
The box, as a metaphor, offers two essential attributes to the doll in the liminal state 
of dollhood: tangibility and manipulability. First, the box, like the doll, is a tactile and 
physical object typically associated with childhood play. As toys very much experienced 
with the sense of touch, both are known to inform any number of aspects of a child’s 
development including the child’s forming of the self, the private, and an understanding of 
consciousness.2 In addition, both the box (specifically the cardboard box) and the doll are 
also played or “mis-played” with in a similar manner. Often misused or abused in being 
collapsed, broken, or changed, these two objects are, with great frequency, repurposed and 
recreated by the child away from the object’s intended use. This act of manipulation 
performed on such a tangible childhood object is the second quality that the box offers to the 
reading of the doll in dollhood. 
                                                          
2
 As evidence consider the article, “Selecting Appropriate Materials for Very Young Children” 
(summer, 1981) by Joan M. Zeller and Suzanne L. McFarland, and published by the Day Care Council of 
America which creates detailed tables of the suggested materials of play for children from 0-3 months old to 
three years old that help in a number of areas of development, including: “physical, cognitive, language, social-
emotional, and play” (7). According to this research, variations of the doll and the box appear to be significant 
tools in helping a child’s development in almost all of these areas and across the entire range of ages.   
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Through the physical nature of the box and its ability to be manipulated, one can 
better understand how the child enters into play with her doll in order to attempt to actually 
grasp its essence, its soul, which the shadow merely points to. Whereas, through a reading of 
the shadow, knowledge about the doll consciousness is accessed through the sensation and 
experience of witnessing that consciousness as an event, an understanding of the box 
illustrates how knowledge about the doll soul may also be accessed through the sensation and 
experience of infringing on that event. 
In order to articulate the nuances of these two qualities of the box as they are found in 
the doll, this chapter begins by addressing why the “mis-play” that takes place in doll play is 
too often interpreted as being equivalent to human acts of violence. Drawing much from 
Lacan and the studies published by child psychologists Hall and Ellis, this chapter begins 
with a discussion of Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye (1970) where a child’s act of “mis-
play” can also be considered an act of curiosity, a curiosity prompted by the desire to more 
fully understand the power and depth of a doll’s soul and not necessarily by a desire to 
destroy it. With Melanie Klein’s concept of “part-object” in mind, the section which follows 
explores how the “mis-played” broken doll character in the Pixar film Toy Story (1995) 
meets the theory of “The Uncanny Valley” in order to discuss how the power of the doll in 
fragmentation is not only located in how unexpected that fragmentation may be to discover, 
but also in how that fragmentation relates to a child’s own fear of being so splintered and 
broken. Then, through Rilke’s “Some Reflections on Dolls,” Kristeva’s Powers of Horror: 
An Essay on Abjection, the art dolls of Hans Bellmer, and the children’s book The Meanest 
Doll in the World (2003), the fragmented doll is discussed in terms of the human corpse and 
the power of the uncanny  associated with that “mis-play” state known  as bodily decay. 
92 
 
After close readings of texts that discuss the fragmented doll in terms of human 
bodily fragmentation, the remaining three sections of this chapter address the nature of the 
soul that remains present in doll parts. Through a reading of a song from Charles Kingsley’s 
children’s book classic, The Water Babies (1863), this chapter analyzes the ways in which 
the wholeness of a doll’s soul appears to stay intact no matter the state of the doll itself. In a 
discussion of Rumer Godden’s The Doll’s House (1962), this chapter then turns to discuss 
the doll soul as being something other than human-like, especially when connected to how, 
where, and why the doll was made. Finally, through a reading of a story, “The Dolls,” found 
in Ian McEwan’s The Daydreamer (1994), the doll soul is put into action as a character. 
Within this text, the doll soul, alive and living in a broken doll, provides the reader with a 
profound uncanny experience as it subverts the relationship between human and object. In 
this story, the power of the doll soul is located in how it can eclipse the human to the point 
where the identity of who is doll and who is human becomes, for the reader, a destabilizing 
experience. 
 
Doll Passivity and Violence: 
First and foremost, what a discussion of the box can offer our understanding of the 
doll is a much more nuanced and complicated reading of what is occurring when a child 
tacitly engages with a doll in search of what he or she perceives as the doll’s knowledge. One 
can see the gain of a type of physical knowledge literally played out in the passage which 
opens this chapter in that it portrays how the doll is offered to Helen Keller as means to 
access knowledge, an entrance to communication. It is, after all, through the tactile 
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experience of the doll that she learned to first “read” that word, her first word, “doll,” as 
expressed in her hand by her teacher, Anne Sullivan.  
However, more often than not, it seems as if how a child physically engages with her 
doll is equated to how play reflects a child’s potentially violent nature or aggressive feelings 
toward what that doll may represent. That is, of course, not to disregard the use and abuse of 
the doll in the hands of a child as discussed and studied in psychological as well as other 
social sciences, but it is also important to not always read the experience of the doll on the 
receiving end of violent action as if it were reacting or processing that violence as a human 
being. For example, although Allyson Booth makes interesting points in her essay “Battered 
Dolls” (1994) as to the hierarchy of dolls to one another other as well as to human beings, 
she discusses the aggressive acts performed on dolls by children in works like Johnny 
Gruelle’s Raggedy Ann Stories (1918) and Rachel Field’s Hitty: Her First Hundred Years 
(1929) in the language of human passivity.  
Booth writes that such stories create “a convention of female characters who are 
supposedly subjects but are actually objects and who inhabit, furthermore, a context that 
teaches the best of them to accept battering as the price not only of love but of life” (148). 
She also writes that “battered dolls in picture books seem—by their eloquent silences, their 
refusals to reassure—to express some of our very real concerns about mute passivity” (151). 
And yet can their “mute passivity” be an expression of something that is not human? After 
all, these dolls are not, nor do they claim to be, humans in disguise as even their narratives 
stress their origins as being from man-made forms and often (putting Pinocchio aside for a 
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moment) what they dream to be is a real live doll − not a real life person.3 Doll passivity 
cannot be equated with human passivity in that the doll sees violence toward itself as part of 
its role as a plaything, as a soul that is as much object. Never mind the fact that dolls as 
bodies made from objects may express the emotional loss of losing an arm, cracking a leg, or 
being chewed on by an animal, they do not, in the vast majority of these narratives, 
physically suffer those losses as a human would suffer them (that includes all the fire, water, 
and worldly damage that is thrust upon Pinocchio).  
Nevertheless, violence is not the only reading to be found in a child’s act of 
transgressing the boundaries of the doll form especially in how this act is represented in 
literary texts and images. In fact, I would argue that curiosity, as it relates to an 
understanding of the doll’s layers of construction, is the actual impetus for such acts. For it is 
in such “violent” actions that a child challenges and digests the stable forms of construction 
(the science of the form’s body, its material make-up) in order to gain an understanding as to 
the construction of the doll as an experience for itself as well as for the child (the aesthetic 
experience of play, of imagination, of soul-searching). Yet unlike the box which offers itself 
up to more of an emotional distance due to its indifferent shape, it is the fault of the doll’s 
resemblance to the human form which too easily informs a reading of a child’s investigation 
of its interior self to be about a type of human on human aggression rather than that of a 
performance of curiosity which is, like us, constructed of and through both recognizable 
materials and abstract sensations. 
                                                          
3
 Aside from Rachel Field’s “Hitty” and “Tottie” from Rumer Godden’s The Doll’s House (1962), see 
the dolls in the children’s book trilogy created by Ann M. Martin and Laura Godwin, and illustrated by Brian 
Selznick: The Doll People (2000), The Meanest Doll in the World (2003) and The Runaway Dolls (2008). 
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Curiosity and Investigation: 
In childhood, many children investigate dolls as they investigate mechanical toys, the 
insides of teddy bears, and clock radios. They open them up, take them apart, and look to 
answer the question: How does it work?  
Lacan argued that, in the mirror stage, even though as infants we soon recognize our 
bodies as whole, it is the memory of a fragmented pre-mirror stage body which continues to 
haunt us: 
This fragmented body … is regularly manifested in dreams when the movement of an 
analysis reaches a certain level of aggressive disintegration of the individual. It then 
appears in the form of disconnected limbs or of organs exoscopically represented, 
growing wings and taking up arms for internal persecutions … (Lacan 6) 
However, that real and intense search for knowledge, known as curiosity, can also be seen as 
the thrust behind what reads as a type of violent behavior. Hall noted this tendency in his 
study with Theodate L. Smith, “Curiosity and Interest” (1903): 
Curiosity as to the cause of sound and motion, and desire to see the inside of things, 
were the chief motives which influenced the youthful investigators. They wanted to 
find out what made the noise, why dolly opened and shut her eyes, what made the 
cow moo, and what was inside tops, marbles, and thermometers, and grief at the loss 
of some valued toy was aggravated by a keen disappointment at non-success in 
finding the noise of the drum or the tick of the watch. Cherished dolls were sacrificed 
to the overwhelming desire to find out what made the eyes move, or why pressing the 
body caused a cry. (“Curiosity” 129-30) 
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Hall and Smith address a child’s desire for knowledge in his or her wanting to know the 
mechanical workings of a toy, but some of the children’s specific responses are more telling. 
They note that one five-year-old girl: “Cut her doll’s body open ‘to see what kind of blood it 
had.’ Said it was something like sugar” (“Curiosity” 131). An eight-year-old girl, Hall writes: 
“Had a doll, and one day knocked its eye in. She broke the head to find out what had become 
of the eye, and then cried as if her heart would break” (“Curiosity” 132). And an eight-year-
old boy “Cut the hair of his sister’s doll to see if it would grow again” (Ibid). Although, in 
this particular work, Hall and Smith are addressing toys in general, what is striking is that the 
children’s responses pertaining to dolls seemed to be more about their desire to find 
something deeper than the mechanical source of eye movement or a voice box. In their 
“Study of Dolls,” Hall and Ellis wrote: 
Discussions with skeptical brothers who assert the doll is nothing but wood, rubber, 
wax, etc., are often met with a resentment as keen as that vented upon missionaries 
who declare that idols are but sticks and stones, or, to come near home, upon those 
who assert cerebral, automatic, or necessitarian theories of the soul. (“Dolls” 164). 
The children that Hall and Ellis observed seemed to reflect what Charles Baudelaire wrote in 
his “A Philosophy of Toys”: “The overriding desire of most children is to get at and see the 
soul of their toys” (Baudelaire 203). In other words, when taking apart a doll, a child is 
seeking to identify the real power that is of and belongs to the doll. The idea of an aggressive 
impulse toward the doll would imply that the child is looking to destroy that power while 
seeking it out suggests that the child wishes to experience or know that power on a more real 
and intimate level.  
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In Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye (1970), the depiction of a white doll in the hands 
of an African-American girl’s hands captures this intense desire for knowledge about the 
toy’s soul that drives the digging (and breaking) hands of curiosity:  
I could not love it. But I could examine it to see what it was that all the world said 
was lovable. Break off the tiny fingers, bend the flat feet, loosen the hair, twist the 
head around, and the thing made one sound – a sound they said was the sweet and 
plaintive cry “Mama,” but which sounded to me like the bleat of a dying lamb, or 
more precisely, our icebox door opening on rusty hinges in July. Remove the cold and 
stupid eyeball, it would bleat still, “Ahhhhhh,” take off the head, shake out the 
sawdust, crack the back against the brass bed rail, it would bleat still. The gauze back 
would split, and I could see the disk with six holes, the secret of the sound. A mere 
metal roundness. (21) 
The child’s hatred of the doll, and the desire for its destruction, reflects a tension of 
difference and identity, the oppressiveness of a hegemonic white American culture, and a 
desire for the oppressed to challenge the power of the oppressor.4 And yet, this protagonist is 
also performing a very typical act in childhood. The taking apart of the doll and investigating 
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 For readings of Morrison’s novel that explore this scene with the doll or inform a reading of it, see:  
a collection of essays from “Bloom’s Modern Critical Interpretations” series titled Toni Morrison’s The Bluest 
Eye. Harold Bloom, Ed. New York: Bloom’s Literary Criticism, 2007. 
Frever, Trinna S. “‘Oh! You Beautiful Doll!’: Icon, Image, and Culture in Works by Alvarez, Cisneros, and 
Morrison” Tulsa Studies in Women’s Literature. 28.1 (spring 2009): 121-139. 
Fultz, Lucille. Toni Morrison: Playing with Difference. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003. 
Furman, Jan. Toni Morrison’s Fiction. South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1996.  
Grayson, Deborah R. “Is it Fake?: Black Women’s Hair as Spectacle and Spec(tac)ular.” Camera Obscura. 36. 3 
(1995): 12-31. 
Scott, Lynn. “Beauty, Virtue and Disciplinary Power: A Foucauldian Reading of Toni Morrison’s The Bluest 
Eye.” Midwestern Miscellany XXIV: being a variety of essays on the works of Toni Morrison by the members 
of The Society for the Study of Midwestern Literature. Ed. Marilyn J. Atlas. East Lansing, MI: The Midwestern 
Press, 1996. 9-23 
Simpson, Ritashona. Black Looks & Black Acts: The Language of Toni Morrison in The Bluest Eye and 
Beloved. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2007. 
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what may be its central power can occur even outside of political, racial, or sexual dynamics 
between the doll and its child. In fact, to examine narratives where the tensions between doll 
and human are not symbolic of cultural dynamics is to still find the doll to be profoundly 
powerful, both when intact and in pieces. This is the very power that Claude Lévi-Strauss 
suggests in his classic work, The Savage Mind (published in French in 1962, English 
translation published in 1966), when he asks (and then answers): 
What is the virtue of reduction either of scale or in the number of properties? It seems 
to result from a sort of reversal in the process of understanding. To understand a real 
object in its totality we always tend to work from its parts. Reduction in scales 
reverses this situation. Being smaller, the object as a whole seems less formidable. By 
being quantitatively diminished, it seems to us qualitatively simplified. More exactly, 
this quantitative transposition extends and diversifies our power over a homologue of 
the thing, and by means of it the latter can be grasped, assessed and apprehended at a 
glance. A child’s doll is no longer an enemy, a rival or even an interlocutor. In it and 
through it a person is made into a subject (23). 
Therefore, even after Morrison’s protagonist broke her doll down, the fact that it continued to 
bleat like a dying lamb seems to vocalize that it still held on to its secret, its soul, and still 
held a real power over the girl and, us, even in its fragmentation. 
Children, in their investigation of the doll, often do seem to be looking for things that 
imply the existence of a living soul, or simply humanness, like blood or growing hair. But for 
a child like the eight-year-old girl who went on a supposed hunt to look behind the doll’s eye, 
there is often devastation at her discovery that there is nothing behind the eyes but doll 
matter. Yet it is devastation worthy of knowing because it is knowledge gained through real 
99 
 
experience or, as Elaine Scarry writes in her work The Body in Pain: The Making and 
Unmaking of the World (1985): “to have great pain is to have certainty; to hear that another 
person has pain is to have doubt” (7). 
 
The Power in Doll Parts: 
Whether broken by a child or simply found by one, finding doll parts (the marble eye, 
the hairless skull, the isolated limb) is unlike stumbling upon the spring from a broken 
battery-operated toy or the stuffing once stuffed inside a bear.  
Like psychologist/object relations theorist Melanie Klein’s idea of “part-object”5 
(where the infant identifies or experiences the whole mother through her parts, specifically 
the breast) or synecdoche (the figure of speech where the name of a part is substituted for the 
whole), doll parts echo the whole. Though limbs and eyes and hair may become literally 
separated from a whole doll body, doll parts, however, do not hold the same figurative 
separation from the perceived whole as other objects and playthings might have from their 
original “bodies.” When taken apart, a teddy bear becomes other things or even non-things: 
pieces of material, clumps of stuffing, lost buttons, loose thread. Those objects away from the 
un-stuffed bear body do not necessarily echo the toy body in the same visceral way in which 
an isolated hand or limbless torso is able to remember and remind us of the doll body.   
And it is this quality of mirroring that begins to address the power of the doll as an 
exemplary image of the uncanny. In terms of Brown’s “Thing Theory,” we also see the doll 
                                                          
5
 Klein, Melanie. Contributions to Psycho-analysis 1921-1945. London: Hogarth Press, 1950. 
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both working and “not working” away from theories of capitalist power.6 By its very nature, 
the doll “works” because its form is a material echo to the human body. Yet when that form 
“stops working” (the doll has been damaged or broken) the echo, nevertheless, persists. That 
is why finding a lone doll limb away from the original is a much more fearful experience 
than finding the stuffed bear unstuffed. Consider, for example, how troubling such an 
experience is for even a “real” and intact toy like Woody from the 1995 Pixar film Toy Story 
when the cowboy reacts with complete and utter terror upon meeting the deconstructed and 
then jury-rigged toy known as “Baby Face” (or “Spider Baby”) that emerges from under the 
bed of Sid, the child sadist. At first, because the light from Woody’s flashlight only falls 
upon the seemingly intact and recognizable face of Baby Face, the toy protagonist expresses 
a sigh of relief and greets this new friend with a soothing: “Hi there, little fella” (Toy Story). 
However, once Baby Face and its bald head is better lit, it turns to reveal its missing eye, and 
rises on its foreign spider-like body made from Erector set pieces, Woody and his movie 
audience, express a collective gasp of fear because the recognizable part of the doll, its head, 
is no longer “working” as expected. That is to say, this doll form becomes a terrifying 
monster because it is no longer whole and intact with its original home body. That encounter 
with the unexpected form then becomes a jarring experience for the viewer. 
Ardyce Masters succinctly noted in her 1986 essay, “The Doll as Delegate and 
Disguise,” that though both dolls and stuffed bears “represented juveniles”… “the bears 
disguised their doll qualities behind an animal mask” (300). In other words, though toys like 
teddy bears and rocking horses can be thoroughly loved, there is an additional layer, a 
distance, existing between these playthings and their players. That additional element is an 
                                                          
6
 Thought-provoking texts which specifically engage with the production, consumption, and economic 
history of dolls are listed in the first footnote of the introduction of this dissertation. 
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association to another “other.” As Masters indicates, a stuffed animal may be loved like a 
doll, but it is also wearing the mask, the association, of being an animal. We can go a step 
further and agree that even toys less pliable to anthropomorphization, like model cars, can 
too be treasured, but those objects wear masks as well and the “doll qualities” of these 
miniatures are hidden behind associations to their larger and less life-like counterparts. In 
other words, as Colette remarked: “There is nothing that gives more assurance than a mask” 
(Jouve 35). What then makes the attachment to dolls unmatched as well as more apt to bring 
on an uncanny experience is that there is no apparent disguise for the doll to wear. A child’s 
fervor for his or her doll cannot be diluted by pointing to the doll’s other connection, other 
identity in the world. This lack of a direct outside reference then turns the doll into a magic 
mirror − one which wears only the mask of reflection. Therefore, it seems as if the doll’s 
only “other” is the child. The only “other” is the self and in that exchange the doll becomes 
the uncanny double mirror.  
In his concept of “The Uncanny Valley,” Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori engaged 
with this double mirroring when he theorized that humans begin to feel revulsion and fear 
when they encounter certain manifestations of robots that are too similar in appearance or 
movement to the human.7 In fact, Mori charted human visceral responses in correlation to 
how much a robot acted or looked to be living (see figure 2).  
                                                          
7
 See Masahiro Mori’s “The Uncanny Valley.” Trans. K. MacDorman and T. Minato. Energy. Vol. 7. 
Issue 4. 1970. Also see Mori’s The Buddha in the Robot. Tokyo: Kosei Publishing Company, 1981. 
102 
 
 
Fig. 2. Mori’s graph of the “Uncanny Valley” is taken from Mori’s 1970 publication 
in Energy. 
As the chart indicates, an encounter with a corpse dips one deep into the experience of the 
uncanny because it is clearly a reflection of the fear of one’s own death. The prosthetic hand 
is also tied to death, but also to brutality, as the disfigurement or mutilation of the robot body 
can also resonate with a human fear of dismemberment (MacDorman).  
Coupled with a deep attachment to the doll, it is also not surprising that children react 
in horror and fear when finding disassembled dolls. Hall and Ellis, in the “Maimed dolls” 
section of their “A Study of Dolls,” observed this to be true:   
If dolls lose their heads, eyes, or get otherwise deformed, little children are often 
afraid of them. Some are horrified if the wig comes off; some little children fear 
everything in human shape, perhaps, till they make the acquaintance of a new baby 
and then love dolls. Some suddenly conceive lifelike wax dolls as real dead persons 
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and have sudden aversions for them. Some like to maim dolls, pulling off their limbs, 
perhaps killing them, in order to have a funeral. Sometimes it is thought rather 
disgraceful to both doll and owner to have new heads, limbs, etc. Accidents to dolls 
sometimes cause sensitive children to faint. (Hall, “Dolls” 183-84) 
Doll fragmentation reflects the possibility of a child’s own fragmentation; these toy parts 
then, both consciously and subconsciously, seem to foretell a possible future.  
And yet, as Jacques Lacan’s theoretical work implies, dolls, and their parts, can also 
echo a past. In his articulation of a pre-mirror stage, Lacan states that the infant perceives its 
body as fragmented before the mirror stage indicates its wholeness. According to his 
“Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis” (1948), the memory of this fragmentation resurfaces in 
“the images of castration, emasculation, mutilation, dismemberment, dislocation, 
evisceration, devouring, and bursting open of the body…” (Lacan 13). We can then also 
claim that the unsettling reaction to the fragmentation of dolls has, for a Lacanian, a clear 
relationship to the subconscious memory of experiencing our own human fragmentation. 
Lacan himself uses the doll to highlight this point: 
One need but listen to the stories and games made up by two to five year olds, alone 
or together, to know that pulling off heads and cutting open bellies are spontaneous 
themes of their imagination, which the experience of a busted-up doll merely fulfills. 
(Ibid) 
And so, as both the work of Lacan and Masahiro Mori suggest, what is startling about 
happening upon the doll appendage is that it hints at the possibility of a child’s (or our own) 
fragmentation or it acts as reminder of a fragmentation already experienced. However, to see 
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the doll merely as a reflection of the human experience is to return to the limitation of the 
magic mirror and a denial of otherness.  
 
The Uncanny Corpse: 
With an eye on the body of the broken doll, one can quickly and easily find its 
reflection in the image of the whole human corpse as can be found in Morrison’s description 
of the breakdown of the doll in The Bluest Eye, or in how Rilke describes his childhood doll, 
in his essay “Some Reflections on Dolls,” as “the externally painted watery corpse” (X). In 
her work, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, Julia Kristeva relates her concept of the 
abject in terms of the corpse because the human cadaver... 
…seen without God and outside of science, is the utmost of abjection. It is death 
infecting life. Abject. It is something rejected from which one does not part, from 
which one does not protect oneself as from an object. Imaginary uncanniness and real 
threat, it beckons to us and ends up engulfing us. (4)  
In addition to reflecting human beauty and loveliness, the doll can also exemplify Kristeva’s 
notion of the abject as a corpse because the doll, like the corpse, can break down the 
relationship between death and life, which then collapses and conflates the supposedly secure 
relationships of which is self and which is other, which is alive and which is dead (which is 
me? which is it?) and swallows us up in that chasm. But if the doll body, in its intact form, 
can be experienced as a reflection of a breaking down between two distinct spaces, death and 
life (or the space of the corpse), then what are we to make of the further physical breaking 
down of the doll body if that single form is already identified as a manifestation of a 
psychological breakdown since it is so often equated with the human cadaver? In other 
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words, if the doll body is already a corpse – what is then the aesthetic or psychological 
purpose of breaking this corpse up into its smaller parts? Although the body of the doll 
appears to easily mirror the body of the dead (open unblinking eyes, a stiffness of limbs, a 
form which can seem to house both death and life), post-doll fragments cannot be as easily 
equated with the post-corpse fragments of skin, bone, and blood. First, the corpse is already, 
in a sense, a fragment of the body since it is what is left once “life” is removed from it. The 
body doll does not have that same relationship to the living form since nothing is taken from 
it for it to become abject. Secondly, the fragmentation of the post-doll body results in a 
collection of “things” like crumpled up pieces of a jigsaw puzzle – the image is broken, but 
still recognizable. 
Furthermore, there is no decay in the fragmentation of the doll body whereas the 
breaking of the corpse is more of a breaking down of matter, of decomposition, and then of 
disappearance. As Kristeva writes in Powers of Horror, in encountering the corpse she 
recognizes that: 
There, I am at the border of my condition as a living being. My body extricates itself, 
as being alive, from that border. Such wastes drop so that I might live, until, from loss 
to loss, nothing remains in me and my entire body falls beyond the limit – cadere, 
cadaver. If dung signifies the other side of the border, the place where I am not and 
which permits me to be, the corpse, the most sickening of wastes, is a border that has 
encroached upon everything. It is no longer I who expel, “I” is expelled. (3-4) 
For Kristeva, in its living form, I (without quotes) is that which is able to do the expelling, 
but once the “I” (the soul, the spirit) within the I of the living form is expelled from the body 
then what remains is the corpse – itself a piece of waste which then continues to cast out and 
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break down in decay because, as Kristeva states: “No, as in true theater, without makeup or 
masks, refuse and corpses show me what I permanently thrust aside in order to live” (3). 
Again, the fragmentation of the doll cannot be considered entirely equivalent to the decay of 
the human body because the doll, and the image of the doll, refuses to cross over the border 
where it can be expelled entirely.  
Consider, for example, a description of how the eight-year-old narrator, Josephine, of 
H. C. Cradock’s children’s book, Josephine and Her Dolls (1916), addresses the 
fragmentation of her doll as discussed in Margaret R. Higonnet’s “War Toys: Breaking and 
Remaking in Great War Narratives” (2007): 
To introduce us to her family of sixteen dolls, Josephine draws their portraits (little 
vignettes by Honor Appleton) and details their condition. Thus she becomes author of 
her own autobiographical story, in which the toys are her active companions. “Some 
of them are a good deal broken,” she explains, “but you can hide the broken parts by 
their clothes and hats. Only 3 are quite whole” (Cradock 10; emphasis in original). On 
the one hand, Josephine’s catalog of physical defects is brutally frank, reducing the 
dolls to their physical constitution. Of “Charlie” she writes: “Pale Blue eyes. Made of 
celluloid. One eye nearly washed out. Crack in the head, a little hole in his nose, no 
feet and no arms.” On the other hand, she emphatically reaffirms their humanity: “Of 
course they are people! Grown-ups sometimes seem to think that dolls are only toys” 
(11).  
Although Higonnet’s reading of this story supports her own argument in how playing with 
such damaged dolls is to also acknowledge and address real wartime losses, her description 
of how the child, Josephine, plays with these dolls illustrates the dolls’ refusal to be expelled 
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in the same manner in which the “I” of the human soul is cast out with the decay of the 
human form. In other words, how Josephine perceives her dolls suggest that, unlike the 
human soul which is thought to leave the human body upon its physical death, the doll soul 
stays in place no matter the broken or corpse-like state of its doll form. In this scene, and 
Higonnet’s discussion of it, although the greatly broken down state of the dolls is expressed 
in terms of refuse − the text also acknowledges the inability of their souls to be completely 
expelled as such as is exemplified in Josephine’s own incapability of seeing them as anything 
other than whole and thus alive. And that is to say, not merely as intact toys, but, for 
Josephine, as actual living souls.   
However, despite the doll’s resistance to being considered refuse, there is a constant 
desire to rid the doll of its “I” or exorcise it of its soul as permanently as the human soul 
seems to leave the human body upon death (much like the removal of the eyes from 
Hoffmann’s Olimpia). Consider, as an example, the doll photography of German artist, Hans 
Bellmer (1902-1975).  
The dolls Bellmer created and took photographs of during the 1930s are, according to 
art historian Therese Lichtenstein and her work Behind Closed Doors: The Art of Hans 
Bellmer (2001): 
…a violent attack on the stereotypes of normalcy evident in Nazi art and culture. 
They rebel against images of the ideal female Aryan body found in Nazi high art and 
mass culture. But more than that, they question the role of representation in the social 
construction of gender and sexuality in German high art and popular culture in the 
1930s. (1) 
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 And these photographs are, indeed, quite disturbing in the ways in which they unsettle the 
ideas of what is a body with its missing limbs, added body parts, or substitutions.  
First, it is important to acknowledge the fact that Bellmer’s dolls, for the most part, do 
not look like the other dolls discussed in this paper in that his dolls do not resemble 
children’s toys at all. Instead, they look more womanly and more like traditional mannequin 
forms. Nevertheless, aside from the argument that Bellmer’s dolls are dolls because that is 
what he chose to call them,8 his forms register as dolls in the same way in which the folk 
artists discussed in the previous chapter, Nellie Mae Rowe, Morton Bartlett, and Calvin and 
Ruby Black, are working with or creating dolls. For Bellmer, like those artists, the form 
functions more like a doll than a sculpture because, with a doll, there is both a level of private 
and physical engagement that occurs between the form, the artist, and its audience that is 
much more intimate than the experience that occurs with the mannequin form, a form meant 
to be used for a much more public display of scrutiny and experience. There is, of course, 
one key distinction between Bellmer’s dolls and the dolls created by Rowe, Bartlett, and the 
Blacks: while those artists focused more on their dolls as intact and whole creations, 
Bellmer’s focus is more on the doll in fragmentation. 
Aside from constructing the dolls with his own hands and possessions, there is a 
greater intimacy present in how he shared these dolls. Bellmer never meant for these images 
to be displayed on their own or on a large scale, they were only meant to be experienced 
through the viewing of their (frequently hand-colorized) photographic images as if collected 
for a single self in a small personal photo album: 
                                                          
8
 The German language does differentiate between the two forms: doll, in German, is “Puppe” while 
the singular form of mannequin is also “Mannequin” in German, although English “mannequin” also can be 
translated as “Vorführdame,” “Modellpuppe,” or “Schaufensterpuppe.” 
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Bellmer’s 1934 book, Die Puppe (The Doll), produced and published privately in 
Karlsruhe by Thomas Eckstein, contains black-and-white photographs of Bellmer’s 
first doll arranged in a series of tableaux vivants. Clearly, this small, handcrafted 
book was not a mass-produced publication but a livre de luxe. A short poetic 
introduction by the artist, titled “Memories of the Doll Theme,” describes his 
inspirational fantasies for the dolls and their origins: “Pulp writers, magicians, and 
confectioners used to have that secret something, that beautiful sweet which was 
called nonsense and that brings joy. They dispensed with that unhappiness normally 
associated in my experience with useful intentions, and revealed the mysteries of 
roads less travelled by.” (Lichtenstein 22) 
The qualities of the book that made it tangible and comprehensible (the book itself was small, 
could be held in one’s own hand, something to easily and readily return to) become 
challenged with the aspects of the book that are profoundly abstract (the contortion of the 
bodies within the images, the fantastical settings, the lack of an overt linear narrative). With 
that, and in addition to Bellmer’s interest in the imagination and play, the finished work 
seems to become more of a highly poetic children’s picture book created for a narrow 
reading audience of individuals rather than something created for the collective experience of 
a larger public audience.    
Hans Bellmer took dozens of photographs of the two dolls that he created from 
fragments of material, junk, and his own handiwork. The dolls never came to him as whole 
and intact dolls, but only as parts. And they continued to stay constantly in a state of flux – 
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being broken and recreated over and over again.9 Built from remainder, a Bellmer doll was, 
in a sense, only recognized as whole in each of its new formations of fragmentation. As 
Lichtenstein observes:  
Like a child playing with dolls, Bellmer constantly dismantled and rearranged the 
appendages of his figure. It is almost as though the doll originally came in fragments, 
like a puzzle, and had to be put together by someone who was unfamiliar with the 
human form. (30) 
Yet, Bellmer’s goal did not seem to be to return to any sort of “human form” through the use 
of dolls because his images never appeared to mirror the human body enough for the viewer 
to mistake them for one. In addition, the photographs clearly show the joints, hinges, and 
framework of the doll. Many of Bellmer’s images also take on a surrealist quality by being 
photographs of headless dolls, or of a doll made up of only a torso plus four legs in knee 
socks, or a doll’s head resting on a sink – held up not by its neck, but by a cluster of breasts. 
Bellmer seemed to be exploring how the “thingness” of the doll, when broken away from 
how it is supposed to work, can have such a hold on us rather than examining the abject 
quality of a human body in decay.   
In his interesting little book, Little Anatomy of the Physical Unconscious, or The 
Anatomy of the Image, Bellmer describes the body “as comparable to a sentence that invites 
us to disarticulate it” (xii-xiii) which Lichtenstein beautifully connects to Bellmer’s dolls 
when she writes:   
                                                          
9
 According to Sue Taylor’s Hans Bellmer: The Anatomy of Anxiety (2000), the assemblage known as 
the first doll basically “consisted of a molded torso made of flax fiber, glue, and plaster; a masklike head of the 
same material with glass eyes and a long unkempt wing; and a pair of legs made from broomsticks or dowel 
rods” (24). 
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As a plastic anagram, the doll in the book invites the viewer to decipher a secret or 
hidden meaning by which its changing physical appearance is symptomatic of 
unconscious psychosexual and emotional states. (35) 
The act of disarticulating the doll to decipher its secret or hidden meaning seems to reflect 
Kristeva’s idea of the shedding of waste – again, “from loss to loss, nothing remains in me.” 
If then, when a doll is shed of its parts does the doll body fall beyond the limit and become 
the cadaver? If a doll is all parts then is its “I,” its soul, and the power it holds over the 
viewer expelled as well?  
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Fig. 3. On left: Hans Bellmer, Untitled, from La Poupée (The Doll), 1936 
gelatin silver print; 4 9/16 in. x 3 1/16 in. (11.59 cm x 7.78 cm); 
San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, Purchase; 
© Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York / ADAGP, Paris. 2011. 
 
On right: Hans Bellmer, Untitled, from La Poupée (The Doll), 1936 
gelatin silver print; 4 5/8 in. x 3 1/16 in. (11.75 cm x 7.78 cm); 
San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, Purchase; 
© Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York / ADAGP, Paris. 2011. 
Bellmer in his construction and reconstruction of the doll, of course, also deconstructed it, 
but not only prior to taking its picture. Consider two images which appeared in the original 
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“Die Puppe” as the fourth and fifth image in the book (see figure 3). As Lichtenstein 
highlights, the three photographs prior to these two show the construction of the doll in 
stages and appear to be of a seemingly “linear narrative” (25-9). That narrative is, however, 
broken with the interruption that is the fourth image where the doll is completely 
disassembled in what Lichtenstein describes as “various parts pinned like specimens against 
a blueprint on the wall” (29) (see the image on the left in figure 3). She sees them as lifeless, 
particularly when compared to the more intact dolls present prior to and following this 
image. Lichtenstein notes, that “Above all else, this photograph signals the doll’s constructed 
nature,” (29) but I believe that the insertion of this image echoes what the child in Morrison’s 
The Bluest Eye was trying to do: to read the doll by removing all its parts in order to see 
what gave it its true power. Yet, even as Morrison’s protagonist broke her doll down, it 
would still bleat like a dying lamb as if to vocalize that it still had its secret, some “thing” 
within itself that held a power over the girl, and us, even in its fragmentation. That same 
experience is present in the Bellmer images as well. The interruption of the doll narrative 
with the inventory of parts can be read as an expression of the idea that the taking away of 
parts is akin to discovering, and then controlling, the secret of its power. Or, in human terms, 
it would mean that to turn the doll into a cadaver would be to expel the “I,” the spirit, from 
the doll. And, yet, as Bellmer suggests, such an “I” cannot be expelled from the doll. As 
those reassembled parts in the following image (the fifth) prove, the doll soul is still present 
and powerful, even when the doll body is in a state of meticulous fragmentation (see the 
image on the right in figure 3). That fifth image acts as the visual representation of the 
deconstructed doll that bleats like a dying lamb in The Bluest Eye − proving that the doll’s 
power is still present no matter how the body is dissected. Finally, that fact is pushed further 
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by the position of the doll’s own face in the fifth image. Looking over her shoulder, she 
appears to be “looking back” at the previous image, on the previous page, and that action and 
expression with peering lowered eyes suggests she is just as haunted by what she sees in 
those parts as anyone else. 
With a seemingly sharp turn away from Bellmer, one can also see how the dissection 
of the doll body does nothing to really diminish its power as a soul and presence as presented 
in The Meanest Doll in the World (2003), a children’s book written by Ann M. Martin and 
Laura Godwin, and illustrated by Brian Selznick. The second book in a series of three middle 
grade novels about a family of dolls, this story focuses on a really terribly mean doll, named 
“Princess Mimi.” Despite the fact that she is a “princess” doll made to look as idealized and 
wholesome as such a title would suggest, she terrorizes the other dolls and is so reckless in 
her behavior that she puts other dolls at risk in revealing to humans their greatest secret: that 
dolls are, indeed, alive. At the book’s conclusion, Mimi is, thankfully, stopped, but not 
because she is taken apart. The reign of the meanest doll in the world finally ends because of 
her hubristic antics. According to Martin and Godwin’s trio of books, dolls can go into 
“Permanent Doll State” (PDS) if they are ever caught, however slightly, being alive in front 
of a human being. To go into PDS is to become a complete and permanent object which is 
what occurs to Mimi when a human character catches the doll jumping off of a bookshelf. 
The princess’s fate is further sealed when she is removed from the world of the dolls she was 
terrorizing and is not only left in PDS, but also in a school’s lost and found box.  
With that said, the source of Mimi’s meanness is played out in an interesting way in 
the book’s design and the Brian Selznick created illustrations. In the first book in the series, 
The Doll People (2000), the end pages reflect the old-fashioned catalog from which the main 
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protagonist, Annabelle Doll, was purchased as a means to establish, in a sense, that where 
she came from is connected to her character as a doll: traditional, loyal, dependable. In The 
Meanest Doll in the World, the end pages are reflective of Mimi’s origins, an origins of parts 
(see fig. 4)  
  
Fig. 4 Illustrated end pages (front end page on left, back end page on right)  
from The Meanest Doll in the World by Ann M. Martin & Laura Godwin.  
Illustrated by Brian Selznick. Copyright © 2003.  
Reprinted by permission of the Disney Book Group. All rights reserved. 
In the front matter of the book (image on the left in figure 4), the end pages look like an 
inventory of Mimi parts while the pages which close the book (image on the right in figure 4) 
are like a map as to how to assemble her. As a whole, the end pages have the quality and look 
of a blueprint or x-ray, two forms of examination which artists, especially younger and 
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contemporary ones, have used to explore the anatomy of dolls.10 Indeed, as is the case for all 
three works in this series, this layout is not only striking in that it is reflective of a beautiful 
and cleverly designed book, but also in how it bookends the narrative itself. After reading 
this story, one cannot help but “look back” at the opening end pages of Mimi-in-parts as the 
doll in Bellmer’s photograph looks back at herself in fragmentation. Mimi’s existence, 
although she is not haunting in the same way a Bellmer doll is haunting, is troubling to the 
reader. She is so terrible, so mean and yet, there is no identifiable origin to her cruel nature. 
After completing the story, the closing end pages inform the reader that even with dissection 
there is either no source to her mean-ness or that it is, in fact, so deeply buried in her “bones” 
that one cannot find it (this instructional page as to how to assemble Mimi is just as much a 
reverse blueprint in how to disassemble her too). Mimi’s true ways are only revealed in what 
is sandwiched between these images of her body − the narrative of her doll soul acting out in 
the world. 
When taken apart, found in states of fragmentation, the doll’s power and unknown 
soul stays intact though buried deeply. And even in the digging up or decay or deconstruction 
of the doll – the sense of its power over us, its soul, cannot be inventoried with any listing of 
limbs, eyes, and hairless skulls. This fact as to, in essence, the doll’s impossible 
fragmentation adds to a better understanding of why it continues to be a cultural and literary 
object of real fascination. The doll can still conjure up the uncanny for a reader or viewer of 
it as an intimate and actual experience − no matter how physically depleted it may or may not 
appear to be. 
                                                          
10
 Examples of blueprint and x-ray doll art can be found at http://dollhood.tumblr.com/tagged/x-ray 
and http://dollhood.tumblr.com/tagged/blueprint. 
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The Deconstructed Doll: The Human Soul within Parts 
What then, aside from being possibly recognized as body-like parts, is it that gives 
even the doll in parts a power over its viewer? And why, long after childhood, do we 
continue to want to break her down? Walter Benjamin might suggest that because children 
see the world as a mirror to themselves that then seeing even the most remote object 
damaged would, undoubtedly, be troubling. He did write in his “The Lamp” (1933) that “At 
first, at the moment of birth, it [the child] makes itself similar to the most distant of things in 
the deepest, most unconscious stratum of its own existence, so as subsequently to enable the 
objects of the world around to accrete, layer by layer” (692). However, I would argue that for 
most children chancing upon doll parts is a much more troubling confrontation than 
stumbling upon another broken object that echoes the self. For one, as James Sully noted in a 
work responding to Hall’s and Ellis’s study, an essay titled “Dollatry” (1899): “dolls seem to 
reach a higher degree of reality than other playthings. As objects of passionate attachment, 
they appear to grow a part of the child’s very self, and so become the least questionable of 
realities” (68). Though Sully’s essay goes on to acknowledge that children can also have 
intense attachments to animal toys − it is not quite the same unique attachment they have to 
dolls and so, one could make the leap that if that attachment is so unique it could be because 
the child experiences the doll as being unique, as being a distinctive and real self, even when 
fragmented.  
Hall’s and Ellis’s “A Study of Dolls” is enlightening as it points to this parallel in the 
ways in which children perceive a doll gestalt in the fragmentation of the toy. As they 
observe, in many cases a child’s faith in his or her doll is so strong that: “Dolls may lose the 
head, limbs, or body, and if they are replaced, generally, though not always, retain their 
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identity” (“Dolls” 163). A song sung by a fairy in Charles Kingsley’s children’s book classic, 
The Water Babies (1863), further illustrates this gestalt quality of the doll:  
 “I once had a sweet little doll, dears, 
    The prettiest doll in the world;  
 Her cheeks were so red and so white, dears, 
    And her hair so charmingly curled. 
 But I lost my poor little doll, dears, 
     As I played in the heath one day; 
 And I cried for her more than a week, dears; 
     But I never could find where she lay. 
 
 I found my poor little doll, dears, 
    As I played in the heath one day: 
 Folks say she is terribly changed, dears, 
     For her paint is all washed away, 
 And her arm trodden off by the cows, dear, 
     And her hair not the least bit curled: 
 Yet for old sakes’ sake she is still, dears, 
     The prettiest doll in the world.” (Kingsley 193)  
The structure of this song with its rhyming and line-mirroring further highlights the child’s 
almost willful insistence on keeping the identity of her doll intact despite its fragmentation. 
The poem begins with a claim of having owned the “prettiest doll in the world” so that the 
reader/listener is primed to anticipate that some kind of disappearance or disaster has befallen 
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the doll which is then followed by an inventory of its beauty (red cheeks, hair curled), its loss 
in the heath, the child’s mourning of it and then, in the second stanza, there is a turn (and 
return) to the heath where the doll is found, an inventory of its lack of beauty (red cheeks 
washed away, missing arm, no curl) and then the reclaiming of owning “the prettiest doll in 
the world.” The penultimate line sung by the speaker, a fairy (a presumably adult figure), acts 
as a critique of the experience, the memory, of having once lost this doll, but not of the 
child’s own conscious thinking when finding that damaged toy. The “for old sakes’ sake” 
indicates that the speaker, as adult, is reflecting back on the experience and recognizing why 
the doll, for her child self, retained the quality of being that which the poem began with: “the 
prettiest doll in the world.” 
Hall and Ellis’s work further emphasizes this demand for wholeness despite an 
awareness of fragmentation in the section of their study titled “Material of which Dolls are 
Made, Substitutes, and Proxies.” As mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, 
children will often ascribe “more or less psychic qualities” to a variety of mundane objects 
like pillows, flowers, “salt bag stuffed,” stools, jugs, and turnips in order to claim them as 
dolls (“Dolls” 159, 160). James Sully in his reading of this collection of untraditional dolls 
conjectures that “of these ‘substitutes,’ one may see a tendency to select what is rudely 
suggestive to the child of the human form” (“Dollatry” 61). He sees the reoccurring shapes of 
these replacement dolls as being suggestive of a child’s rudimentary drawing of the human 
body: “Here we see the value for the child’s imagination of the circular or oval, and allied 
forms for head and for body, and of forked lines for the biped’s shanks” (Ibid). Sully then 
points to the pillow as echoing the roundness and ovalness of the body, the legginess of 
stools, the faces in flowers, and the logic of dollifying the turnip when “hair is apt to appear 
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in glorious abundance in nursery drawings” (Ibid). Art historian James Elkins in his book, 
The Object Stares Back: On the Nature of Seeing (1996), sees this act of substitution as a 
type of “contour completion”:  
We instinctively repair fragments into wholes and search for continuous contours and 
closed curves. … Psychoneurologists call the phenomenon subjective contour 
completion, and it helps explain how we routinely see a single building instead of 
disjunct pieces. On a deeper level, subjective contour completion answers to a desire 
for wholeness over dissection and form over shapelessness. (125) 
The gestalt principle of closure also points to the child’s way of “doll making” or “doll 
becoming” since it addresses the mind’s reaction to familiar patterns and the desire to 
complete patterns where they are incomplete. However, it is not only a pattern that is being 
completed in these substitution acts, but a body. Elkins writes: 
When we are confronted with an unfamiliar object -- a blot, a funny smear, a strange 
configuration of paint, a mirage, a frightening apparition, a wild landscape, a brass 
microscope, a building made of brick and rock – we seek a body in it; we try to see 
something like ourselves, a reflection or an other, a doppelganger or a twin, or even 
just a part of us – a face, a hand or a foot, an eye, even a hair or a scrap of tissue. In 
other words, we try to understand strange forms by thinking back to bodies. Even odd 
bodies, things that are manifestly not human, get referred back to human bodies when 
we try to understand them. (129) 
This desire for closing and completing, especially in forms of the body, calls for a return to 
Lacan’s work as well and how this idea of being both whole and divided in the same “body” 
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is akin to how Elizabeth Grosz, in her Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction (2001), 
negotiates Lacan’s idea of child identity: 
The child sees itself as a unified totality, a gestalt in the mirror: it experiences itself in 
a schism, as a site of fragmentation. The children’s identification with its specular 
image impels it nostalgically to seek out a past symbiotic completeness, even if such 
a state never existed and is retrospectively imposed on the pre-mirror phase; and to 
seek an anticipatory or desired (ideal or future) identity in the coherence of the 
totalized specular image. Lacan claims that the child is now enmeshed in a system of 
confused recognition/misrecognition: it sees an image of itself that is both accurate 
(since it is an inverted reflection, the presence of light rays emanating from the child; 
the image as icon); as well as delusory (since the image prefigures a unity and 
mastery that the child still lacks). It is the dual, ambivalent relation to its own image 
that is central to Lacan’s account of subjectivity. (39) 
For the child this duality is an internal negotiation of being self and other at the same time, 
but through the doll it can also function as a reflection of this “system of confused 
recognition/misrecognition.” 
Once again Hall and Ellis’s work is informative because it shows how the child’s 
engagement with the doll points toward the child’s own confusion over identity in terms of 
what is seen and what is desired: “Children are often under a long-continued delusion 
concerning the material of which dolls are made. Even long after it is known that they are 
wood, wax, etc., it is felt that they are of skin, flesh, etc” (“Dolls” 164). 
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The Deconstructed Doll: The Non-Human Soul within Parts 
Nevertheless, aside from how doll fragments echo the human body or suggest a 
human soul, doll parts can also be experienced as uncanny as they are associated to the soul 
of the unknown, of the other. 
In Brown’s use of the word, there is the doll’s very single “thingness” as a whole and 
intact object in addition to the things (cloth, wood, stuffing, paint, porcelain) that make up 
the one thing − the doll body. Therefore, obviously, in the very creation of its whole body, 
before the whole, the doll is made up of fragments. And this pre-body fragmentation often 
does “assert itself” as many narratives will include a story of origins which is often also a 
story of becoming a commodity (a product of human labor) because it includes where a doll 
came from, what it was made out of, and how the things that the doll body is made out of 
influences the “life” the doll has at the moment (Brown, “Thing Theory” 4). The story of 
Pinocchio begins with him as an ordinary “piece of wood,” but other doll stories will talk of 
their origins in Cleveland factories or at the hands of English doll makers, as breakable china 
or indestructible plastic (Collodi 83).11  
For instance, Tottie, the main “doll” character in Rumer Godden’s children’s book 
The Doll’s House (1962), is aware that she is made of “good wood” which she thinks has, 
indeed, provided her with certain strength of character:  
How strange that a little farthing doll should last so long. Tottie was made of wood 
and it was good wood. She liked to think sometimes of the tree of whose wood she 
was made, of its strength and of the sap that ran through it and made it bud and put 
                                                          
11
 For example, the aforementioned trilogy of doll novels for children by Ann M. Martin and Laura 
Godwin, illustrated by Brian Selznick address the many differences between “living as” older, handmade and 
breakable dolls and being modern, Cleveland-made plastic dolls: The Doll People (2000), The Meanest Doll in 
the World (2003) and The Runaway Dolls (2008). 
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out leaves every spring and summer, that kept it standing through the winter storms 
and wind. “A little, a very little of that tree is in me,” said Tottie. “I am a little of that 
tree.” She liked to think of it. (2) 
Tottie’s recognition that she is “a little of that tree” points to the fact that there is a 
“thingness” about her that not only provides her with a type of permanence (as she may live 
as long as the tree did to “put out leaves every spring and summer…”), but also a sense of 
wholeness in relationship to something else. Through reciprocity, she is like the tree as the 
tree is like her. As eloquently expressed by Tottie, this pre-body fragmentation easily fits into 
the argument that pieces can give strength to the whole. However, at the same time, the pre-
body of the doll is actually less of a fragmentation than a cultivation of parts. Wood, glass, 
cloth, tree, sand, plant − these are the things which existed before the body and, therefore, are 
not fragments of it. What is more interesting is the fragmentation that occurs after the body is 
created and how that state of broken-ness reflects more profoundly on the fixed place of the 
doll in our cultural imagination. Tottie is an example of power located in origins, a traditional 
site or recognition of authority, but post-body fragmentation presents a new place of power.  
 
The Deconstructed Doll as a Soul in Action: 
This new place of power can be located in Foucault’s idea of power relations. From 
his work “The Subject and Power,” Foucault notes that power is “a mode of action which 
does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their actions” (789). In 
other words, power may seem to be about a relationship between individuals (the boss to a 
worker) where one (the boss) holds exclusive power other another (the worker), but, for 
Foucault, it is more about the struggle within that relationship of free subjects where power is 
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a "mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others” (Ibid). As he 
states:  “Power exists only when it is put into action” (Foucault 788). The word “action” is 
central in Foucault’s definition of power because if all subjects are free and have 
opportunities for implementing knowledge then the play for power begins with the ability to 
act and, perhaps, react.  
Dolls, in their very definition, are children’s playthings, are subject to the whims of 
the hands that grip or hold or cradle them. They have no power in play. However, in doll 
narratives, there is often a depiction of power relations which does not equate human with 
boss and doll with worker. Power, instead, belongs to the one (human or object) which has a 
knowledge greater than the other and expresses that knowledge through action. Brown’s idea 
that “we begin to confront the thingness of objects when they stop working for us” and that 
“the story of objects asserting themselves as things” then becomes the “story of the changing 
relation to the human subject” is often acted out through power relations in doll narratives 
(“Thing Theory” 4). Therefore, if the “thing” (the doll in this case) no longer “works” for us 
because it no longer functions how we have known it to function in the past, then the 
relationship between us and the doll changes. If the doll asserts itself or, for Foucault, “acts” 
in a way in which is unknown to us in our prior engagement with the thing then the 
relationship of power has shifted. Further, if a thing stops working for us − that does not 
mean it stops “working.” It may, in fact, continue to work and act in a way which is not as a 
pre-conceived notion to us or in a way that that we are familiar with, but then that is how the 
doll may, in a sense, gain a certain power over us because it then becomes unknowable to us. 
Consider, for example, the taking apart of the doll in “The Dolls” by Ian McEwan. 
This stand-alone short story is actually a chapter from his children’s book The Daydreamer 
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(1994) about a ten-year-old boy named Peter and his vivid imagination. Peter, having shared 
a room with his seven-year-old sister, Kate, and her sixty dolls, is finally given his own 
room. Months pass, but due to boredom on an Easter afternoon, Peter decides to head to his 
sister’s room where, while distracted by “trying to remember his ignorant younger self of six 
months before,” he notices a “figure making its ways across the carpet toward him” 
(McEwan 30). The figure is one of Kate’s dolls, called “Bad Doll”: 
It was a pink that no human had ever been. Long ago its left leg and its right arm had 
been wrenched from their sockets, and from the top of its pitted skull grew one thick 
hank of black hair. Its makers had wanted to give it a sweet little smile, but something 
must have gone wrong with the mold, because the Bad Doll always curled its lips in 
scorn and frowned, as if trying to remember the nastiest thing in the world. 
Of all the dolls, only the Bad Doll was neither boy nor girl. The Bad Doll was simply 
‘it.” (25) (see figure 5)  
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Fig. 5. Illustration of “Bad Doll” by Anthony Browne from Ian McEwan’s  
The Daydreamer. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 2003) 24.   
Illustration copyright © 1994 by Anthony Browne. 
Used by permission of HarperCollins Publishers. 
Soon the other dolls, some walking, some stumbling, come toward him – roaring at him over 
the fact that he had been given his own room which they thought they rightfully deserved. 
Bad Doll, sweaty and limping, leads the dolls in ripping off Peter’s leg and arm and inserting 
his limbs into the absent spaces of its own body and then ripping out the boy’s hair to 
resemble “its” own ravaged scalp: 
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And then a strange thing happened. Peter’s leg came off. It came right off. He looked 
down at where his leg used to be, and instead of blood there was a little coiled spring 
poking out through his torn trousers.  
 “That’s funny,” he thought, “I never would have guessed…” 
 But he did not have time to think about how funny it was because now the 
dolls had grabbed his right arm and were pulling yo-ho heave-hoing, and his arm was 
off too, and sticking out from his shoulder was another little spring. 
 “Hey! Peter shouted. “Give me back my arm and leg.” 
 But it was no use. The arm and leg were being passed over the heads in the 
crowd, back toward the Bad Doll. It took the leg and slotted it on. A perfect fit. Now 
it was putting the arm in place. That arm could have been made specially, it fit so 
well. 
 “Odd,” Peter thought. “I’m sure my arm and leg would be too big.” 
 Even as he was thinking this, the dolls were on him again, and this time they 
were scrambling up his chest, pulling his hair, ripping at his clothes. 
 “Get off,” Peter shouted. “Ouch! That hurts.” 
 The dolls laughed as they yanked out nearly all his hair. They left one long 
hank sticking out of the middle of his head. (McEwan 38-40) 
The scene ends when Kate enters the room and finds her brother covered with dolls. 
Apparently, as Kate’s mild reaction reveals (“…Kate laughed to see her brother with sixty 
dolls piled on top of him” (41)) this was a boy swept up in a game of imaginative play. This 
story essentially appears to end here, with an interruption that wakes Peter up out of his play. 
However, in the concluding paragraphs of the story, when Peter puts Bad Doll back in “its” 
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place, “he was sure he heard it say, ‘One day, my friend, that room will be mine’” (McEwan 
42). 
Narratives about whole dolls, intact dolls, can be haunting. Kate, in this story, owns a 
world of dolls, but the narration notes that:  
They were all quite different, but they all had one thing in common: they all had the 
same wide, mad, unblinking angry stare. They were meant to be babies, but their eyes 
gave them away. Babies never looked at anyone like that. When he walked past the 
dolls, Peter felt watched, and when he was out of the room, he had the idea they were 
talking about him, all sixty of them. (McEwan 23) 
They, collectively, held a knowledge unknown to Peter, but – again – returning to Foucault – 
they did not, for a time, act on that knowledge. Yet the doll that does finally assert itself into 
action and has power over Peter is the broken, fragmented one with the pitted skull where 
one thick piece of black hair grew. What is key about this descriptive choice is that this doll 
did not only stop “working” by no longer being a doll that sat, knowingly but silent, in its 
place until it turned on Peter. It also stopped working well before it advanced toward Peter 
because of how it appeared to be different from other dolls. The fact that Bad Doll is 
physically, visually, more distant from the other dolls in its state of fragmentation also 
contributes to its assertion of power over Peter (see figure 5). Considering the illustration of 
Bad Doll, the reader is further drawn into the doll’s power in producing a feeling of the 
uncanny in how it is even depicted on the page. As the large shadow behind the doll 
suggests, the doll is lit as if in a spotlight and yet lit slightly lower in order to create an 
unsettling darkness around the eyes. Furthermore, Bad Doll, unlike Hoffmann’s Olimpia in 
his story “The Sandman,” would not be mistaken for human by anyone since, aside from the 
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absent limbs, it still does not look human or child-like. As depicted in its shadowy portrait: 
“Its makers had wanted to give it a sweet little smile, but something must have gone wrong 
with the mold…” (McEwan 25). Finally, the doll appears to be sitting on a shelf and so the 
viewer, like the child, is positioned as if having to look up at it in awe, reverence, and fear of 
the unknown. 
Additionally, the multifaceted notion of the uncanny relates to Bad Doll in more than 
the doll’s mere unexpected animation or physical representation. Freud wrote that: “Severed 
limbs, a severed head, a hand detached from the arm … feet that dance by themselves … − 
all of these have something highly uncanny about them, especially when they are credited, as 
in the last instance, with independent activity” (“Uncanny” 150). As the chart of the 
“Uncanny Valley” indicates (see figure 2), the zombie is assessed to be a more disturbing 
thing to encounter than any other type of familiar object because, as Mori argues, it is the 
zombie’s act of movement that intensifies the eeriness of the uncanny. Fear of the zombies, 
like the corpse, is clearly tied to a fear of death, but it is the animation of the zombie (the 
most macabre image of dead man walking) that is more terrifying because its movement is a 
sign of life, of still having a soul. In discussing the uncanniness of body parts, Mori observes 
that such improvements have been made to “simulate veins, muscles, tendons, finger nails, 
and finger prints” as well as color in prosthetics that a man-made limb can be mistaken for a 
real one (Mori, “Uncanny” 33). However, Mori stresses that if “this kind of prosthetic hand is 
too real and when we notice it is prosthetic, we have a sense of strangeness” (Mori, 
“Uncanny” 34). With the prosthetic there too is the element of movement in a supposedly 
inanimate thing which not only results in feeling unsettled, but also brings in the aspect of 
surprise. Mori writes “if we shake the hand, we are surprised by the lack of soft tissue and 
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cold temperature. In this case, there is no longer a sense of familiarity. It is uncanny” (Mori, 
“Uncanny” 35). Therefore, for the larger hidden nature of the strange to be revealed, one 
must also be willing to have an intimate if not physical engagement with that which just may 
initially appear to be only somewhat unfamiliar. 
Returning to McEwan’s story, Bad Doll’s power of uncanniness is therefore not only 
that which comes from encountering disengaged and animated body parts, but also in that 
very real engagement with said body parts. In other words, a feeling of uncanniness is also 
produced from that fact that the fragmentation of the doll body allows it to become 
interchangeable with the boy’s. In “The Uncanny,” Freud writes that a sense of the uncanny 
is also created when:  
…a person may identify himself with another and so become unsure of his true self; 
or he may substitute the other’s self for his own. The self may thus be duplicated, 
divided and interchanged. Finally there is the constant recurrence of the same thing, 
the repetition of the same facial features, the same characters, the same destinies, the 
same misdeeds, even the same names, through successive generations. (“Uncanny” 
142)  
We see this repetition of self resulting in an instability of “true self” not only when the dolls 
take the boy’s arm and leg, causing him to mirror the missing limbs of Bad Doll, but also in 
the fact that when these are taken from him – what is left in that space is not blood, but “a 
little coiled spring,” while the arm and leg once belonging to him are now slotted perfectly 
onto Bad Doll’s body: “A perfect fit” (McEwan 39). Here the identity of who is, in fact, the 
human and who is the doll is clearly a destabilizing experience, a fact emphasized by Peter’s 
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own utterance of “That’s funny … I never would have guessed” (39).12 Yet this “funny” 
moment also begs to make the connection as to how children are apt to see the dollness in 
themselves and not just the humanness of their toys. Hall and Ellis also write in their 
observations of dolls and children that:  
To find a doll’s head hollow or that it is sawdust, while it suggests to very young 
children the same as contents of their own body, is with older children a frequent 
source of disenchantment and sometimes marks the sudden end of the doll period. … 
It is singular how slow and late children learn what the “hard things” under their own 
skin (bones) are, and how easily, after a trifling injury, they think the body a bag of 
blood, or somehow get the impression that they are blown up and grown by inflation, 
or are themselves full of sawdust or of stomach, which fills even arms and legs 
(“Dolls” 164) 
Indeed, the identity of the “true self” is troubled in this moment between this boy and this 
doll, but, as Freud writes, the confusion over identity through acts of duplication, division, 
and interchangeability occurs “through successive generations” (“Uncanny” 142). In other 
words, this does not occur simply like a clean swap of identity for identity, but becomes 
piecemeal as well as successive as textual elements also play with the instability. One such 
example of instability created through confusion over identity is found in choosing to name 
the protagonist, “Peter,” a name already associated with a famously half boy/half other 
creature (Peter Pan), not to mention also the name of the doll featured in the Life photo essay 
                                                          
12
 This “That’s funny” is actually working in the same way in which the speaker in Robert Louis 
Stevenson’s “My Shadow” expresses anxiety when he notices how the his shadow’s movement is not only 
different from him but different from what he recognizes to be human movement: “The funniest thing about 
him is the way he likes to grow—” (Stevenson 22). In both instances the pause to not something as different, as 
“funny” initially appears rather mild, but it actually expresses a deeper sensation of the beginning of anxiety. 
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discussed in the previous chapter. In addition, in choosing to not only set this narrative on a 
Sunday, the most “betwixt and between” day of the week, but Easter Sunday, a holiday 
which, in many ways, encapsulates and celebrates many of these aspects of the uncanny, is 
telling as well as intriguing as to the real instability of not only this story, but our own trust in 
what is real and what is play, what is fact and what is storytelling. 
Finally, though the story ends in a seemingly tidy ending of an almost “and then he 
woke up” when Kate walks into the room and breaks the spell of play, the story still ends 
with Peter thinking he hears Bad Doll threaten him. Therefore, with the repetition of the 
engagement to the doll in and out of play, we are unsure as to which is “true” and so we are 
left with a feeling of the uncanny.   
In The Savage Mind, Lévi-Strauss wrote that the bricoleur is someone who uses his 
hands to create, much like a craftsman or storyteller:  
The ‘bricoleur’ is adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks, but, unlike the 
engineer, he does not subordinate each of them to the availability of raw materials 
and tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the project. His universe of 
instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to make do with ‘whatever 
is at hand’, that is to say with a set of tools and materials which is always finite and is 
also heterogeneous because what it contains bears no relation to the current project, or 
indeed to any particular project, but is the contingent result of all the occasions there 
have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with previous constructions or 
destructions. (17) 
In the narrative of play as well as in narratives about play, the child is like a bricoleur. 
Offered only those tools “at hand” (the doll, the box), he or she must make do with 
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constructing and deconstructing these familiar forms in order to achieve the desired 
resolution of knowing what it is (and if there is) something inside the material thing. And, in 
that, the child’s ability to understand his own consciousness (or the unique consciousness of 
another) is developed and explored in how he negotiates with those parts which his hands 
touched, found, or broke. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
THE DOLL IS A SHADOW BOX 
“Untitled (Bébé Marie), Early 1940s”  
The chubby doll in a forest of twigs. Her eyes are open 
and her lips and cheeks are red. While her mother was 
busy with other things, she went to her purse, took out 
the makeup, and painted her face in front of a mirror. 
Now she’s to be punished. 
     A spoiled little girl wearing a straw hat about to be  
burnt at the stake. One can already see the flames in her 
long hair entangled with the twigs. Her eyes are wide 
open so she can watch us watching her. 
     All this is vaguely erotic and sinister.  
 
poem by Charles Simic from his poetry collection inspired by the artwork of 
Joseph Cornell: Dime-Store Alchemy: The Art of Joseph Cornell (1992), 47. 
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Fig. 1. Art © The Joseph and Robert Cornell Memorial Foundation/Licensed by 
VAGA, New York, NY 
Cornell, Joseph (1903-1972) 
Untitled (Bébé Marie). Early 1940s.  
Papered and painted wood box, with painted corrugated cardboard floor, containing 
doll in cloth dress and straw hat with cloth flowers, dried flowers, and twigs, flecked 
with paint, 23 ½ x 12 3/8 x 5 1/4" (59.7 x 31.5 x 13.3 cm).  
Acquired through the Lillie P. Bliss Bequest.  
Location: The Museum of Modern Art, New York, NY, U.S.A. 
Photo Credit: Digital Image © The Museum of Modern Art/Licensed by SCALA / 
Art Resource, NY 
 
Introduction: 
 Engaging with the qualities of both the shadow and the box, as outlined and discussed 
in the previous two chapters, the image of the “shadow box” literally brings together these 
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two metaphors to illustrate one of the defining ways that the doll is a distinctly unique liminal 
figure: it can move with fluidity and ease between being an object which is looked upon and 
a subject that does the looking. Furthermore, when encountered in such a liminal state of 
constant flux, the doll becomes a profound figure of the uncanny. As its identity can 
enigmatically and swiftly oscillate between being comprehended as a physical object and 
soul-filled subject, the doll in dollhood becomes impenetrable to organizing principles of 
logic. Instead, the doll becomes an experience that the metaphor of the “shadow box” only 
begins to articulate. 
This chapter will begin with a close reading of two different artworks with a slight 
variation of the same name, “Untitled (Bébé Marie),”1 in order to extract the distinct qualities 
of the shadow and the box as expressed in the doll found in Joseph Cornell’s shadow box and 
the one located in Charles Simic’s poem. Following this analysis, however, this chapter will 
present how both the qualities of the shadow and the box are working in a much more 
profound way as an expression of the liminal when left intertwined, like a Möbius strip, in 
these same two works. Then a reading of Rainer Maria Rilke’s essay “Some Reflections on 
Dolls: Occasioned by the Wax Dolls of Lotte Pritzel” is introduced in order to articulate just 
how the doll is able to occupy the space of both a subject (and spectator) and an object (or 
spectacle) and how that liminal state is unique to the doll and thus unsettling for the human to 
experience. This chapter then focuses on Dare Wright’s children’s book The Lonely Doll 
(1957) in order to illustrate how the experience of the uncanny emerges from a text that plays 
with and manipulates a doll’s identity as being both, as well as neither, a subject and an 
                                                          
1
 Cornell’s shadow box is known as “Untitled (Bébé Marie)” while Simic’s poem is named “Untitled 
(Bébé Marie), Early 1940s.”  
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object. Finally, Bolesław Leśmian’s poem “Lalka” (“The/A Doll”) is introduced to express 
how the doll can even address and embrace itself as living in that in-between space of being a 
subject/spectator as well as object/spectacle.  
 
The “Shadow Box” in Cornell’s Shadow Box: 
Looking at the Joseph Cornell shadow box which opens this chapter, “Untitled (Bébé 
Marie),” one could attempt to dissect the power of its impact on the viewer in terms of its 
shadow and box qualities (see figure 1).  
As an image representing a three-dimensional artwork, it is, of course, only a shadow 
of the original self. This is not the actual artwork, but a shadow, a photographic reproduction, 
of that original. The art piece is also a shadow because of the content within its actual box, 
specifically the doll itself. Although the artwork was created in the early 1940s, the doll is 
not of its time as both its porcelain face and anachronistic attire are more a reflection of the 
Victorian time period than the American mid-century. Furthermore, the doll not only 
performs as a shadow cast from another time period in general, but also as a shadowy 
remainder of Cornell’s own personal past. Lindsay Blair in her book, Joseph Cornell’s Vision 
of Spiritual Order (1998), points to the quality of personal nostalgia in Cornell’s use of this 
particular doll as he, as an adult, stole it from his cousin Ethel in order to use it in his own art 
(110). This act reinforces the idea that Cornell “was attempting to fashion his art from the 
stuff from his grandmother’s attic,” making art from his own personal shadows (Ibid). 
Finally, there is the frequency with which the image of Bébé Marie appeared in photographs 
before she was “boxed” in this box. Blair writes that “Cornell did not enjoy being 
photographed” and so he “used her … as a prop for portrait photographs” (Ibid) and so 
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likenesses, photographic shadows, have also been made of her away from and before the box 
as well.  
 As a box, “Bébé Marie” is more than the “box” which frames and holds its contents.  
It is also a box in that it “boxes” its contents as recognizable and tangible artifacts. As the 
image and the description of the image correspond to one another, there appears to be no 
complexity in what it is filled with: “Papered and painted wood box, with painted corrugated 
cardboard floor, containing doll in cloth dress and straw hat with cloth flowers, dried flowers, 
and twigs, flecked with paint...” (MoMA). In addition, this artwork is also clearly a box 
because, if permitted to, one could physically parse out its contents and investigate them as 
well as the interiority and shape of the box itself, never mind the body of the doll within that 
box. However, aside from all the measureable ways in which Cornell’s “Bébé Marie” is both 
a “shadow” and a “box,” how those two qualities are working when intertwined with one 
another is an entirely new assemblage of liminal power, a liminality which the poet Charles 
Simic captures in his own poem titled “Untitled (Bébé Marie), Early 1940s.” 
In Simic’s brief poem about Cornell’s own “Untitled (Bébé Marie), Early 1940s” (the 
poem appears on the second page of this chapter), there exists a Möbius strip-like movement 
in the relationship between the shadow and box that, when each image is isolated outside of 
that relationship to the other, loses its potency.  
Without a doubt, one can take an inventory of the qualities of “shadow” and “box” in 
this poem. The shadow exists, first, in the very title of the poem as it is a duplicate to how the 
artwork is referenced. The shadow is also present in the form of the poem as one stanza is 
mirrored by the next not merely in line count (five each), but also in structure. Like a play on 
the form and structure of John Hollander’s “Swan and Shadow,” the first stanza of Simic’s 
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own  “Bébé Marie” begins with a description of the real object in the Cornell box, the 
“chubby doll,” while the second stanza begins with a description of the doll’s shadow, a 
“spoiled little girl.” And in addition to structure, qualities of the shadow are suggested in the 
presence of the mirror, the doll’s other double − the mother, the use of makeup, the repetition 
of “twigs” and the doubling of the image (and language) of both the doll’s and the girl’s eyes 
being open.  
The values of the box are present in this poem in a number of ways as well. There is 
the investigative quality present in how the poem moves as well as the action within it. Both 
stanzas begin with a line which seems to be making a claim as to meaning based on the 
contents of the box: “The chubby doll in a forest of twigs” or “A spoiled little girl wearing a 
straw hat about to be burnt at the stake.” Then the action imagined within the box is imagined 
through and because of an understanding of the box’s contents.  
The rosy lip and cheek of the Victorian doll may have prompted the imagining of the 
doll stealing her mother’s makeup as the doll’s stiff and direct stance may have brought to 
the poet’s mind an image of looking into a mirror or being punished. And the girl, like the 
actual doll, is wearing a straw hat, and although the twigs are twigs and not flames − her 
position in them, the way they rise up as if devouring her, suggests that, yes, she is about to 
be burnt at the stake.  
 However, the power of Cornell’s “Bébé Marie” is not actually conveyed in the sorting 
out of what elements are “shadow” and which are “box” in this poem (and artwork). This is 
because the impact of the artwork is not found in the act of isolating the “shadow” from the 
“box,” but rather in how both are moving into and from one another like a Möbius strip.  
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In truth, the actual impact of Cornell’s "Bébé Marie” is located in how those qualities 
of the shadow are able to move into those of the box (and vice versa), a perpetual movement 
that Elizabeth Grosz articulates as being the Möbius strip quality of the “shadow box” as it 
shows “the inflection of mind into body and body into mind” (“Volatile” xii). Its power, for 
example, is not in recognizing the twigs as twigs but in being able to imagine that those 
“twigs” are, as Simic poses, a forest which imprisons a misbehaving doll, flames which 
engulf a spoiled girl, or something else entirely. As Simic suggests, the artwork is a Möbius 
strip which will not yield, will not stop, and will not provide a single meaning. This fact is 
reinforced by the firmness of the doll’s gaze, which, again, Simic emphasizes twice in his 
poem when he writes: “Her eyes are open” and then “Her eyes are wide / open so she can 
watch us watching her” as if her face is as indifferent to giving away any stable meaning as is 
the Möbius strip. In the isolating of “shadow” from “box,” each concept was experienced as 
if on the receiving end of a subjective action or engagement, but now, when amalgamated, 
“shadow box” appears to be able to participate in the subjective experience. The doll/girl is 
an object which not only does not look away but also looks back with indifference. She also 
makes the viewer her object by how she appears to be unblinkingly “watching” the viewer in 
his or her attempt to dissect the toy’s meaning in terms of her relationship to everything from 
Sleeping Beauty to Joan of Arc. This is why Cornell’s shadow box is a “shadow box” − 
because it stays, after one experiences it and tries to pin it down as being, what Simic calls, 
“vaguely erotic and sinister.” In other words, for the state of dollhood, this shadow box as a 
“shadow box” illustrates how the doll can now not only be the nuanced object but also that 
which gazes upon the object like a subject. The doll can be both the object of the subject’s 
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gaze and also fully capable of being that subject that gazes upon its viewer as if the viewer is, 
in fact, the real object.  
 
The Doll as Object and Subject: 
Toys, in general, but the doll, in particular, are objects that seem to have been created 
solely in order to be on the receiving end of experience. Dolls are gazed upon and admired, 
but they do not look. Dolls are handled in play and in their creation,2 but they do not touch. 
Yet, the doll is much more than an object that can be used as a screen to project our 
experiences upon. More interestingly, the doll is, in many ways, not only a fully realized and 
experienced object of the gaze, but it may also be considered a richly complex and very real 
gazing subject as well. This distinction between doll as object and doll as subject becomes 
more complicated in works where the division between these two states is unclear and where 
the doll is capable of being both subject and object in the same liminal moment. 
By naming the ways in which the doll is able to embrace and, yes, embody the 
qualities of an object and a subject, we can see how both a poem like “Lalka” (“The/A Doll” 
in English), by Polish poet, Bolesław Leśmian (1878-1937) and a picture book like The 
Lonely Doll by Dare Wright (published in 1957) can express how the doll is both an object 
of experience and the subject who experiences, the spectacle and the spectator − the doll is 
the thing that, unlike the human, can exist on the line between life and art. 
                                                          
2
 “Of course, such toys were not originally the invention of toy manufacturers, but were produced in 
the workshops of wood carvers, pewterers, and so forth. Not until the nineteenth century did toymaking become 
the province of a branch-industry of its own. The particular style and beauty of toys of the older kind can be 
understood only if we realize that toys used to be a by-product of the many handicrafts that were all subject to 
the rules and regulations of the guilds, so that each member could manufacture only products that fell within the 
definition of his own trade” (Benjamin, “Cultural” 113-14). 
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First, it must be noted that the idea of a “living” doll can not only be transposed to 
those supposed living people (fictional or otherwise) who, it can be argued, act as dolls or 
become like dolls in the hands of their creators like Oscar Wilde’s (or Lord Henry’s) Dorian 
Gray or Vladimir Nabokov’s (or Humbert Humbert’s) Lolita. In addition to that type of 
living doll, there is the actual doll, the plaything made of objects or assembled from physical 
materials, which can be perceived, in certain works, as also living or having a human-like 
soul. It is a concept that Baudelaire acknowledges when he writes in his essay, “A 
Philosophy of Toys,” that “The overriding desire for most children is to get at and see the 
soul of their toys” and that once, at last, the child opens the toy he wonders “But where is the 
soul? This is the beginning of melancholy and gloom” (203-04). In his essay, “The Cultural 
History of Toys,” Benjamin also sees the plaything as belonging to a more living space 
because it acts more purposefully than a mere object. He writes: 
…children do not constitute a community cut off from everything else. They belong 
to the nation and the class they come from. This means that their toys cannot bear 
witness to any autonomous separate existence, but rather are a silent signifying 
dialogue between them and their nation. (“Cultural” 116) 
In his essay “Some Reflections on Dolls: Occasioned by the Wax Dolls of Lotte Pritzel,” 
Rilke wonders where these dolls exist when there are no children in their lives: 
…this would be, in a certain sense, the condition of their origin, that the world of 
children was past and over. In these figures the doll has at last outgrown the 
understanding, the sympathy, the pleasure, and the sorrow of the child, it has become 
independent, grown-up, prematurely old, it has entered upon all the unrealities of its 
own life. (43) 
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He refers to dolls as being “unchanging” and of “being impenetrable and incapable of 
absorbing, at any point, even a drop of water in their extreme state of well-enough known 
solidity” (Ibid). Yet this deadness of being a doll is not its only quality. He admits to a 
consciousness belonging to the dolls as well. As addressed in Chapter One of this 
dissertation, Kitti Carriker notes in her book, Created in Our Image, that as “Rilke’s essay 
and the fictional narratives treated here illustrate, the body of the doll is often invested with a 
‘truth-bearing function,’ perhaps even with a soul,” which implies that the doll soul may also 
be a unique consciousness separate and different from that which is recognized as human 
(172). Even Heinrich von Kleist, in his essay “On the Puppet Theater,” notes how the 
marionette, the puppet doll, exists on this unnatural border between existence and non-
existence. The puppet exists and has a soul because out of the dead things that are its limbs it 
is able to create art, the dance. However, at the same time, it does not exist because, not only 
are its strings being pulled by something larger, but the puppet creates a dance that is more 
beautiful than one that any human dancer can create. Yet, what is striking is that Kleist also 
shows how the human dancer exists on that same border of life and art as well. The dancer is 
living and creating art, but his dance can be too affected, too unnatural, as if manipulated by 
awkward strings. Therefore the puppet, controlled by a puppeteer, is more natural and life-
like than the dancer who controls himself. The answer then becomes muddied as to who is 
the real object, who is the real subject and which dance is the true act: 
“And the advantages of such a puppet over living dancers?” 
“The advantage? First of all, my good friend, a negative one; namely that it 
would be incapable of affectation. For affectation, as you know, appears when the 
soul (vis motrix) is located at any point other than the center of gravity of a 
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movement. Now because, with his wires and strings, it is this very point and no other 
that the puppeteer controls, all remaining members are, as they should be, dead, pure 
pendulums, which follow the basic law of gravity – a marvelous quality, which we 
look for in vain in most of our dancers ….” (Kleist 213) 
For Rilke, however, although the doll is a “half object” which is unlike objects which 
moved him “deeply by their beautiful participation in human living” like the “sewing clamp, 
a spinning-wheel, a domestic loom,” it is still very much a live, active object even though he 
says that the doll-soul is “not made by God” (Rilke 45, 49). However, his choice to talk about 
the doll in terms of death and decay re-affirms its existence because he discusses it in terms 
of human decay and not the decay or breakdown of material, of objects. Imagining the anger 
he would feel at finding one of his old dolls, he writes: 
… it would almost anger us with its frightful obese forgetfulness, the hatred, which 
undoubtedly has always been a part of our relationship to it unconsciously, would 
break out, it would lie before us unmasked as the horrible foreign body on which we 
had wasted our purest ardour; as the eternally painted watery corpse, which floated 
and swam on the flood-tides of our affection, until we were on dry land again and left 
it lying forgotten in some undergrowth. (Rilke 45) 
It is at this point that the doll in Rilke’s essay is revealing itself to be both the spectacle and 
the spectator. We see that it is the spectacle, the material doll, that is “dead” outside of the 
individual’s, the child’s, pleasure of not only playing with it, but also when applying 
pleasurable ideas and concepts upon it (like Humbert Humbert to his Dolores Haze). Yet 
Rilke’s hostility seems to not stem from the fact that the doll is the spectacle, but that the doll 
also seems to be asserting itself through its non-assertion. That is to say that it is also the 
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spectator, a subject − watching the individual react to its choice to not overtly give direction. 
The doll is very much the flâneur − a voyeur, who is the center of this world (the anger and 
focus of Rilke’s thoughts) and wants to see (as it does with its “disproportionate, mobile eyes 
open, scarcely capable, indeed, of distinguishing whether it was the mechanical lid or that 
other thing, the air, which lay upon them”) but does not want to be seen for all that it is 
seeing (Rilke 43-44).  However, what is strikingly unique about the doll’s subjectivity is that 
its unblinking eyes and unchanging self also reveal that it is “nil admirari” and it admires 
nothing with its fixed doll face of boredom. Here is where its objecthood makes its presence 
known in the doll as a subject. The doll, because it is still an object, is able to express an 
intense type of indifferent judgment that is unfamiliar to human subjectivity. This is an 
expression of the state of the doll’s liminality that the human cannot enter, and yet it is a state 
which terrifies the human to experience. Rilke, for one, is hostile at this distinctive spectator-
like existence of the doll (again, existence here supported through the description of its 
human deadness and decay, and the doll’s rudimentary “idea” of falling and its ability to 
“allow itself” to be dreamed about). He is hostile not merely because the doll forced him to 
assert himself, but the fact that the doll: 
…made no response whatever, so that we were put in the position of having to take 
over the part it should have played, of having to split our gradually enlarging 
personality into part and counterpart; in a sense, through it to keep the world, which 
was entering into us on all sides, at a distance. The things which were happening to us 
incomprehensibly we mixed in the doll, as in a test tube, and saw them there change 
colour and boil up. That is to say, we invented that also, it was so abysmally devoid of 
phantasy, that our imagination became inexhaustible in dealing with it. (Rilke 45-46) 
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It is as if the doll’s power lies in its indifference. The choice of that indifference is so 
unsettling for Rilke because it takes the power away from Rilke and forces him to act, to be 
the spectacle for the spectator which is the doll’s natural double position. 
 
The Lonely Doll Looking: 
Turning to Dare Wright’s picture book, The Lonely Doll, one can see that this work 
expresses similar key qualities of the object as subject, but it also performs this state by 
playing with a number of liminal qualities already present in the children’s book. First, this is 
a kitschy, photographic, and very minor work of art. It was also the creation of a woman who 
used the concept of copying and mirroring to really re-create something new out of things 
that are not. Wright created an artwork, the doll, Edith, that looks just like the author (blond 
ponytail, gold hoop earrings), is named after the author’s mother (who is called “Edie”), and 
plays dress up in the story (the play act of copying). If we just look at the cover of the book, 
it appears that Wright created this image to already look like a piece of art in not only the 
way in which the pink gingham pattern and very title of the book suggest the quality of 
portraiture, but also in the choice to photograph the doll in a pose typical of the art form of 
portraiture: in a staged moment of intimate repose and reflection with an open book in her lap 
(see figure 2). And yet by exploring the history of this image and Dare Wright herself, one 
discovers how the photograph is not merely mimicking portraiture as a style but is actually 
mimicking an already created piece of artwork, as the cover of the book looks strikingly 
similar to the painting that Wright’s own mother, “Edie” (Edith Stevenson Wright), a 
successful portrait painter, painted of Wright as a child (see figure 3). In both images we see 
a girlish subject in solitude, positioned in profile, and with arms encircling an open book held 
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close to her body. In addition, whether lost in thought, reflection, or distraction, neither the 
painted girl nor the photographed doll meets the viewer’s gaze.  
   
Fig. 2. On left: the original photograph that later appeared as the cover of  
The Lonely Doll.™ 
Image courtesy of Brook Ashley and The Estate of Dare Wright. 
© Dare Wright Media / The Lonely Doll™ 
 
Fig. 3. On right: portrait of Dare Wright at age six painted by her mother Edith 
Stevenson Wright. 
Image courtesy of Brook Ashley and The Estate of Dare Wright. 
© Dare Wright Media / The Lonely Doll™ 
148 
 
 
Fig. 4: Original author photo of Dare Wright taken by Dare Wright. 
Image courtesy of Brook Ashley and The Estate of Dare Wright. 
© Dare Wright Media / The Lonely Doll™ 
This idea of mirror-image portraits produces the experience of the mise-en-abyme as even 
the author photo of Dare Wright is strikingly similar to the images she herself created of her 
doll as well as of the image her mother created of Wright as a child (see figure 4). And 
although this image is flipped (Wright’s body is facing left rather than right) and she holds a 
camera in her hands rather than a book − the pose, lighting, mood, and look of concentration 
all reflect the look and feel of “her” other two portraits. 
The Edith doll, as an object, is dead, yet its art is in how it is constantly referring and 
associating outside of itself as often as it is absorbing the attention. This doll, as art work, is 
moving, enacting the Möbius strip quality of the “shadow box.” Aside from the 
aforementioned doublings and reflections – the doll itself plays dress up in the story (the play 
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act of copying) (see figure 5) and this book as well as all of Wright’s books are literally full 
of mirrors upon mirrors, glassy reflections, and reflections in water that offer repetition as an 
entrance way to depth as well as abstract images of reflection as Edith and her bears are 
prone to slipping into liminal states like sleeping, wishing, and reading. 
                                
Fig. 5. On left: original photograph used in Dare Wright’s The Lonely Doll.™ 
Image courtesy of Brook Ashley and The Estate of Dare Wright. 
© Dare Wright Media / The Lonely Doll™ 
 
Fig. 6. On right: original photograph used as title page for Dare Wright’s  
The Lonely Doll.™ 
Image courtesy of Brook Ashley and The Estate of Dare Wright. 
© Dare Wright Media / The Lonely Doll™ 
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Edith, the doll, is also very much an image of spectacle and spectator. She is the 
spectacle, the material doll posed for photographs in the minor artwork that is this picture 
book. She seems to be very much a type of “dead” artwork because she is so unchanging. 
Her expression never alters and she, like Rilke’s doll, does not close her eyes. Even on the 
title page when the doll is depicted covering her eyes to, perhaps, count to ten before playing 
hide-and-seek – we can see that her eyes are not really covered or closed at all (see figure 6). 
 However, Wright’s doll is very much a conscious figure as well. David Colman 
writes in his 2004 New York Times article, “The Unsettling Stories of Two Lonely Dolls,” 
that there are many reactions to the book. Some found the still posed photography and the 
blank doll face “disturbing,” the spanking by the father bear as upsetting and yet others found 
the doll to be “haunting.” He also notes that, for children, the reaction is quite different:    
Its power is also due to its novel format, narration of a story through photography. 
The artist Laurie Simmons, who has explored the strangeness of dolls through 
photographs, said the images lend a heightened sense of realism to the story that is 
intoxicating to a child’s eyes. Moreover, she said, the doll’s expression never 
changes, and that makes it a potent blank screen upon which a child can project 
feelings. (Colman) 
What makes this depiction of a doll a depiction of an object with a soul is that unchanging 
face. Its watchfulness and, as with Rilke’s doll and Cornell’s “Bébé Marie,” its non-assertion 
as an observer or voyeur is how it turns its own experience into something that it is a witness 
to rather than a thing on the receiving end of experience. This position of a voyeur is further 
highlighted because of the fact that the artist depicts the doll frequently looking at mirrors, 
through mirrors, out windows or even, on the cover, where the doll is reading, but not 
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reading a text. Her eyes or, more precisely, her line of vision is never in the moment, but in 
another space − watching something other. 
Looking at the page depicting the infamous spanking scene (see figure 7) one can see 
that the doll is as detached and voyeuristic as she is in the beginning of the book, when she is 
posed to be waiting for friends or, in later parts of the book, when she is supposed to 
represent a figure enjoying herself. 
 
Fig. 7. Original photograph used in Dare Wright’s The Lonely Doll.™ 
Image courtesy of Brook Ashley and The Estate of Dare Wright. 
© Dare Wright Media / The Lonely Doll™ 
The doll is maintaining a gaze of superficiality because she is experiencing the pleasure 
(play) and the perversity (spanking) of being an artwork as well as always being able to 
watch these experiences with her blank face. Therefore, in the same moment, she is existing 
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on and in the liminal line between life and art and watching her watch us creates a very real 
moment of uncanny experience for us, the human readers. 
 
How Leśmian’s “Lalka” Looks: 
In Leśmian’s “Lalka” (in English, “The/A Doll”3) we also see how the doll is both 
alive as the spectator and dead as the spectacle in the same space. The poem begins with the 
doll acknowledging herself as an artwork, a thing of pleasure: 
Jam - lalka. W mych kolczykach szkli się zaświat dŜdŜysty, 
Suknia jawą atłasu ze snem się kojarzy. 
Lubię fajans mych oczu i zapach kleisty 
Farby, rumieńcem śmierci młodzącej mat twarzy.  (Leśmian) 
 
I am – (the/a) doll. In my earrings shines the drizzly world, 
My dress, like a daydream of satin, is reminiscent of dreaming. 
I like the delft of my eyes and the gluey smell 
Of the paint that with a blush of death makes my matte face young. 
From this first stanza, seemingly opposing claims are being made as to whether the doll is 
seen (or sees itself) as an object or a subject. First, the description is of a surface – the 
exterior of the doll. Yet, the doll is not merely noting its own surface details, but it is 
enjoying those very feminine attributes (the sparkling earrings, the blue eyes, blushed 
                                                          
3
 Polish does not have articles and so translating “Lalka” into “The Doll” or “A Doll” becomes a 
linguistic choice which informs the reading of this poem especially in the context of this analysis. Of course, a 
third choice is to merely call the poem “Doll” since English does not require that a noun be accompanied by an 
article. Also, please note that the entirety of the poem is included in the appendix as well as my working 
translation of it. Thank you to Dr. Madeline G. Levine and my own mother, Anna T. Panszczyk, for assisting 
me in the translation of this very difficult Polish poem. 
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cheeks) and perverse qualities (smelling like glue, red paint blushing its face as if bringing 
life back into a dead face) by detailing them, which emphasizes their importance, the 
importance of that surface. The description is also a constant and eager observation as the 
doll’s own gaze admires and acknowledges its own self, in the first stanza, then moves into 
gazing at the space around itself, in the second stanza, and then moves to seeing the girl in 
the third stanza. The movement away from the doll and to the girl shifts the gaze from one 
focus to the next, but that movement is still very much superficial because it moves, across 
three stanzas, from the surface of the doll to the surface of the room and then to the girl. 
 The beginning of the poem easily presents the ways in which the doll is clearly an 
object in terms of valuing the feminine and perverse surface qualities of the doll. At the same 
time the poem is also setting up the doll as a much more complicated conscious subject with 
a soul by the mere fact that the doll is, yes, the spectacle, but it is also the spectator, by its 
first person narration, which is admiring itself as an art object. Moreover, its liminal quality 
opens up to yet another level because the doll as the spectator, although acknowledging itself 
as a spectacle, an artwork, is also acknowledging the spectacle of the self as spectator 
(spectacle  -» spectator -» spectacle). The poem becomes a house of mirrors when, in the 
third stanza, the doll claims (in its own words) that it is a “non-being” and that the girl “says 
everything for me” and “pretends that she believes that I am alive.”4 Roland Barthes wrote in 
his work Roland Barthes (1977) that while listening to a recording of himself playing he 
shifts from:  
                                                          
4
 “... gdy w dłonie mój niebyt porywa / I mówi za mnie wszystko, róŜowa natchnieniem, / I udaje, Ŝe 
wierzy w to, iŜ jestem Ŝywa.” 
 
154 
 
…imitation (from description) and entrust myself to nomination. Do I not know that, 
in the field of the subject, there is no referent? The fact (whether biographical or 
textual) is abolished in the signifier, because it immediately coincides with it: writing 
myself, I merely repeat the extreme operation by which Balzac, in Sarrasine, has 
made castration and castrature “coincide”: I myself am my own symbol, I am the 
story which happens to me…. (Barthes 56) 
This same movement of coinciding is occurring to the doll within this poem because the doll 
is the symbol, the artwork, happening to itself as it moves from describing itself as a 
spectacle to forcing itself, and naming itself, to actually become a spectacle. At the same time 
the doll, as the narrator, as a spectator, is disappearing, and becoming non-existent because it 
is the story that it is telling. Consider another passage from Roland Barthes in terms of the 
doll in this poem:  
Chance has produced that rare moment in which the whole symbolic accumulates and 
forces the body to yield. He had received in a single gust all the divisions of which he 
is the object, as if, suddenly, it was the very being of exclusion with which he had 
been bludgeoned: dense and hard. For to the simple exclusions which this episode 
represented for him was added a final alienation: that of his language: he could not 
assume his distress in the very code of distress, i.e.: express it: he felt more than 
excluded: detached: forever assigned the place of the witness, whose discourse can 
only be, of course, subject to codes of detachment: either narrative, or explicative, or 
challenging, or ironic: never lyrical, never homogenous with the pathos outside of 
which he must seek his place. (Barthes 86) 
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Barthes wrote this passage about a feeling of exclusion, of difference, and how a particular 
moment was the symbolic accumulation of all of his differences and outsided-ness. The 
collected alienation was heightened by his inability to express his distress over his exclusion, 
pushing him further into the role of witness and making him feel that the only way to talk 
about such a position is through the discourse of detachment. Barthes is establishing a 
position here where the language of the voyeur seems to be the only language he permits 
himself to use in terms of his own isolation. He knows only to talk about his self as if he is 
watching the image of that self and is not necessarily experiencing it in his own body. Seeing 
the self as excluded and putting that position into a discourse is presenting the object as 
subject ideal whereas one sees the self, at a distance, as an image, and yet that image, that 
voice, is also the witness to its position as an image. It is an example of being one’s own 
object. The difference, however, between Barthes’ experience of this liminality and the doll’s 
is that the doll exists comfortably in this space while the human not only does not fully 
experience it in himself but also perceives it as alienating. 
 Consider, for example, how the dichotomy of the subjective experience and the 
existence as an object is presented as a naturally negotiated space in “Lalka.” The doll 
watches itself, and presents itself, as excluded, as an image that is a “non-being” that, as 
stated in the sixth stanza, has “a permanent expression” on its face “like the Laughing Man”5 
and as an image that can be read by an outsider. The doll shows how, in the fourth stanza, the 
girl reads its palm to tell it its future, but the doll also reads itself at a distance. Looking at the 
image of the doll, the doll writes a story about another doll, and wonders if that second doll 
would even exist since it is an image within an image, within that first doll: 
                                                          
5
 “Mam stały wyraz twarzy, niby Człowiek Śmiechu.” 
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Mam zamiar pisać powieść, której bohaterką 
Jest PraścieŜka, wiodąca urwiskami w Pralas, 
Gdzie ukryła się lalka - i nikt jej nie znalazł! 
Duszę ma z macierzanki i patrzy w lusterko.  
 
Mówi tylko dwa słowa: Papa albo Mama. (Leśmian) 
 
I intend to write a story whose heroine 
Is the Ur-path, leading along precipices into the Ur-forest, 
Where the doll was hiding—and no one found her! 
She has a soul of thyme and she looks into a mirror. 
 
She says only two words: Papa or Mama. 
In this poem, the voice of the doll as spectator and the image of the doll as spectacle become 
almost like Russian nesting dolls because both sides (the spectator and spectacle, the witness 
and the image, the life and the art) get stacked within each other and hidden until all of the 
“dolls” are folded into one another and disappear as the doll claims occur at the end of its 
story: “The world is dying... The laughing doll disappears with her parents. / There is nothing 
left except a mirror and thyme.”6 Although this line implies that this secondary doll, this 
“laughing doll,” is only the spectacle that the primary doll watches in its position as observer, 
this secondary doll also reveals itself as having its own consciousness. However, the Polish 
word “śmieszka,” though translated here as “laughing doll,” does not convey all of the 
                                                          
6
 “Ginie świat... Z rodzicami znika lalka śmieszka. /Nic nie ma prócz lusterka i prócz macierzanki.”  
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connotations of the original word which actually offers a much more complicated reading of 
this line. In Polish, “śmieszka” is not an adjective, but a noun used to refer to a grown 
woman who does not merely laugh or joke, but who uses her ability to joke and laugh as a 
persona that draws the attention of others to her. A “śmieszka” is aware of how she can 
manipulate a situation with her charm. With this expanded definition in mind, the apparent 
passivity implied when this doll “disappears with her parents” is challenged because this 
plaything is not merely tittering on like an automatic toy or a silly, flirtatious woman. Rather, 
despite her disappearance into the world of that story, this doll makes her presence known by 
deciding to act in a certain manner, by choosing to manipulate those around her so that they 
are drawn to her not as one would be to any doll, but a doll capable of making choices as to 
her own behavior. The concluding line of that stanza (“There is nothing left except a mirror 
and thyme”) reinforces this idea that this doll is more than a mere object of reflection. This 
doll is also a mirror that reflects the consciousness of the observer and, in the symbolism of 
thyme, a reminder of what is magical, mystical, and also unknown in the world.7 
The rest of the poem addresses the doll-spectator’s concern about also being a 
spectacle and how such doubling up of positions seems to add up to a broken or “not 
working” doll. The doll, though now sent to the doll hospital to be properly made into an art 
                                                          
7
 According to Gretchen Schoble and Ann Field’s The Meaning of Herbs: Myth, Language and Lore 
(2001), thyme has not only become a symbol of bravery, but is “also considered a death herb. In England there 
was a legend that the souls of murdered men rest in thyme flowers, and in Wales the herb is planted on graves. 
More cheerfully, thyme was a charm for seeing fairies, You simply collected thyme flowers from a hillside 
where the fairies were known to gather and laid the flowers upon your eyelids. Then you would have the power 
to see any fairy who happened to be nearby” (44). With such associations, it is no wonder that Shakespeare 
referenced thyme when describing the fairies in his A Midsummer Night’s Dream (see Jessica Kerr’s book 
Shakespeare’s Flowers (1997) for a fuller discussion of this topic). 
One cannot claim that the Polish poet Leśmian was aware of this exact Western European symbolic 
understanding of thyme, but it is worth noting that, according to Sophie Hodorowicz Knab’s Polish Customs, 
Traditions, & Folklore (1993), thyme, like many herbs, was also valued in Polish traditional folklore for having 
magical powers.  
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object again with a new hip, a mouth set to smile and positioned in the window to be seen, 
continues to be the object of its own voyeurism as it watches itself extend its hands “rigid 
and cupped like spoons”8 to God. The doll though reaching up is also acknowledging that 
God did not die on the cross for it, for an image, but the doll still sees itself, like God, 
pretending to be immortal. This convergence with God is something that Kleist also noted 
when he wrote about puppets:  
—But just as two intersecting lines, converging on one side of a point, reappear on 
the other after their passage through infinity, and just as our image, as we approach a 
concave mirror, vanishes to infinity only to reappear before our very eyes, so will 
grace, having likewise traversed the infinite, return to us once more, and so appear 
most purely in that bodily form that has either no consciousness at all or infinite one, 
which is to say, either in the puppet or a god. (Kleist 216) 
Bolesław Leśmian’s “Lalka” and Dare Wright’s The Lonely Doll are two very 
different works that represent the profound way that the doll can perform the roles of both 
object and subject. As an object that is seen as both alive and dead, always observing, 
admiring nothing and being a thing that is interested in the cult of the self at the same time 
that it is not a self, the doll can hold that space of spectacle and spectator, of being an object 
experienced by a subject as well as being a subject that views us as its object. As impossible 
as it may seem for a person to do, perhaps one can claim that the doll, in the liminal state of 
dollhood, can exist successfully and fully on this line between life and art. 
                                                          
8
 “ścisłe i wklęsłe jak łyŜki” 
  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
THE DOLL IN DOLLHOOD 
Every secret is a collective assemblage. The secret is not at all an immobilized or 
static notion. Only becomings are secrets; the secret has a becoming.  
from Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (1987), 317 
 
Introduction: 
In this dissertation, the liminality of the doll was explored through its quality as a 
“shadow,” as a “box,” and as a “shadow box.” The “shadow” highlighted how dynamic the 
visual experience of the doll soul is to the viewer. The “box” provided a reading of the depth 
of that doll soul through its physicality and tangibility. And through the “shadow box,” a 
concept which bridges the “shadow” with the “box,” the complexity and power of the doll 
consciousness is articulated as something that registers beyond being simply read as a 
representation of soul or form, but is actually a moving and fluctuating assemblage of both 
that is unique to the doll itself. Recognizing the doll as such an assemblage results in pushing 
the toy beyond our own subjective experiences and into a field of experience that the doll 
embraces and epitomizes: that state of liminality where it can be both the observed object and 
the observing subject at − and in − the same moment.   
However, the reason to examine, compare, and then articulate the richness of the 
doll’s identity in such disparate and various works of twentieth-century literature and art is 
not merely because the doll, as an image, is a tantalizing and engaging thing to explore. 
Rather, the value in investigating how the doll has been represented in such a variety of texts 
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grants us a new entrance into understanding the anxiety that was present in the relationship 
between human beings and their possessions in the twentieth century as well as how it may 
continue to exist into the twenty-first century. The culmination of this anxiety, and thus the 
height of the uncanny experience associated with this toy, is that the liminal nature of the doll 
can and does overwhelm and eclipse that of the human when the two identities are placed on 
the same stage as equals.  
Therefore, in this concluding chapter, in addition to referencing Susan Stewart’s On 
Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection (1984) and 
Jane Bennett’s “The Force of Things: Steps toward an Ecology of Matter” (2004), I employ 
Sylvia Cassedy’s children’s book, Lucie Babbidge’s House (1989) as a type of summary text 
that captures how the full existence and capacity of the doll in dollhood is able to confront, 
unsettle, and usurp human identity. In other words, the goal of this chapter is to call attention 
to the fullest expression of the doll’s power in the liminal state of dollhood to the human 
existence.  
 
Why Dolls at All?:   
Susan Stewart notes in her work, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the 
Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection (1984), that the concept of the miniature encourages 
and expresses an idea of the “within within within.” She writes:  
A house within a house, the dollhouse not only presents the house’s articulation of the 
tension between inner and outer spheres, of exteriority and interiority – it also 
represents the tension between two modes of interiority. Occupying a space with an 
enclosed space, the dollhouse’s aptest analogy is the locket of the secret recesses of 
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the heart: center within center, within within within. The dollhouse is dollhouse is a 
materialized secret; what we look for is the dollhouse within the dollhouse and its 
promise of an infinitely profound interiority. (61)   
In play, this concept is expressed when children engage with miniature objects (also known 
as toys, dolls), imagine the actions those objects will perform, and then provide those 
miniatures with a narrative which, in turn, gives the miniature objects a secret history. 
According to Stewart, the miniature creates a constant pull into interiority (the within within 
the within). She uses the example of the dollhouse to express this idea as a type of mise-en-
abyme. The dollhouse is the miniature of the “real” house, but the doll maker’s interest is not 
as much in the construction of the outside of the dollhouse as he is focused on the interiors, 
the withins (the miniatures within the miniatures, the secrets within the secret). Dolls, those 
residents of dollhouses, also express that type of infinite interiority. A child engages with 
dolls, plays out stories for dolls, projects fantasies onto dolls, creates families and pasts for 
dolls, and so shapes the idea that dolls have their own secrets, histories, and identities. In 
other words, (to use another doll image as an example) the pull into interiority can also be 
simplified in the image of Russian nesting dolls, but where there is no final doll at its center. 
Furthermore, the dolls’ resemblance to the human reinforces the idea that dolls, unlike other 
miniatures and toys, have a consciousness as profound as that of the humans who play with 
them. In the unblinking acknowledgment of past-ness and secret history which is imagined 
by children and feared by adults as well as their “likeness” to ourselves, dolls thus reflect the 
Freudian idea of the uncanny because they close and muddy the space between our “real” 
identities and their “imagined” ones. They are therefore the definition and first experience of 
the ensouled object in dollhood. 
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The Doll on the Human Stage: 
But what then if this enlivened assemblage known as the doll is put on the same stage 
as the complex human identity? The result is an expression of the full power of the doll’s real 
uncanniness and profound liminality because even though it, unlike us, can be both a subject 
and an object in a way that is unique to its own existence − it, with us, can also be 
indistinguishable from us.  
The immaterial shadow inside the material form is of interest to Jane Bennett who, in 
her “The Force of Things: Steps toward an Ecology of Matter” (2004), breaks away from 
seeing things as mirrors or “faces” in her conceptualization of a material “thing-power” in 
which she seeks to describe “a materialism of lively matter, to be placed in conversation with 
the historical materialism of Marx and the body materialism of feminist and cultural studies” 
(347). Bennett wishes to discuss the possibility of ecological1 implications when the power of 
the thing is not only recognized but also is seen as sharing top billing with the human: 
I want to give voice to a less specifically human kind of materiality, to make manifest 
what I call “thing-power.” I do so in order to explore the possibility that attentiveness 
to (nonhuman) things and their powers can have a laudable effect on humans. (I am 
not utterly uninterested in humans.) In particular, might, as Thoreau suggested, 
sensitivity to thing-power induce a stronger ecological sense? (Bennett, “Force of 
Things” 248) 
                                                          
1
 To clarify her use of this term, Bennett claims that “to call something ecological is to draw attention 
to its necessary implication in a network of relations, to mark its persistent tendency to enter a working system” 
(“Force of Things” 365). For further clarification on Bennett’s understanding of the modern use of  the term 
“ecology” as a network of relationships and interactions that “came from Darwin through Ernst Haeckel,”  see 
her endnote 66 (“Force of Things” 372). 
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Engaging in a conversation about “things” with a number of theorists, most significantly 
Theodor Adorno’s idea of “nonidentity” as defined in his Negative Dialectics (1966), 
Bennett draws on Manuel De Landa’s view that the power of nonhuman materiality can be 
recognized in the ability to “self-organize,”2 Bruno Latour’s term for a material agency 
(“actant”3),  and, most fully, Gilles Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s concept of assemblage,4 as 
well as “the Spinozist idea that bodies have a propensity to form collectives” (“Force of 
Things” 349). Bennett suggests that “thing-power, as a kind of agency, is the property of an 
assemblage”: 
Thing-power materialism is a (necessarily speculative) onto-theory that presumes that 
matter has an inclination to make connections and form networks of relations with 
varying degrees of stability. Here, then, is an affinity between thing-power 
materialism and ecological things: both advocate the cultivation of an enhanced sense 
of the extent to which all things are spun together in a dense web, and both warn of 
                                                          
2
 As quoted in Bennett’s article, De Landa claims in his A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History 
(2000) that “inorganic matter-energy has a wider range of alternatives for the generation of structure than just 
simple phase transitions…. In other words, even the humblest forms of matter and energy have the potential for 
self-organization” (“Force of Things” 351). 
 
3
 “Unlike the term ‘actor,’ an actant can be either human or nonhuman: it is that which does something, 
has sufficient coherence to perform actions, produce effects, and alter situations” (Bennett, “Force of Things” 
355). For Latour’s use of this term, see his Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (1999) 
(specifically the definition of “Actor, Actant” as noted in the glossary section of that work). 
 
4
 Bennett is using the term “assemblage” as illustrated in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus 
(1987). In the second footnote in her essay, “The Agency of Assemblages and the North American Blackout” 
(2005), Bennett defines the concept: 
“An assemblage is, first, an ad hoc grouping, a collectivity whose origins are historical and circumstantial, 
though its contingent status says nothing about its efficacy, which can be quite strong. An assemblage is, 
second, a living, throbbing grouping whose coherence coexists with energies and countercultures that exceed 
and confound it. An assemblage is, third, a web with an uneven topography: some of the points at which the 
trajectories of actants cross each other are more heavily trafficked than others, and thus power is not equally 
distributed across the assemblage. An assemblage is, fourth, not governed by a central power: no one member 
has sufficient competence to fully determine the consequences of the activities of the assemblage. An 
assemblage, finally, is made up of many types of actants: humans and nonhumans; animals, vegetables, and 
minerals; nature, culture, and technology.” (Bennett, “Agency of Assemblages” 445) 
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the self-destructive character of human actions that are reckless with regard to the 
other nodes of the web. (“Force of Things” 354) 
Clearly, Bennett’s argument that “Thing-power entails the ability to shift or vibrate between 
states of being, to go from trash/inanimate/resting to treasure/animate/alert” (Ibid) does not 
deviate much from Bill Brown’s theory that “misuse value” acts as the shifting force between 
the state of being an “object” to the state of being a “thing” (Brown, “Sense of Things” 74-5). 
However, where Bennett pushes thing theory is by first proposing that both the human and 
nonhuman equally engage and work in a moving assemblage of matter. Neither priority nor 
superiority is granted to the human. Both human and object share the same stage: 
For a thing-power materialist, humans are always in composition with nonhumanity, 
never outside of a sticky web of connections or an ecology. 
Thing-power is the lively energy and/or resistant pressure that issues from one 
material assemblage and is received by others. Thing-power, in other words, is 
immanent in collectives that include humans, the beings best able to recount the 
experience of the force of things. Thing-power materialism emphasizes the closeness, 
the intimacy, of humans and nonhumans. (“Force of Things” 365) 
However, even more arresting is Bennett’s implication that the human and the thing can 
exchange and change states of being not merely through a corporeal interchange (a 
mechanical arm on a human body as was the case for Peter in Ian McEwan’s The 
Daydreamer or real eyes for Hoffmann’s mechanical girl) but also through an immaterial one 
akin to, perhaps, the child’s idea of claiming another’s shadow. Bennett argues for such an 
exchange when she states that “thing-power” materialism “is a dynamic flow of matter-
energy that tends to settle into various bodies, bodies that often join forces, make 
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connections, form alliances…”(Ibid). She further suggests that the distinction between 
subject and object is erased because “humans are always in composition with nonhumanity, 
never outside of a sticky web of connections” (Ibid). In other words, for Bennett, to 
recognize “things” as having power (or, for Brown, to see an object as a “thing”) is to not 
only recognize them as having a resemblance to us but also to acknowledge that, like us, each 
“thing” is a subject; that each object too has its own existence. 
 
Being a Doll (or a Human?) in Lucie Babbidge’s House: 
Sylvia Cassedy’s Lucie Babbidge’s House (published in 1989) is a middle grade 
novel which captures this closing in of identity (between imagined/doll and real/human) 
through the use of the endless representation of mise-en-abyme and the pull of interiority in 
not only the story structure, but also in the very body of its protagonist, Lucie Babbidge. 
More than presenting the fear of life in the artifice or representing depth of interiority, this 
use of mise-en-abyme creates a feeling of uncanniness as layers of identity are presented as 
being both recognizably separate and disturbingly merged in Lucie. Lucie is not a simple 
little nesting doll, but a surrealist’s depiction of one as identities within her do not elegantly 
overlap each other in the neatness of a Venn diagram, but overlap haphazardly and randomly 
as coins thrown in a fountain. At the end of the novel, a sense of the fantastic also erupts as 
no clear answer is given as to which of the Lucie identities the reader can trust as real and 
which as imagined, but also whether the reader can even recognize the difference at all. The 
fantastic then also enters into the questions as to whether there even was a “real” Lucie and 
whether that should (or can) even matter in the understanding of the text.   
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Lucie, a lonely and ill-treated schoolgirl, lives at Norwood Hall where she is 
victimized by not only her fellow classmates for her shyness and insecurity, but also by her 
teacher, Miss Pimm. She finds solace by playing with an old dollhouse she finds hidden 
away in the school’s basement and the dolls she finds within it and the dolls she herself 
makes for it. With this dollhouse, she not only plays out her own fantasies as to what she 
would wish her life to be like, but she also plays out the events that are going on around her 
and includes those whom she knows in her present life, like her classmates and teacher. The 
members of the dollhouse include a Lucie, Mumma, Dada, Emmett, Maude, Olive, and a Mr. 
Broome. The family, their maid, and live-in piano teacher are all kind to their daughter, 
Lucie (the doll), as the doll tells them all the things she learned in school that day, how she 
got along with her friends, and how she eagerly responded correctly to her kind teacher’s, 
Miss Pimm’s, questions.  
However, initially, as Lois Rostow Kuznets notes in her book, Narratives of 
Animation, Metamorphosis, and Development, only toward the end of chapter two does the 
reader realize that the actions within the dollhouse are the actions of Lucie’s imagination and 
not what is “really” occurring in her life (126). Before that moment in the story, the reader is 
led to believe that the narration about the doll is actually about the real Lucie. Cassedy’s 
choice in organizing her narrative and use of perspective clearly reveals that she wants her 
reader to confuse the life of the doll with the actual girl. Lucie, in fact, never leaves her 
school and has no family; she is also neither popular nor outspoken. Once the relationship 
between the doll and the girl is understood, the reader is directed to see that the way in which 
Lucie plays with the dolls is actually a simple game of projecting as the doll becomes 
representative of Lucie’s own familial desires − where she has a loving home, is popular at 
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school, and even that she has the comfort of a repeated and familiar pattern (the one which 
she plays out with the dolls again and again – of coming home from school, having the same 
snack, and listening to her brother, Emmett, make the same type of bad puns every day.5 
Although the doubleness of the Lucies may be reasoned out in the first few chapters, 
those same chapters also hint to the more profound representation of the multiplicity of 
identity that is the core of this story. In other words, not only is the doll Lucie a double for 
the girl Lucie’s imagined life, but other, subtler, interiorities exist as well. There is the 
within-ness of sounds and spellings in names like Mumma, Dada and Emmett; the 
doubleness of identity with object (aside from child Lucie with Lucie the doll) – Olive is 
named for an olive, Mr. Broome for a broom as well as the fact that both those dolls are 
actually clothes pins that keep falling down, as Lucy notes, like clothes pins. Even the baby, 
Maude, is named from a song that Lucie is incapable of singing in class, but knows all the 
lyrics to when doll Lucie sings it to her family.  
Nevertheless, the dolls and dollhouse, as representation for Lucie’s loneliness, do not 
hold steady on that one level of “within-ness,” discovered early on by the reader in chapter 
two, of doll Lucie living the life that girl Lucie wishes she lived. Nor is the clever doubling 
of sounds, dialog, and actions that take place within the dollhouse the only example of an 
unstable multiplicity of identity in this children’s classic. Girl Lucie’s (as I will refer to her 
for the sake of clarity) class is assigned to write a letter to someone, “a personage” as Miss 
Pimm says, in order to learn the rules of formal correspondence (Cassedy, “Lucie” 20). Lucie 
                                                          
5
 An example of Emmett’s punning would be the following exchange: 
“I want to go to school, too,” Emmett said to the ceiling, “and plant a jungle bean.” 
“You will, Emmett,” Mumma told him. “When you’ve grown some more.” 
“How much more?” 
“At least another foot.” 
“Grow another foot!” Emmett raised his heels above his head and examined them. “But Mumma, two 
are all I need.” (Cassedy, “Lucie” 15)  
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knows no one to write to, but finds a name, “Delia Hornsby” and an address, in England, on 
the back of the dollhouse. The back of the dollhouse also has written the year, 1885, as the 
year in which Delia Hornsby died. Knowing this, girl Lucie still writes to the address and this 
deceased Delia only to, surprisingly, receive a letter from a girl, also named Delia Hornsby, 
who claims to be the great-great granddaughter of the “original” Delia Hornsby. This 
younger Delia, as she tells girl Lucie in the letter, is also living in the real house that her 
great-great grandmother once lived in and that her house is the very house that the dollhouse 
was made to replicate. 
  Girl Lucie does not write back, but Delia continues to write to Lucie whom she calls 
“her best friend” and for a vast part of the novel, the reader is led to believe that Delia is a 
real girl who is reaching out and connecting with girl Lucie. As the end of the novel begins to 
reveal relationships, the reader realizes that not only does young Delia Hornsby not exist, but 
there is neither a name nor an address written on the back of the dollhouse and thus there 
never existed an original Delia Hornsby who died in 1885 or an original house in which she 
lived. Unlike understanding the difference between girl and doll Lucie, this discovery is 
revealed subtly as the story progresses. The reader first begins to see too many similarities 
between Delia’s life and the events that are occurring around girl Lucie. The adventures that 
she begins to play out with doll Lucie exist in eerie parallel with the adventures that Delia is 
having in England and describing to Lucie in her letters. In addition, girl Lucie’s as well as 
doll Lucie’s teacher is reading, to her class, a collection of stories about a family called the 
Pendletons and the adventures that those characters are having are also occurring to Delia 
(also, to note, both are taking place in England). Delia, throughout most of the novel, is a pen 
pal that is first presented to the reader as “real” but is actually an imagined girl who lives in 
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the imagined “original” of the dollhouse. Now, not only is girl Lucie mixing her identity with 
doll Lucie, but Delia is also an identity within girl Lucie and within Delia is another Delia, 
another house and another family’s, a fictional family’s, story.  
Representation is constantly at odds with permanence as ideas of identity continue to 
escape labels and limitations in this novel. The reader must continually attempt to untangle 
the relationship between human and doll characters in order to assign certain ones the title of 
“imagined,” others “real,” and to unpack what is “really” happening and what is not. The 
story, however, grandly frustrates the reader’s desire to make such frames within the mise-
en-abyme clearly delineated. Cassedy does not only express the idea of a within within 
within interiority (like nesting dolls), but also shows how those “withins” are identities 
connected with and to each other and other “withins” in more than a controlled image of 
circle within circle within circle. In fact, to describe what Cassedy is doing is to visualize 
overlapping, haphazardly thrown circles because there is no identity that exists, and touches, 
only one other identity at a time. Consider Delia again. Her identity, by the end of the story, 
overlaps with an imagined great grandmother, the house in which she lives, the adventures 
that she shares with a fictional family, the parallel situations she falls into with doll Lucie 
and, of course, girl Lucie and her imagination in which Delia seems to exist exclusively as 
“imagined,” for us, but is also entirely “real” for girl Lucie and for us for a great part of the 
story. Another example of the text’s resistance to creating a linear intertexuality is the way 
girl Lucie infuses her actions, dreams, and play with her own “real” memories of a day at the 
beach with her deceased parents. However, these “real” moments now have the haze of 
memory (which is already a medley of all sorts of ideas of what is or was real and what is or 
was imagined) that is also mixed with non-memories or imaginings as to what happened on 
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that same day at the beach and what she wished happened or could have happened in that 
day. All of these unstable spaces build to the culmination of the experience of reading a 
dollhood narrative. What seems to have existed in any sort of measurable reality was made 
unsteady by that initial presence of, and then engagement with, a doll in a dollhouse. It was 
that encounter in play, as seeing the doll as a true self equal to that of the human self, that led 
to a complicated disintegration of identities (human or otherwise) as well as a truly uncanny 
experience for the reader. 
The novel continues on with these multiple layers of representation within 
representation. Not a single surface of identity is represented with a single within-ness, but it 
all seems to get deeper and wider mixing memory, made-up memory, daydream, play, 
stories, correspondence, and mirroring into the body and mind of one large symbol: the shy 
and isolated girl Lucie. She then seems to be what Roland Barthes says about himself in his 
work, Roland Barthes: “I myself my own symbol, I am the story which happens to me…” 
(56). 
Finally, at the end of the novel (after her dolls are stolen by her classmates, her pen 
pal, Delia, is kidnapped, and she is able to sort out what has happened to all and to 
understand some of the connections between them), girl Lucie seems to gain a sense of 
identity and power.  She stands up for herself, for the first time, in class, leading the reader to 
believe that the only way to come to terms or comprehend the representations of interiority 
presented throughout the story is to understand them as being held, simply, within the larger 
frame that is the body of girl Lucie herself. Supporting this reading is the fact that this single 
strong identity not only feels empowered enough to respond to her teacher but also finally 
confident enough to respond to Delia’s letters and write Delia about her own life. At this 
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point, the reader feels as if, at least, the frame of the mise-en-abyme is understood. We began 
with girl Lucie and within her, of her, are copies which recur into infinity (doll Lucie, the 
Delias, the Pendletons, her stories, her dreams, her memories), but those copies are not 
simulacra because the original is known. Girl Lucie is the original even though a complex 
web of circles exists within her.  
However, the very end of Lucie Babbidge’s House jars the reader again and presents 
girl Lucie as part of the Möbius strip of infinite identity and not as its starting point or 
original. In class, when she finally stakes an identity, has a voice − she uses, surprisingly, 
another voice. Throughout the novel, “Emmett,” the boy/brother/doll keeps saying bad puns. 
This is an act that is singularly his. No other doll or character speaks in this way. Yet, a pun 
is the very last thing that Lucie says in this book which is supposed to be her moment of 
independence and strength. Her teacher tells her to “pick up your head” and Lucie replies: 
“How can I, Miss Pimm?” and adds: “How can I, when it never fell off in the first place?” 
(Cassedy, “Lucie” 242). 
The fact that Lucie speaks so to the teacher is startling not only for the reader, but 
also for her classmates, who stop what they are doing and look up in surprise. They are 
surprised because this response is so unlike her, but the reader is surprised because it seems 
as if she has become a doll, the doll identity has claimed her. The language of doubling 
which we associate with Emmett is now coming out of her mouth. It is not a voice or a tone 
that the reader thinks of as belonging to her. The reader clearly sees this voice as belonging 
to Emmett and Cassedy’s decision to use it, instead of inventing a new voice to represent girl 
Lucie’s independence, is telling. It is as if she wants us to see Emmett as bursting through 
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and breaking the supposedly fixed frame of identity that is Lucie. In addition, the choice to 
use punning is interesting because, as Lois Rostow Kuznets writes: 
…the nature of verbal play in toy dialogue … frequently depends on ‘naïve’ punning 
or literal misreadings of figurative language, significant in calling into question 
conventional notions of the relation between language and “reality,” signifier and 
signified. (2) 
 That understanding of pun and the use of it here thus contributes to the collapsing of the 
simple truth that the reader may have established up to this point − that though the identities 
within identities within identities may not be as clearly delineated as nesting dolls, they all 
inhabit one real thing, the girl Lucie. Yet, now, how is that true if not only is another’s 
distinctive voice coming out of her mouth, breaking through the mise-en-abyme frame, but 
that that voice is the voice of a toy as well as a voice which uses puns, language which 
confuses its relationship to reality? Is the reader so sure that Lucie is real if a miniature is 
talking for her as if she were actually the doll?  
 To further support this idea that girl Lucie is not even the one real that the reader can 
count on, consider how Cassedy describes Lucie after Miss Pimm tells her to pick up her 
head:  
For a long, long moment, Lucie didn’t answer or even move. Then, suddenly, she  
stood straight up and tall, and, with her eyes on Miss Pimm, spoke in a voice both 
strong and clear. (Cassedy, “Lucie” 243) 
Robotic? Possessed? Uncanny? There were many instances of uncanniness and dolls in this 
middle-grade novel, but by presenting Lucie as a doll − is that the final moment of the 
uncanny? This is the moment in which the reader realizes that perhaps, yes, girl Lucie is not 
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a girl at all, but a doll herself (this idea is further supported by Cassedy herself if one is to 
also consider her other children’s book, Behind the Attic Wall (1983), in which what we 
think of as people turn out to be dolls when they “die”). At the very least, girl Lucie is part of 
the author’s identity (she is, after all, Cassedy’s creation), but also the reader’s doll (molded 
in each of the story readers’ imaginations). A great part of the uncanniness in Lucie 
Babbidge’s House and its liminality is that it makes the reader doubt what is reality and what 
is imagination, what is the past and what is the present. Part of the sense of fantastic of this 
novel’s articulation of dollhood is the fact that it leaves the reader with a sense of overall 
confusion – wondering if anything, in fact, is to be trusted in any of the houses, in any of the 
identities, built by Sylvia Cassedy or by ourselves as readers. Even after the sorting out of the 
inter-textuality and infinity of Lucie’s identities, can one, after all, even believe that there is a 
first real frame, a real “Lucie,” at all? 
As in all the texts discussed in this dissertation, the profound experience of the 
uncanny is set into motion in this text because of the unique liminal nature of the doll. The 
doll is not only the emblem, but also the inventor of this interstructural state where 
boundaries of identity, imagination, and the object collapse and become redefined. A 
seemingly innocuous plaything, this child’s toy can bring to light the troubling and 
challenging relationship we have to our things − those objects that we think we possess, but 
secretly fear may possess us too. 
APPENDIX 
 
Original version of “Lalka” by Bolesław Leśmian followed by the English translation. 
 
“Lalka” 
by Bolesław Leśmian 
 
Jam - lalka. W mych kolczykach szkli się zaświat dŜdŜysty, 
Suknia jawą atłasu ze snem się kojarzy. 
Lubię fajans mych oczu i zapach kleisty 
Farby, rumieńcem śmierci młodzącej mat twarzy. 
 
Lubię leŜeć, gdy pokój słonecznieje czynnie, 
Na strojnego dywanu naroŜnej purpurze, 
Gdzie irys obok sarny kwitnie bezroślinnie,  
A z wieczności pluszowej unoszą się kurze. 
 
Dziewczynce, co się moim bawi nieistnieniem,  
Wdzięczna jestem, gdy w dłonie mój niebyt porywa 
I mówi za mnie wszystko, róŜowa natchnieniem,  
I udaje, Ŝe wierzy w to, iŜ jestem Ŝywa. 
 
Pilnie wróŜy mi z ręki, Ŝe w najbliŜszym maju 
W świat wyruszę, a w drogę wezmę chleb i zorze,  
By piechtami wędrując po Znaszlitymkraju,  
W ustach chłopca włóczęgi całować bezdroŜe. 
 
UbezdroŜyć się muszę na ziemi i w niebie,  
By w chwili, kiedy najmniej spodobam się losom, 
Znaleźć się niespodzianie, na przekór niebiosom,  
W połoŜeniu - bez wyjścia - bez śmierci - bez siebie. 
 
Mam stały wyraz twarzy, niby Człowiek Śmiechu.  
Znam tę powieść i inne... Ta sama dziewczynka 
Uczyła mnie czytania, jak się uczy grzechu, 
I jestem pełna wiedzy, jak do listów skrzynka. 
 
Mam zamiar pisać powieść, której bohaterką 
Jest PraścieŜka, wiodąca urwiskami w Pralas, 
Gdzie ukryła się lalka - i nikt jej nie znalazł! 
Duszę ma z macierzanki i patrzy w lusterko.  
 
Mówi tylko dwa słowa: Papa albo Mama.  
Mama - mówi do śmierci, a Papa - do grobu 
I śmieje się... Sen chwieje łbem u próŜni Ŝłobu, 
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A ona śmiechu swego nasłuchuje sama. 
 
Koniec mojej powieści jest ten, Ŝe PraścieŜka 
Odbiera sobie Ŝycie... W mgle są o tym wzmianki…  
Ginie świat... Z rodzicami znika lalka śmieszka. 
Nic nie ma prócz lusterka i prócz macierzanki.  
 
WartoŜ pisać tę powieść? Baśń wyszła juŜ z mody,  
Jak krynolina z tęczy!... Módl się do korala  
O wiersz barwny!... Zszarzały dusze i ogrody,  
A mnie wkrótce do lalek poniosą szpitala. 
 
Wyrwę w biodrach zasklepią, brew wznowią nad okiem,  
Wargom uśmiech narzucą taki, Ŝe aŜ zbrzydnie, 
I na pokaz wystawią, abym się bezwstydnie 
Do przechodniów łatanym mizdrzyła urokiem. 
 
Stracę wartość. Nastąpią cen spadki i zniŜki.  
I wówczas, gdy juŜ mroki poczuję w pobliŜu, 
Wyciągnę dłonie ścisłe i wklęsłe jak łyŜki, 
Do Boga, co nie za mnie umierał na krzyŜu! 
 
On, wiedząc, jak mi trudno, choć sen się snem łata, 
Grać rolę siebie samej na świata arenie, 
Dla prób nieśmiertelności, po zniŜonej cenie 
Nabędzie mnie - za jedną łzę z tamtego świata! 
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“(The/A) Doll” 
 
I am – (the/a) doll. In my earrings shines the drizzly world, 
My dress, like a daydream of satin, is reminiscent of dreaming. 
I like the delft of my eyes and the gluey smell 
Of the paint that with a blush of death makes my matte face young. 
 
When the room fills with sun, I like to lie 
On the corner of an elegant purple rug 
Where an iris beside a deer blooms lifelessly,  
And dust rises up from plush eternity. 
 
To the girl who plays with my non-existence, 
I am grateful when she grasps my non-being in her hands 
And says everything for me, rosy with inspiration, 
And pretends that she believes that I am alive. 
 
She carefully foretells from my palm that next May 
I will set out into the world, taking bread and dawns for my journey, 
So that, traveling on foot through TheLandYouMayKnow,1 
I might kiss roadlessness on the lips of a vagabond boy. 
 
I must make myself roadless on the earth and in heaven 
So that in the moment when I am least pleasing to the facts 
I shall find myself, unexpectedly, to spite the heavens, 
In a position—without exit—without death—without myself.  
 
I have a permanent expression on my face, like the Laughing Man, 
I know that story2 and others... This same girl 
Taught me how to read and how to learn sin, 
And I am full of knowledge, like a mailbox. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 “TheLandYouMayKnow” is an attempt to translate the neologism “Znaszlitymkraju” which can be 
more literally translated as “DoYouKnowThisLand.” A reference to the Adam Mickiewicz poem, “Do H... 
Wezwanie do Neapolu (naśladowanie z Goethego)” (“To H… Invitation to Naples (An Imitation of Goethe)”), 
Leśmian has turned the Mickiewicz culturally important and popular phrase/question “Znasz li ten kraj...?” 
(“Do you know this land? (Or “country of origin”)) into a single word, declined it like a noun, and, as Dr. 
Madeline G. Levine notes, “imbued it with the dreamy sentiment of the entire love lyric in which the past is 
recalled as a beautiful landscape.” 
 
2
 The reference to “that story” is a reference to “Człowiek Śmiechu” (“Laughing Man”) the Polish 
translation of Victor Hugo's novel, “L'Homme qui rit” (thanks again to Dr. Madeline G. Levine for making this 
connection).  In Hugo’s story, an English boy, born of noble birth, is kidnapped as a baby and, in order to be 
sold as a carnival freak, his face is mutilated into a disturbing permanent grin. 
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I intend to write a story whose heroine 
Is the Ur-path, leading along precipices into the Ur-forest, 
Where the doll was hiding—and no one found her! 
She has a soul of thyme and she looks into a mirror. 
 
She says only two words: Papa or Mama. 
Mama—she says to death, and Papa—to the grave. 
And laughs... dream sways its head near the void of the gully,  
And she listens intently to her laughter alone. 
 
The end of my story is this, that the Ur-path 
Takes her own life... There are mentions of this in the fog... 
The world is dying... The laughing doll disappears with her parents. 
There is nothing left except a mirror and thyme. 
 
Is it worth it to write this story? Fairy tales are out of fashion, 
Like rainbow-colored crinolines!... Pray to coral 
For colorful verse!... Souls and gardens have grown gray, 
And as for me, they'll soon take me to a hospital for dolls. 
 
They will seal the gap in my hips, renew the brow above my eye, 
Afix a smile to my lips until it turns ugly, 
And put me on display so I can shamelessly 
Wink to those passersby with my mended charm. 
 
I will lose value. There will be sales and price reductions. 
And then, when I already feel darkness nearby, 
I will extend my hands, rigid and cupped like spoons 
To God, who did not die on the cross for me! 
 
He, knowing how hard it is for me, though my dreams do intertwine, 
To play the role of myself in the world's arena, 
For tests of immortality, at a reduced price, 
Will acquire me—for a single tear from the other world! 
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